World Nuclear Order

New Horizons Of The Nuclear Age - Book Review  By Gp Capt TP Srivastava 

Editor's Note 

"New  Horizons of the Nuclear Age is a book by Ichimasa Sukeyuki that analyzes the evolving nuclear landscape. The book's strengths include:

·         Bridging theory and reality

The book connects traditional deterrence theory with the realities of technological change and multipolarity.

·         Historical context and contemporary policy

The book's analysis is grounded in both historical context and contemporary policy debates.

·         Innovative approach

The book includes "Column" and "Coffee Break" sections that provide supplementary insights and a break from the theoretical discussions.

The book's nuanced analysis is relevant for today's security environment. " 

Above quoted text is the 'AI Overview'  of the book ' New Horizons of the Nuclear Age' by Ichimasa Sukeyuki 

Eversince its release this book has received  several  book  reviews  that  have surfaced in the print and electronic media.

This review by Gp Capt TP.Srivastava is relevant to India  and  would interest all Indians located around the globe . Views given in the  article are  author's personal views.

Editor MVI

Historians and story tellers normally say that Mahabharata took place because of one blind person; king Dhritrashtra, who was blind since birth. That is incorrect. Mahabharata took place due to two blind men. The other ‘blind’ person, who could see was Bhishma Pitamah, whose idealism led to totally avoidable war and annihilation of Kauravas, the very people whom he was supposed to protect.

Bhishma Pitamah was a mythological figure. But in real world of today, self proclaimed conceptual/intellectual czars are the biggest threat not only to civilized society but also to the world peace and stability. These conceptual czars come wrapped in various fabrics and have mastered the art of telling the world what not to do rather than ‘what to do’.

In the modern era too, there is no dearth of numerous ‘Bhishma Pitamahas’. They are omni-present as individuals as well as institutions. For example one such intellectual czar was an eminent American social scientist, who challenged the age old philosophy of grooming a child (read future of the mankind) by propagating the precept of ‘no corporal punishment’ to an errant child in schools. He successfully challenged the age old precept of ‘spare the rod, spoil the child’ and convinced the parents/teachers in mostly nucleus families (inadequate supervision/monitoring) to ignore the tantrums/misdemeanours of the child. His theory of ‘no corporal punishment’ has virtually destroyed and torn the fabric of western society. India, too, is on same route to self destruction. The result is that USA suffers the ignominy of having produced number of gun toting teenagers shooting their own colleagues indiscriminately every now and then.

Example of social scientist has been mentioned merely to reinforce the fact that there are any number of pseudo military strategists, who propagate various theories based not only on idealistic options but also on presumptuous imagination. One such example is the dream to have a nuclear weapons free world. While dreaming so in broad day light with eyes wide open they also talk of containment and non proliferation of nukes knowing fully well that neither is possible in foreseeable future. 

Ever since the nuclear holocaust event of Hiroshima and Nagasaki proponents of non-proliferation have held innumerable seminars, authored thousands of volumes but to no avail because all of them individually and collectively viewed only the destructive capability of the nukes and called it Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). But they have failed to realize that it is the ‘potency’ of the nukes that is more powerful than any diplomatic overture in maintaining peace, however uneasy it might be. Near perfect example is China going nuclear in 1964. USA had conveyed threat to China (through India) that if China continues with Korean offensive USA will use nukes. China took a vow that they will never again be blackmailed. China went nuclear in 1964 and in 2024 has attained same/similar capability as the erstwhile super powers.

Last full blown war fought by India was in 1971. That was before we became a nuclear power. 53 years have gone by but no wars in spite of situation along LoC and LAC having deteriorated. Why? Because China, India and Pakistan are nuclear powers. China and Pakistan have openly threatened India with use of nukes but have not dared to exercise that option because they know the consequences of retaliation by India. China’s recent melt down is a proof of that.

Now about the book its contents and review. The contents of the book ‘New Horizons of Nuclear Age’ authored by Japanese intellectuals carry their perceptions, views and assumptions most of which are based on unsubstantiated facts and have been listed as mere statements. What is of interest and concern to me is that book has been reviewed by a NMF functionary and meets NMF aspirations. My comments are in India centric context.

“The chapters collectively argue that the world is moving away from the relatively stable nuclear order of the Cold War into a fragmented environment where strategic stability is under unprecedented pressure.”

Quoted above is the utterly flawed and unconvincing justification/argument that world is moving away from ‘Stable nuclear order of Cold War’. It merely indicates level of ignorance of the intellectuals concerned. World faced the most probable chances of a nuclear exchange between USSR and USA during Cold War era.  Mention of Cuban missile crisis needs no reaffirmation. In fact more tonnage (destructive power) THAN THE TWO NUKES has been used in the ongoing wars in middle east and erstwhile USSR.

The issues discussed by four authors are;

1.     Strategic Stability in a Fragmented World (Sukeyuki).

2.     Revisiting Stability-Instability Paradox (Kurita Masahiro)

3.     Nuclear Compellance : A risky Proposition (Ohnishi Ken)

4.     Disruptive Potential of New Domains (Arie Koichi)

5.     Pragmatic Approach to Arms Control (Sukeyuki)

Collectively all four authors have said the same things albeit worded differently while supposedly covering different domains. Not one has attempted to make explicit recommendations, which can be implicitly applied and be verifiable. Author/s have used terms viz ‘Nuclear Super Powers’. They are obviously using English phrase because there is nothing like ‘nuclear super powers’. Let me explain. If one nation has 1000 nukes and the other has 100, pseudo strategists will identify the nation having 1000 warheads as more powerful. ‘NO’. If the nation having 100 nukes has the capability of retaliatory strike with 10 nukes, that nation, too, is as powerful. What better example than North Korea and USA.

Meaning of word ‘Deterrence’ is not understood by many including the authors. Deterrence is not related to ‘Capability’ alone; It is related to ‘Intent to Use’. Deterrence sans Intent is Impotence. If the intent to use nukes (after pre-designated red lines have been crossed) has been clearly and unambiguously enunciated the adversary will think a million times before crossing the red line.

In recent times, near perfect example of containing China’s belligerence was our formidable military response followed by nearly four years of negotiations from ‘position of strength’. China has had to back down. Would it have happened if we were not a formidable nuclear power? In case of nukes one is not required to count number of warheads as would be in case of numbers of fighters/tanks/ships/submarines. In fact overwhelming supremacy of conventional weapons can be conveniently neutralized by threat of ‘FIRST USE’ of nukes as has already been enunciated by Russia.

Authors have mistakenly attributed strategic stability to nuclear instability. They have obviously not appreciated that in a nuclear exchange there would be no clear winner/loser. In fact by default nukes have not only become currency of power but also of ensuring enduring peace.

Authors have very little idea about missile intercept capability as it exists anywhere in the world. There is no existing air defence system or ballistic missiles intercept capable ABM, which can guarantee assured intercept of all warheads carried by a MIRV capable ICBM racing towards target with dozen warheads. Interceptors will engage one, two, may be six but remaining six will find the target. Interceptors cannot differentiate between dummy and live warheads.

Statements viz “The risk of undermining mutual vulnerability through missile interception or disabling nuclear command systems introduces new dimensions of unpredictability.” Indicate their lack of information on actual technological capabilities achieved by the most advanced SAM or ABM system. Yet again a case in point; 1.Israel 100 aircraft strike over Iran had no losses due to AD systems of SAMs. 2. In spite of systems like Iron Dome etc numerous unguided HAMAS rockets hit their targets in Israel.

On the subject of nuclear compliance the author opines that “The vulnerability of these systems to anti-satellite (ASAT) attacks poses a significant risk to the stability of nuclear deterrence.” An absolutely irrelevant and technologically irrational assumption. No country as on date has an operationally proven ASAT system. In any case what is the direct relationship between an ASAT system and nuclear deterrence?

While discussing containment authors have conveniently glossed over the success/failure of SALT, START1, START2, MTCR and numerous other treaties including the intermediate range ballistic missile treaty between USA and Russia.

There is just one sensible, implementable and rational statement, which reads “include regional nuclear actors such as India and Pakistan in arms-control dialogues reflects an understanding that strategic stability cannot be secured solely through US-Russia agreements.”

The book contains statements and statements. Ironically these unsubstantiated statements have been corroborated/substantiated by NMF by stating;

New Horizons of the Nuclear Age provides a fairly thorough examination of the evolving nuclear landscape, with its greatest strength lying in its ability to bridge traditional deterrence theory with the emerging realities of multipolarity and technological change. 

The book’s pragmatic recommendations for risk mitigation, rather than idealistic disarmament goals, align with the current international atmosphere, where strategic stability and arms control are under significant strain.

We cannot, should not and must not allow our views on national security to be influenced by such rhetoric. These eminent authors have not even conceived of concept of nuclearisation, which I term as ‘Concept of Adopted/Surrogate Nuclearisation’. Can a nuclear capable US fighter with Taiwan not carry a nuclear tipped ALCM provided by USA of the shelf? This is the future of warfare and future of nuclear deterrence.

My views on our utterly flawed and idealistic NO FIRST USE policy remain. Ironical but true even an element of Indian Military apparently supports it.

India must view it's nuclear options through its own glasses. With two hostile nuclear armed neighbours, who have openly threatened use of nukes against us, we do not have to view nuclear option through Japanese glasses, which has no nuclear threat.