Did the Henderson Brook report suggest that initiation of the war might have been at the behest of India’s provoking of China through her 'Forward Policy' , launched since 1955, where JL Nehru had directed establishment of forward posts?
This was done based on the Indian claim line (maps showing boundary according to Johnson- Ardagh Line of 1865 in the West and Mc Mohan Line in the East) particularly in the places which might be disputed.
How did Nehru think of Johnson - Ardagh line in the West as Indo- Tibetan border? How did the idea of ' forward Policy' germinate in the mind of the ‘man of peace’ which led to forward patrolling and establishment of forward posts? It seems the idea of 'forward policy' might have been injected in his mind who was very influential with him —it was certainly not Army. It was at the behest of someone who wanted to disrupt Nehru’s dream of India - China friendship . It is therefore pertinent to review Nehru’s conduct Pre-1955 and Post 1955.
NEHRU: PRE - 1955
One must note that Nehru had initially favoured China over Western / USA block. He accepted, China’s suzerainty over Tibet and authenticated its Occupation in 1950. To be fair to him, he was stuck with his moralistic and ethical bug and was not pragmatic about international relations. Gandhian thought of 'Harmony at all costs' , even at the risk of personal discomfort and harm, was deeply embedded in his mind. This is also evident from his act of, firstly, going to UNO over Kashmir issue, on the advice of Lord Mountbatten and secondly, under a wrong Chapter of settling the dispute rather than 'Evicting the aggressor'.
It is pertinent to note that Dy PM Sardar Patel had advised Nehru NOT to accept Chinese suzerainty over Tibet . He had written a letter to Nehru on 17 December 1950, barely few weeks before he died. Patel’s death made Nehru a very Towering figure in Indian politics and none could question him. Those who dared to question him , like Acharya Kriplani or Jai Parkash Narayan had to leave Congress and became non - entity in Indian politics till he was alive .
Even military had objected to accepting Chinese Occupation of Tibet. There was a prediction by Lt Gen Kulwant Singh , who headed a Committee, set up by the Government in 1952 . It had said in its report that India and China would go to war in 5-7 years . But no action was taken to prepare army and equipping them for such a war .
Besides, accepting Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, Nehru had supplied some 10,000 mounds (400 Tons) of rice to Chinese troops in Tibet through Chumbi valley.
Then, when USA had offered India UNSC berth ,Nehru had refused. Instead he had proposed that China deserved the berth .
One must not forget Prime Minister Nehru’s rebuke to Gen Roy Boucher, C- In- C of Indian Army, when India got freedom. When Gen Roy Boucher had recommended more funds for army , Nehru had thundered ,” What funds ? We have No enemy . We don’t need Army . We can do with police” or words to that effect .
In 1954 , he signed a Panchsheel agreement with China. following principles. (Ironically 54 years later his great grand son, signed another agreement with CCP , whose details are still unknown). Panchsheel Agreement had following principles. :-
1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty.
2. mutual non-aggression.
3. mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
4. equality and mutual benefit.
5. peaceful co- existence.
BANDUNG CONFERENCE AND USA.
In April 1955 , Nehru led a conglomerate of 29, Afro - Asian nations to start a 'Non- Alignment Movement' based on the Five principles Nehru had signed with Mao DzeZong of China . This was to stay away from both Soviet Union and USA Blocks .
Annoying USA . Non- alignment Movement was a shocker for USA — against India who survived on her doles of PL- 480 (PL 480 was wheat imported from the United States to India under the Public Law 480 (PL 480) food aid program)
KOREAN WAR AND ITS IMPACT ON INDO - US RELATIONS
In mid 1950’s China and USA were engaged in a war in Korea . Non- alignment movement and India’s indifference to openly side with USA over Korean conflict irked USA . More annoying was Indian PM , Nehru’s Coziness with Mao . This ' Love - Affair ' of ‘Nehru- Mao’ had to be broken.
IB Chief BN MULLICK (1950-64) had a colossal influence over Nehru. It seems Mullick’s words were gospel truth for Nehru . In fact , Lt Gen SK Sinha , in his article on 1962 war in 2012 , had called BN Mullick as Nehru’s 'Man Friday' . He was the man who had convinced Nehru that China would not attack India or react violently , even if China was in a position to do so . As we discuss Nehru Post 1955, his role would be critical to understand.
NEHRU: POST - 1955
Volte Face By Nehru : Question springs up as to what led to Nehru volte face and anti - China 'forward Policy'. It was probably after 1955, when intelligence reports came through IB Chief, (famous BN Mullick, in whom Nehru had blind faith), that China was constructing a Tibet Highway (G219) through Aksai Chin . It had trickled to IB probably through CIA channels. Nehru took the briefing from IB & Army on the border with Tibet .
It turned out that Britain had left an undefined border with Tibet at the time of partition. In the West, Ladakh Sector, there were various lines drawn from time to time by Britain to check mate Russian expansion. After discussing various lines, it was suggested that Jounson - Ardagh line of 1865 was the most favourable one.
On the East , he was told that about British - Tibet Agreement of Shimla in 1914 , which ran along the watershed . It was named Mc Mohan Line , after its surveyor . However this was not ratified neither by Tibet nor British India . McMohan line remained unofficial border.
Nehru immediately ordered Publication of Indian maps showing Indian border according to Johnson- Aradagh line in the West and McMohan Line in the East . The implications must be understood here that it meant AKSAI CHIN in the East and NEFA or ARUNACHAL PRADESH (South Tibet — occupied by India in 1951) as Part of India. Another point of interest is to know that China, in 1951, did not object to Indian occupation of South Tibet ( NEFA). It began to do so only after , Chinese Premier, Chou En Lai’s Visit to India .
Occupation of forward posts according to Indian claim line . Thus, the stage was set for a break in Nehru’s China infatuation. Forward posture was done at the advice of BN Mullick who was insisting that China would not react. Even VK Krishna Menon , Defence Minister supported him .
By August 1962, India had established some 60 such posts under Army and armed police . Even on the western sector Army HQ was insisting upon forward posts but western Army Cdr was asking for more reinforcements to do so . Western Command’s apprehension was of Chinese reaction which was turned down on IB Chief’s assertion of Chinese reluctance to react .
Forward patrolling had been started since 1954 by the armed police wing of IB, under BN Mullick . This led to Kangka Clash of 1959. After Kangka incident of 1959 , forward patrolling was ended and army had taken over . However by 1961, Lt Gen BM Kaul, a JL Nehru favourite, had become CGS (Chief of General Staff). Brig DK Palit , Kaul’s favourite, was appointed as Director Military operations(DMO). In a meeting of 02 Nov 1961, this restriction of forward patrolling was lifted .
Earlier a Dhola post was created in the east ahead of Mc Mohan Line. on 08 Sept 1962, chinese troops had “Gheraoed” Dhola post. It might be noted that in July 1962, in the Western Sector, in Ladakh, China had also cut off an Indian post of a Gorkha Regiment Companyin Galwan valley. When, on 06 October 1962, a reinforcement of 5 JAT battalion was sent to provide relief , it was massacred.
Therefore , there were indications of “ Forward policy” and unwanted aggression by India having had provoked China to initiate a “Teach -a-lesson- war” by Mao dze Dong. Henry Kissinger, US foreign Minister with president Richard Nixon in 1972, claimed in his autobiography : Mao had told him that he wanted to teach a “lesson to Nehru”. Was it for Nehru’s volte face on China?
In mid September 1962, troops deployed below Thagla Ridge, were given orders by Army HQ (a) to capture a Chinese Post , some 1000 yards North East of Dhola Post, (b) contain Concentration of China South of Thagla Ridge .
HB report on this order says that the General Staff , sitting in Delhi, ordering an action against a position, 1000 yards, North East of Dhola Post, was astounding. The terrain was not known, enemy situation vague and for all that there may have been a ravine in between (the trrops and their objective), but yet the order was given . This order could go down in the annals of history as being as incredible as order for the ‘Charge of the Light Brigade’”.
Worst was that Army HQ at the behest of IB assessment, discounted Chinese violent and aggressive reaction. Of course BN Mullick was at the helms of affairs of IB. HB Report quotes Mullick as saying, “ the chinese would not react to our establishing new posts and that they were not likely to use force against any of our posts , even if they were in a position to do so”. This assessment had contradicted army intelligence opinion some 12 months back .
Allegedly , as is now known that Brig DK Palit (a BM kaul appontee), in consultation with BN Mullick , decided to deny documentary access to HB committee on matters concerning any document emanating civil side, in other words, he has tried to scuttle the enquiry from finding out the real truth, as far as he could, as to the nexus between civil and the military.
PROBABLE CIA - IB NEXUS
Herein lies the catch. Was IB Chief’s assertion a professional error or it was something else ? It is rumoured and alleged that it was something to do with USA through IB. A TRUTH COMMISSION is a must to unearth the real root cause, not only to know the conduct of principal characters in Government and military but also to ascertain if it was not thrust upon India by some international manipulations. Though, even today, India does not have good relations with China but attempts were being made to pitch India against China to serve interests of global players .
HB REPORT AND ITS NON PUBLICATION FULLY !
May be HB had Commented upon it . Brig DK Palit, who had survived the humiliation of 1962 war and continued to be DMO , asserted in his autobiography, published in 1991 that HB Committee had no business to pry into “ the high level policies and decisions”. Question arises what was he protecting? A further query springs up: what was preventing the current GOI from publishing it? Devil lay in Part -4 (Conclusions) of HB report , which remains unpublished or was never leaked. It could be as well a comment on IB’s deliberate attempt to provoke a Sino - Indian war by manipulating deliberate acts of provocations. But at whose behest ?
A brief look at HB Report is necessary here. Committee was instituted by army (acting Army Chief Lt Gen JN Chaudhary) to carry out a review of operations. Its authors were Lieutenant-General T.B. Henderson Brooks and Brigadier P S Bhagat, a Victoria Cross, winner of 2nd workd war. It is said of PS Bhagat that he was no non- sense soldier. Report was written by him and surely he went much beyond his terms of references . He might have made unpalatable comments in the unpublished and not yet leaked, Chapter -4 of Part-1 on civil- military relations and unwanted interference in military operations by intelligence agency, read IB.
It did not have a Governmental mandate to go into political issues of decision making. It had a limited scope. Also, the functioning of the Army Headquarters was outside the purview of this commission. Thus, all the main characters of the war were kept out if this scanner. Some scholars state that General Chaudhuri did not want to "dig too deeply" into the conduct of the top military echelons.
The terms of reference were restricted to :—
* Training
* Equipment
* System of command
* Physical fitness of tps
* Capacity of Cdrs st all levels to influence the men under their command.
The terms of reference suggest that the committee was designed to cover the fiasco and mask the real facts —- as to why certain decisions were taken when odds were against India. Knowledgeable sources inform that the report was in seven bound volumes, along with appendices.
There were two copies of the report, one was with General Chaudhuri, Army Chief and the second with Chavan under Pradhan's own care. But it is doubtful, if they were in their original shape and size after 61 years . Indian public needs to know not only about real contents of HB Report but the whole chronology of 1962 Conflict . This certainly seeks a TRUTH COMMISSION .
The leaked version of the report reveals that the report was divided into two parts. Part 1 contained four chapters:
* Chapter I - Western Command
* Chapter II - Eastern Command
* Chapter III - IV Corps
* Chapter IV - Conclusions
*Part 2 of the report , it seems had contained detailed lessons on tactics and operational procedures . They were probably meant for a more general distribution. More important was Chapter IV of the report which seems to have certain unpalatable facts. It is certainly NOT about Army and Generals and not even about political establishment. I presume , as it will come out, that it was definitely about “game of the Foxes”, which sparked the war .
The report was critical of the Indian Army’s high command of the time, as well as of the execution of tactical operations. It states that the Indian government, which would have been keen to recover territory, advocated a cautious policy, but that the Army Headquarters dictated a policy that was militarily unsound.
NON - USE OF IAF
While soldiers were being battered in Himalayas, the Government and IB were worried about urban venues of Kolkotta, New Delhi and Mumbai. Once again, IB recommended non -use of offensive power of Air Force and IAF chief readily accepted. IB’s point was that PLAAF was far superior with Mig -19 & Mig-21 fighter aircrafts. Also, that mountainous terrain won’t allow maneuverability to Indian fighter aircrafts. How strange was this logic? While China had no airfields in Tibet, then, and it had to operate from Mainland, IAF had to operate from plains with more load . If the terrain was tough it was for PLAAF . But Government and IAF accepted this IB logic. It is strange no one has discussed IB’s role in the entire war !
WHY NEEDLE OF SUSPICION ON USA ?
Claude Api in his blog on HB report by Neville Maxwell writes on IB Chief BN Mullick : Since the Prime Minister placed such faith in BN Mullick, it would be at the least the lese- majesty and even heresy, to deny him a kind of a papal infallibility. If it be taken that Mullick was just not deluded, what other explanation could there be for the unwavering consistency with which he urged his country forward on a course, which in general perception could only lead to war with a greatly superior military power and thereafter defeat !
Claude Api carries on to suggest that Sino - Indian conflict would serve only US policy of keeping two Asian giants apart . He asks : who in those years, would most have welcomed the great falling out which saw India shift in a few years from a strong international support for People’s Republic of China to enmity and armed conflict with it ? From founding and leading the non- alignment movement to the tacit enlistment in the hostile encirclement of China, which was Washington’s Aim. Mullick maintained close links with the CIA station head in New Delhi , Harry Rossitsky. Answer may lie in Agency’s archives !
Was someone trying to teach a lesson to India and Nehru to defy the West ? Was the War orchestrated by some intelligence agencies to break the flourishing love affair of Nehru and China ? Is there such a connection in the HB Report ? If so, only a fool in the Indian Government would think of declassifying it ?
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