Editor's Note
The seeds of Indo-China border dispute that were sown in 1954, manifested in 1958 for the first time, ultimately leading to war in 1962. The post-war period of 62 years has seen repeated flare-ups taking place from time to time, only because the boundary lines have not yet been mutually ratified through a treaty. This deeply researched piece of article by Brig BL Poonia throws light on the causes of border dispute leading to the war, and suggested course of action. However, it is left to the reader to form him/her own opinion.
Introduction
How right Capt Bassil Liddell Hart was, when he wrote, "The only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out." The tragedy is that when it comes China, we tend to base our arguments on the premise : "Since my country can do no wrong China has to be the villain, who being expansionist by design, has occupied Indian territory." But unfortunately, this claim cannot be substantiated by any historical evidence. The bitter truth is that in 1962, it was India who tried to capture Chinese territory, and when China gave us a befitting reply, India tried to cover up the blunder by blaming China for being an expansionist country. It was just a face-saving exercise. In fact, the very basis of our claim on Aksai Chin is not justified in any manner. Unfortunately, the entire nation has been misled with a shockingly wrong version of history, and now it is near impossible to change that belief. And the person responsible for misleading the nation was none other than Pandit Nehru. Now, the only way to convince the nation is to declassify Henderson Brooks Report, but doing so will result in India losing the moral high ground of never having ventured out to capture its neighbour's territory. This may sound too harsh but truth is always harsh and bitter.
A claim on any piece of territory can be based, either by conquest or by consent. But can India produce any record of the battle during which it had ever conquered Aksai Chin, or a treaty under which it was given to India? No; there was none. Well, if that be so, what exactly is the basis of our claim ? The British never laid any claim on Aksai Chin or NEFA till they left India in 1947. So how was independent India justified in doing so? Since the very basis of our historical presumption is wrong, we are unable to reach any logical conclusion while writing various articles on China, except for condemning China. But China-bashing cannot be the solution to the border problem. To come out with any workable solution, we have to first accept the truth, and the truth is that it was India who was responsible for provocation of the 1962 war, and China the victim. Well, who won the war is totally a different issue; who provoked the Chinese to retaliate so strongly, is more important.
Let us not forget that till 1962 war, China never made any attempt to occupy an inch of Indian territory. In fact it tried to settle the boundary issues in a friendly manner with an unbelievable spirit of accommodation. It was Pandit Nehru, who betrayed China's faith. It was he, who believing China to be militarily a weak nation, tried to occupy Chinese territory through 'Forward Policy', which we tend to overlook so conveniently. All this was based on Nehru's belief that nine-tenth of the claim gets justified through the right of possession. And this unjustified belief was the beginning of the problem.
History of Aksai Chin Dispute
Now let's have a look at the history of Aksai Chin dispute. Johnson, a British officer of Survey of India, who visited Khotan (China) in 1865 via Aksai Chin, drew a boundary line showing Aksai Chin in Kashmir territory. It was named 'Johnson Line' (also known as Johnson-Ardagh Line), and the same was published in an atlas in 1868. It had no legal sanctity, since it was a unilaterally drawn line, that was sought to be proposed, but the British never even communicated this as a boundary proposal to China. Interestingly, this is the line from which India derives its claim on Aksai Chin. Later, the British printed Johnson Line on its maps, showing its legal status as 'Boundary Undefined'. This didn't create any dispute or problem. The problem arose only when the same was unilaterally printed as an international border, by removing its legal status of 'Boundary Undefined', by Pandit Nehru in 1954 in a 'Top Secret' exercise just to counter China's claim on Aksai Chin. More about it later.
History of McMahon Line
Now let us move on to NEFA and examine the history of McMahon Line. Historically Tibet was a part of China since 1720, under the control of Quing dynasty. The sudden collapse of Chinese power in Tibet in 1911-12, tempted Lord Hardinge to capture the area which later came to be known as NEFA. Since a direct attack on Tibet would have resulted in a war with China, Britain convoked a 'Tripartite Conference' in Simla, comprising Britain, China and Tibet, in October 1913, since China excercised 'suzenerity' over Tibet, i.e. it controlled Tibet's foreign policy. But the Simla Conference did not result into any treaty to which China was a party, since China rejected the McMahon Line proposal. Hence the British played a trick, and secretly signed a 'Bilateral Agreement' with Tibet, by assuring them to get independence from China. But even the 'Simla Convention - 1913' showed Aksai Chin as part of Tibet. However, four months later, the British invited Tibet to Delhi for further discussions on Assam -Tibet border in Feb-Mar 1914, but China was neither invited, nor informed. A secret treaty was signed on 24 Mar 1914, and the alignment agreed upon was McMahon Line. However, this treaty was kept secret, since it was in violation of Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, as well as Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, under which Britain was prohibited to enter into negotiations directly with Tibet except through an intermediary of Chinese government. In short, this treaty was illegal. Had it been legal, Britain would have occupied NEFA in 1914 only, whereas it published McMahon Line on its maps, only in 1937, that too showing it as 'Boundary Undemarcated'. Howevever, it made no physical claim on NEFA.
Annexation of NEFA
The Chinese power returned in Tibet in 1950, but soon China got occupied with the Korean War from 1950 to 1953. During this period, India 'quietly', without consulting China, annexed NEFA in 1951 by sending a strong patrol under Maj Bob Khating of Assam Rifles, who hoisted the Indian flag at Tawang on 09 February 1951, forcing the Tibetan administration out of Tawang, in spite of its vehement protests. Thus McMahon Line was 'unilaterally' transported from the maps to the ground as the de facto northeast boundary of India. Hence NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh), belongs to India only on the basis of the 'Right of Possession' and not on the basis of a legitimate treaty. That is why China lays its claim on Arunachal Pradesh. Even POK is held by Pakistan on the basis of the 'Right of Possession', and not through a force of treaty, hence India lays its claim on POK.
Thus, by annexing NEFA, India added 65,000 square kilometres of territory, which legally belonged to China, but China did not protest. This puzzling silence of China can be construed as her acceptance of the McMahon Line, since China wanted to maintain friendly relations with India, and also resolve its remaining border issues, especially in Ladakh. But Nehru misconstrued China's decency and silence, for its military weakness, which encouraged him further to make similar moves to acquire more of the Chinese territory.
Despite this unwelcome and unfriendly move by India, China displayed magnanimity, by agreeing upon signing the famous Indo-China friendship treaty, ie the 'Panchsheel Agreement' (Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence) on 29 Apr 1954, and in mid-1950s, the slogan 'Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai' became very popular in India. This treaty formed the basis of India's foreign policy with China.
Unilateral Change of Boundaries
However on 01 Jul 1954, precisely two months after signing this treaty, Nehru unilaterally converted the 'Johnson Line' into a permanent boundary line on India's official maps, by removing its legal status of 'Boundary Undefined', and thus manufactured the Indian claim on Aksai Chin. In fact, it was a 'Top Secret' excercise, which was given a physical expression on the Indian maps under the personal guidance of Nehru. Mr A.G. Noorani, an expert on legal and constitutional matters, known for the study of Indo-China boundary issues, has mentioned this incident in his book 'India-China Boundary Problem - 1846-1947 : History and Diplomacy'. He writes, "It was a fateful decision. Old maps were burnt. One former Foreign Secretary told this writer how, as a junior official, he himself was obliged to participate in this fatuous excercise." It was speculated that the official was Ram Sathe, India's last Counsel General in Xinjiang and later an Ambassador to China. In addition to this, the Thagla Ridge area across NEFA, comprising about 100 square kilometres of Chinese territory, was also included in Indian territory, since inclusion of this ridge facilitated India to have a clear view of the troop movements deep inside the Chinese territory. The book mentions that the new maps were printed showing 'Johnson Line' and 'McMahon Line' as permanent international boundaries without making any reference to the legal status of these lines, i.e. Johnson Line (Boundary Undefined), and McMahon Line (Boundary Undemarcated). These maps were sent to all the embassies, and these maps and atlases were introduced in all the schools and colleges of India in 1954. Thus these boundaries got inprinted and engraved in the minds of the entire youth of the nation. In fact, they had no reasons to doubt or disbelieve the same. However, Nehru made a big mistake; the Indian Army was still in possession of the British era maps, even during the 1962 war, which depicted the correct alignment of the boundaries with China, showing their legal status. And that is how the truth got endorsed in the Henderson Brooks Report. No wonder, this report could neither be tabled in the Parliament, nor can it be declassified now.
Now 70 years later, none of us would find it convincing to believe that Nehru had unilaterally changed the boundary lines in 1954. Rather, after the 1962 Indo-China War, one finds it far too easier to believe, that China had occupied Aksai Chin and Thagla Ridge in 1962, which were a part of Indian territory. But this was not the case, since those areas were never in our possession. Unfortunately, this chapter of history remains unknown to the nation, which is the root cause of India's dislike for China. Moreover, even China was not aware of these dark secrets pertaining to the geographical shenanigans played around by Nehru, hence it tried its level best to have the boundary issues ratified diplomatically.
Chinese Efforts To Ratify Borders
The Chinese delegation reached Delhi on 19 Apr 1960. This was Chou En-lai's fourth visit to India. He wanted a fair and reasonable approach to boundary settlement through friendly negotiations. Basically the boundaries that had existed historically needed to be ratified through a formal treaty and there were no disputes whatsoever. Ratification of boundaries through a treaty, leads to permanent resolution of boundary disputes.
Howevever, based on 1954 edtion maps, the opposition benches insisted upon having no talks with China, but Nehru told the Parliament that he would talk but not negotiate. Thus he closed all the options of settling the boundary issues diplomatically. In fact, he wanted China to ratify the borders as per the unilaterally drawn boundaries on the maps that he had got reprinted in 1954, in which he had included Aksai Chin and Thagla Ridge (across NEFA), in Indian territory, stating that these were the maps handed over to India by the British on 15 August 1947.
The negotiations took place for six days at Nehru's residence in Teen Murti Bhavan. China's stand was that India accept Aksai Chin and China accept McMahon Line; no withdrawals were involved. Chou En-lai even said, "You keep what you hold, you take too anything in dispute and occupied by neither, and we keep what we hold." But the Indian side was adamant, since Nehru had a hidden agenda, which no other cabinet minister was aware of; an agenda to cheat China. The Chinese delegation had come via Burma, where they had accepted the McMahon Line. India once again missed a golden opportunity. Even the USA's secret CIA report read, "Fundamentally, China was right to assert that the boundary was undefined and called for negotiations without pre-conditions. Its terms in 1960 were reasonable."
But when Nehru refused to compromise, Chou En-lai met Dr S Radhakrishanan, GB Pant, and Morarji Desai, in a gesture of reconciliation. Their arrogance was matched by their ignorance, and in a desire to cut Nehru to size, Morarji was even rude to Chou-En-Lai. The diplomatic process was debased and Nehru compounded diplomatic arrogance with military folly. However, before departure from Delhi, China held a press conference and made a six-point statement to convey their approach of resolving the boundary issue through peaceful negotiations. This was known as 'Delhi Summit Statement - 1960'.
Resolution of boundary issues through diplomacy involves the following five steps :
● Talks.
● Negotiations.
● Delimitation (Marking the mutually agreed boundary lines on maps).
● Signing of Treaty (For ratification of the boundary alignment).
● Demarcation (Jointly erecting boundary pillars on ground).
Both in case of Pakistan and Burma, the boundary questions were settled by China, following this procedure. In case of Pakistan, China ceded around 1,950 square kilometres of their territory, in exchange for the Shaksgam Valley given to China, and in case of Burma, China ceded much more territory than she received. It is on Indian Army's published records of ARTRAC, that between 1949 and 2005, China had resolved no less than 17 border disputes, in 15 of which, Beijing made significant concessions over land claims in the larger interest of securing her borders, in order to concentrate on the development of China. In all these cases, China didn't display any expansionist attitude with any of her neighbours; the bogey of which was created by Pandit Nehru only to justify his hidden agenda, and inspired by a patriotic fervour, the entire nation believed him verbatim. In fact, the nation had no reasons to disbelieve him. This led India to treat China as the biggest villain since 1962.
Forward Policy
Encouraged by annexation of NEFA, Nehru started implementing the Forward Policy, which involved nibbling away of the Chinese territory in a gradual manner, whereas to ensure peace on the borders, both Armies were required to be separated by 20 miles, and no patrolling was supposed to be carried out within two kilometres of the established borders. While China religiously honoured its 'Delhi Summit Statement - 1960', India blatantly dishonoured it. She continued with her 'Forward Policy', assuming China to be militarily a weak nation. Bhola Nath Mullik, the all powerful Director of Intelligence Bureau for 16 years continuously (1948-64), propelled Nehru to believe that China would not react, since militarily it was not in a position to do so. As a consequence, in September 1960, instructions were issued for forward patrolling as a part of Forward Policy, in the Western Sector, i.e. across Ladakh. Gen Thimayya was still the Army Chief, and the government was apprised of the risk and the lack of capability of the Indian Army to deal with a large scale Chinese offensive. Government questioned the Army for its sluggishness to implement its policy. It was due to its total ignorance of all matters military.
The civil set up was of the view that political factors would prevent a strong Chinese reaction. Though Gen PN Thapar, who had replaced Gen Thimayya as the Army Chief differed, and pointed out the dangers with prophetic precision, yet his warnings were merely registered and never pressed. Now Lt BM Gen Kaul, who was Chief of General Staff, the most powerful staff officer at the Army Headquarters, personally appointed by Nehru, was the man who counted. As a result, in mid-1961 the straight contest between the civilians and the soldiers ended in favour of 'Forward Policy', which commenced during the winter of 1961-62.
Lt Gen Daulat Singh, Army Commander Western Command, protested against the establishment of post at Samzungling, in Galwan Valley, but he was overruled by Lt Gen Kaul. In Chip Chap Valley, across Ladakh, the Indian Army occupied posts both to the front and rear of the Chinese and started provoking them. By the end of August 1962, India had established 43 posts across Ladakh, beyond the established boundaries which existed since 1842, with the aim of occupying Aksai Chin and cutting off supply routes to the Chinese posts. In NEFA, some 24 new posts were set up along the McMahon Line, in violation of the spirit of 'Delhi Summit Statement -1960'.
The Trigger For War
When Assam Rifles was ordered to establish Dhola Post, across the McMahon Line, in Chinese territory opposite Kameng Sub-Division of NEFA in June 1962, Lt Gen Umrao Singh, GOC 33 Corps objected, it being a tactical liability. But he too was overruled by Lt Gen Kaul. The Chinese, who refrained from carrying out patrolling along the borders, learnt of the same much later, hence moved up to Thagla Ridge, overlooking that area, only in September 1962 and asked the Indian troops occupying Dhola Post, to vacate the Chinese territory. But India refused to do so.
At the same time, a divided cabinet, an irresponsible opposition, an uninformed press, a restive Parliament, and misinformed public, all fed on wrong history, clamoured for eviction of the Chinese from Thagla Ridge (NEFA). The opposition's demand and the public pressure gained momentum and the newspapers hammered the point editorially. Nehru was in a fix. At this stage, he couldn't have admitted that Thagla Ridge was actually in the Chinese territory, since he himself had unilaterally altered the boundary lines in 1954. And thus he got drawn into a whirlpool of anti-Chinese agitation. Now he was left with no option but to order the Indian Army to evict the Chinese from Thagla Ridge (16,000 ft), to pacify the public opinion. It carried the Forward Policy one explosive stage further. In fact, it was a strategic blunder of first magnitude.
The War
Unfortunately for India, Nehru had locked the doors to negotiations. The mood in lndia equated any agreement to negotiate, with surrender. So the Lok Sabha put it formally in a resolution, in which it affirmed "the resolve of the Indian people to drive out the aggressor from the sacred soil of India", ie from the Thagla Ridge. Now China was left with no option but to teach India a lesson the harder way. As a consequence, it launched a massive pre-emptive offfensive on 20 October 1962 simultaneously, both in Ladakh and NEFA sectors, and by 21 November 1962, China captured all its claim areas. With this, militarily the Chinese victory was complete, and the Indian defeat absolute.
Having achieved its aim, China announced a unilateral ceasefire with effect from 22 November 1962, and voluntarily commenced its withdrawal to pre-war positions with effect from 01 December 1962. After completion of the withdrawal, China invited India for resolving the border issue through talks. It was now that the Indian government realized, that China had been engaged not on an invasion on India, but on a giant punitive military expedition for trying to unilaterally alter the boundaries, through use of force under the cover of Forward Policy.
Unfortunately, majority of Indians still believe that China occupied Aksai Chin during the 1962 war. In fact China had fought this war to defend its own territory of Aksai Chin and Thagla Ridge, and did not occupy an inch of Indian territory, even after winning the war. But since this part of history remains unknown to the nation, China appears to be a villain since then. If China wanted to regain NEFA, it could have done so after capturing it in 1962, but it didn't. It could have also retained the territory captured in Ladakh Sector, but it didn't. Nothing forced China to withdraw to the pre-war positions; it was purely its voluntary decision. In fact, India should have appreciated this magnanimity on the part of China. But instead of appreciating this noble gesture, believing Nehru, India labelled China as an expansionist country, least realizing that Nehru was only trying to cover up the Himalayan Blunder.
Review of the Situation
Pandit Nehru made the biggest blunder in adopting Forward Policy after unilaterally altering the borders that existed since 1842. Instead of resolving the border issues with China diplomatically, he chose the path of military confrontation. Now instead of accepting our mistake, we continue to blame China for border skirmishes, since 99.99 % public tends to believe China to be wrong, and anyone countering this belief is labelled as unpatriotic.
Had Nehru and Krishna Menon given sober thought to the politico-military consequences of their rashness in demanding the eviction of Chinese from Thagla Ridge, they could have saved the humiliating defeat of the Indian Army and India's reputation in 1962. As Brig John Dalvi put it, "Nehru's short-sightedness and negligence with regard to China is remarkable when judged against his far-sightedness in world affairs." And of course, Krishna Menon, as Defence Minister, had appeared like a malignant shadow over the military horizon. Both, combined together, ruined the reputation of India as well as that of the Indian Army, and spoiled our relationship with China for ever. They are the ones who are responsible for the bloodshed of our young soldiers ever since then. To do away with this avoidable bloodshed that has taken place for the past 62 years, we need to resolve our border disputes with China in a political framework, by mutually accommodating and accepting the historical facts. Adamancy, in spite of being wrong, does not reflect nationalism; maturity demands accepting the bitter truth and being reasonable and flexible.
The Way Ahead
While the Henderson Brooks Report is best kept under wraps, it is in India's long term strategic interest now, to settle the boundary dispute with China in a political framework. It is futile to fight on and off, leading to avoidable loss of precious human lives for minor tactical gains, resulting in meaningless short-term jingoistic jubilations. How long will the youth of India keep bleeding like this, without a permanent solution ? The far-sighted political wisdom demands that the blunder committed in 1962, be corrected now. For this, India needs to give up her claim on Aksai Chin and Thagla Ridge, and China will automatically reciprocate by giving up its claim on the erstwhile NEFA, which it had offered to India in 1956, 1959 and 1960, but has been using it as a lever to counter India's claim over Aksai Chin and Thagla Ridge since 1962. No withdrawals are involved on either side.
Conclusion
However, the real challenge lies in accepting the unpalatable truth and convincing the nation, which has become near impossible now. As per Neville Maxwell, "It would imply India's tacit admission of error and recantation of the deeply cherished belief that in 1962 India was the the innocent victim of unprovoked Chinese aggression." Psychologically, it would be a herculean task to convince the nation that in 1962, India provoked the war, and China retaliated to defend its territory. Yet a beginning has to be made, and a lasting solution has to be found.
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