Introduction
Does Aksai belong to India and the erstwhile NEFA to China ? Ask any Indian, he will say, "Both belong to India"; ask any Chinese, he will say, "Both belong to China." These are the deep-rooted beliefs, to uphold which, both sides can lay down their lives, and anyone saying anything contrary to their views would be branded unpatriotic. However, a thing is not necessarily true just because a man is ready to die for it. So what is the truth ?
India claims Aksai Chin across Ladakh, and Thagla Ridge across NEFA, and China claims both Aksai and NEFA. But how does the claim of a nation gets justified on any piece of territory ? It has to be either by conquest or by consent. So what exactly are the claims of both the neighbours based upon, is the real issue. Did we ever conquer these areas, or were these territories ever acquired by India under any treaty ? Well, the answer is 'no'.
If that be so, on what basis have we based our claim on these areas, and how exactly are we justified in blaming China for being in possession of Aksai Chin and Thagla Ridge ? And why have we been made to believe that China had forcefully occupied these areas, and China was the aggressor, and India the victim, in 1962 ?
Well, the simple answer to these complex questions lies in Nehru's deep-rooted desire to acquire these areas, fully knowing that India had no historical or legal claim on the same. While it may sound strange, it is true. But why did such a strange desire germinate in his mind ? That is the question.
India became independent on 15 August 1947, and People's Republic of China came into existence about two years later on 01 October 1949. Nehru considered China militarily a weak nation, incapable of facing India, and firmly believed that physical possession of territory was nine-tenth of the law. It is this irrational belief of Nehru, followed by his passionate desire to convert it into reality, that led to 1962 debacle.
Neville Maxwell, in his book 'India's China War', mentions , "In 1834, Gulab Singh's Dogras invaded Ladakh, but were pushed back by the Tibetans. A non-aggression treaty was signed in Oct 1842, asking each other to respect 'the old, established frontiers', where the most advanced Indian post in Ladakh was at Chushul, far short of Aksai Chin."
This formed the de facto boundary between Ladakh and Tibet, which the British printed on their maps as 'Alignment of the British Boundary Commission 1846-47', and later extended the same towards the northwest, naming it as the 'Foreign Office Line - 1873'. But even this was far short of Aksai Chin, running west of the Karakoram Range. Aksai Chin, the area east of Karakoram Range, had always been a part of Tibet, and Tibet was at that time unquestionably under the control of China.
Importance of Aksai Chin
Now let us glance through the history and importance of Aksai Chin. Maxwell mentions, "Aksai Chin means 'desert of white stones'. It is a high and desolate plateau, 17,000 feet above sea level, covering an area of 33,000 square kilometres, where nothing grows and no one lives, lying between the towering ranges of Karakoram and Kuen Lun. The ancient silk route lay along this. The British strategic interest lay in keeping the mighty Russian empire and the Chinese away, by having Aksai Chin as a buffer zone, since the Russians, the Chinese, and the British feared each other."
WH Johnson, a British officer of Survey of India, who visited Khotan (China) in 1865 via Aksai Chin, drew a boundary line showing Aksai Chin in Kashmir territory. It was named 'Johnson Line' (also known as Johnson-Ardagh Line), and the same was published in an Atlas in 1868. It had no legal sanctity, since it was a unilaterally drawn line, that was sought to be proposed, but the British never even communicated this as a boundary proposal to China. Interestingly, this is the line from which India derives its claim on Aksai Chin.
In 1899, the British proposed to divide Aksai Chin through 'McCartney - MacDonald Proposal', a boundary line suggesting a portion of Aksai Chin to be included in the British territory. But the Chinese never replied. After 1899, there was no further attempt by the British to get China to agree to a boundary alignment across Ladakh.
So the only ratified boundary, that had legal sanctity, was the one which existed as per the '1842 Treaty', i.e. 'Alignment of the British Boundary Commission 1846-47', as per which, the entire Aksai Chin remained part of China. Howevever, the 'Johnson Line', which had no legal sanctity, continued to be shown as 'Boundary Undefined', thereby implying it to be one of the boundaries 'to be proposed'. But for China, the strategic importance of Aksai Chin increased manifold, after the construction of 'Aksai Chin Highway' in 1957, which linked the vast regions of Sinkiang Province with Western Tibet.
The McMahon Line
Now let us move on to NEFA and examine the history of McMahon Line. The sudden collapse of Chinese power in Tibet in 1911-12, tempted Lord Hardinge to capture the area that later came to be known as NEFA. However, a direct attack on Tibet would have resulted in a war with China. Hence Britain convoked a 'tripartite conference' in Simla, comprising Britain, China and Tibet, in Oct 1913, since China excercised 'suzenerity' over Tibet, i.e. it controlled Tibet's foreign policy. But the Simla Conference did not result into any treaty to which China was a party. Hence the British played a trick, and secretly signed a 'bilateral agreement' with Tibet. But even the '1913 Simla Convention' showed Aksai Chin as part of Tibet.
However, this 'bilateral agreement' was kept secret, since it was in violation of Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, as well as Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, under which Britain was prohibited to enter into negotiations directly with Tibet except through an intermediary of Chinese government.
Four months later, the British invited Tibet to Delhi for further discussions on Assam-Tibet border in Feb-Mar 1914, but China was neither invited, nor informed. A secret treaty was signed on 24 Mar 1914, and the alignment agreed upon was McMahon Line, which resulted in drawing of a new boundary line between Assam and Tibet, extending from Bhutan into Burma. It was a 1050 km long line, of which 890 kms lay in India, and 160 kms in Burma. Essentially, it pushed the British boundary up northward by about 100 kms. The newly added area on the map came to be known as NEFA, covering an area of 65,000 square kilometres. However, since China was not a part of this treay, it made it clear, that since Tibet did not enjoy sovereign identity, or treaty-making powers, it would not recognize any treaty which excluded China, in violation of Anglo-Chinese Convention - 1906. Legally, this treaty was illegal.
World War l broke out soon thereafter, and McMahon Line was forgotten, till the Survey of India began to show it as its northeast boundary in 1937, but qualifying it as 'undemarcated'. Soon thereafter, both British and China got involved in World War II. The British left India in 1947, leaving behind two unilaterally drawn boundary lines on maps, across Ladakh and NEFA, without the consent of China. Since both these boundary lines had not been ratified by China, they lacked legal sanctity to be treated or claimed as international boundaries. That is why the British never even attempted to occupy or capture either Aksai Chin or NEFA, till their final departure from India. The British never laid any claim on Aksai Chin.
Annexation of NEFA
The Chinese power returned in Tibet in 1950, but soon China got occupied with the Korean War from 1950 to 1953. During this period, India 'quietly', without consulting China, annexed NEFA in1951 by sending a strong patrol under Maj Bob Khating of Assam Rifles, who hoisted the Indian flag at Tawang on 09 February1951, forcing the Tibetan administration out of Tawang, in spite of its vehement protests. Thus McMahon Line was 'unilaterally' transported from the maps to the ground as the de facto northeast boundary of India.
Thus, by annexing NEFA, India added 65,000 square kilometres of territory, which legally belonged to China, but China did not protest. This puzzling silence of China can be construed as her acceptance of the McMahon Line, since China wanted to maintain good friendly relations with India to resolve its remaining border issues. But Nehru misconstrued China's silence for its military weakness, which encouraged him further to make similar moves to acquire more of the Chinese territory.
Despite this unwelcome and unexpected move by India, China displayed magnamity, by agreeing to sign the famous Indo-China friendship treaty, ie the 'Panchsheel Agreement' (five principles of peaceful co-existence) on 29 Apr 1954, and in mid-1950s, the slogan 'Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai' became very popular in India. This treaty formed the basis of India's foreign policy with China.
Unilateral Change of Boundaries
However on 01 Jul 1954, within two months of signing this treaty, Nehru unilaterally converted the 'Johnson Line' into a permanent boundary line on India's official maps, by removing its legal status of 'Boundary Undefined', and thus manufactured the Indian claim on Aksai Chin. In fact, it was a 'Top Secret' excercise, which was given a physical expression on the Indian maps under the personal guidance of Nehru. Mr A.G. Noorani, an expert on legal and constitutional matters, known for the study of Indo-China boundary issues, has mentioned this incident in his book 'India-China Boundary Problem - 1846-1947 : History and Diplomacy', stating that India revised the maps unilaterally, where the legend '(Boundary Undefined)', defining the legal status of Johnson Line, was dropped on the official maps, and a firm clear international boundary line was shown instead.
He writes, "It was a fateful decision. Old maps were burnt. One former Foreign Secretary told this writer how, as a junior official, he himself was obliged to participate in this fatuous excercise." It was speculated that the official was Ram Sathe, India's last Counsel General in Xinjiang and later an Ambassador to China. The book mentions that the new maps were printed showing 'Johnson Line' and 'McMahon Line' as permanent international boundaries without making any reference to the legal status of these lines, i.e. Johnson Line (Boundary Undefined), and McMahon Line (Boundary Undemarcated).
Another significant change made by Nehru was to alter the alignment of McMahon Line in the Kameng Frontier Division of NEFA, shifting it further north from Hathungla Ridge to Thagla Ridge, involving a unilateral shift of about five kilometres, thereby including around 100 square kilometres of Chinese territory in India. The importance of Thagla Ridge lay in the fact, that it provided an unhindered view of the Chinese movements and military build-up, deep inside their territory.
A.G. Noorani's book mentions that Nehru also wanted these maps to be sent to embassies abroad and to be introduced to the public in general to be used in schools and colleges. Accordingly, new maps were printed and the Indian atlases and maps started showing Aksai Chin and Thagla Ridge in Indian territory. The Indian youth which grew up seeing these maps and atlases printed in 1954, in schools and colleges since their childhood, had no reasons to doubt or disbelieve, and these boundary lines got imprinted and carved out on their unsuspecting minds. Anything contrary to this became unbelievable, and anyone challenging this obviously appeared unpatriotic. Moreover, after 1962, China was projected as the villain, an expansionist Communist country. As per Noorani, even the 1950 edition of Indian maps showed 'Johnson Line' as 'Boundary Undefined'. He writes, "A century old problem was neglected by a conscious decision in 1954, which in turn acquired the dimensions of boundary dispute in 1959. Unresolved in 1960 when the prospects of a fair settlement were bright, the dispute was sought to be resolved by confrontation."
He further wrote, "The conclusion is hard to resist that there was a total disconnect between the facts of history and India's policy on boundary problem, and later boundary dispute, and worst of all, an impermissible recourse to unilateral change of frontiers." It also flouted the 'Oct 1842 Treaty', and even the USA's secret 'CIA Papers', confirm these facts. And thus did Nehru shut the doors to boundary negotiations on 01 Jul 1954, which became the self-created root cause of the boundary problem.
During 1956-57 China constructed the Aksai Chin Highway. This activity did not arouse the Indian government for the simple reason that they knew nothing about it. Indian Army had never been to Aksai Chin. India learnt about it only through the Chinese press reports, and it was not until 1958 that India made a formal claim to Aksai Chin. Having unilaterally altered the boundaries on maps, and emboldened by the annexation of NEFA without any Chinese objections or resistance, Nehru got encouraged to implement his plan of occupying Aksai Chin and Thagla Ridge, armed with the self-created logic that these were the maps handed over to India by the British in 1947.
Forward Policy
Nehru's plan involved nibbling away the newly claimed boundaries by pushing forward the Indian Army in a gradual manner, which came to be known as 'Forward Policy'. Nehru felt that China could only create tension but was not in a position to provoke a war with lndia, as she had her own problems. That was the faulty premise, and the fundamental flaw in the 'Forward Policy'. But unfortunately, the altered boundaries had been printed only on a limited number of official maps, and the Indian Army was still in possession of the original British era/pre-1950 edition maps. Hence whenever they were asked to cross the established border across Ladakh or McMahon Line across NEFA, as printed on their maps, for implementation of Forward Policy, the Army officers questioned the wisdom and legality of such actions, as these had serious military repercussions. However, they were asked by the Ministry of Defence to disregard the same.
Now the Army was asked to establish two posts in the Chinese territory, across the McMahon Line in NEFA, ie Longju Post in Subansiri Frontier Division, and Khinzemane Post in Kameng Frontier Division, on the slopes of Thagla Ridge. Both these posts were pushed back by the Chinese in August 1959. However, when the Chinese returned, Indian Army re-occupied Khanzemane Post. In Ladakh Sector, the Indian troops reached Kongka La Pass in Cheng Chenmoh Valley, but were pushed back by the Chinese on 20 Oct 1959. Due to these incidents, political opinion was aroused in India by the end of 1959. So the controls were locked, but in the positions in which Nehru had set them. As per A.G.Noorani, "In Aug-Sep 1959, Nehru had publicly admitted that Aksai was a disputed territory. However, his advisors were grossly culpable. They fed him with palatable history."
Chinese Efforts to Ratify Boundaries
The Chinese delegation reached Delhi on 19 Apr 1960. This was Chou En-lai's fourth visit to India. He wanted a fair and reasonable approach to boundary settlement through friendly negotiations. The negotiations took place for six days at Nehru's residence in Teen Murti Bhavan. China's stand was that India accept Aksai Chin and China accept McMahon Line; no withdrawals were involved. He even said, "You keep what you hold, you take too anything in dispute and occupied by neither, and we keep what we hold." But the Indian side was adamant. The Chinese delegation had come via Burma, where they had accepted the McMahon Line. India once again missed a golden opportunity. Even the USA's secret CIA report read, "Fundamentally, China was right to assert that the boundary was undefined and called for negotiations without pre-conditions. Its terms in 1960 were reasonable."
But when Nehru refused to compromise, Chou En-lai met Dr S Radhakrishanan, GB Pant, and Morarji Desai, in a gesture of reconciliation. Their arrogance was matched by their ignorance, and in a desire to cut Nehru to size, Morarji was even rude to Chou-En-Lai. The diplomatic process was debased and Nehru compounded diplomatic arrogance with military folly.
Resolution of boundary issues through diplomacy involves the following five steps :
● Talks.
● Negotiations.
● Delimitation (marking the mutually agreed boundary lines on maps).
● Signing of Treaty (for ratification of the boundary alignment).
● Demarcation (jointly erecting boundary pillars on ground).
Both in case of Pakistan and Burma, the boundary questions were settled by China, following this procedure. In case of Pakistan, China ceded around 1,950 square kilometres of their territory, in exchange for the Shaksam Valley given to China, and in case of Burma too, China ceded much more territory than she received. It is on record that China has resolved no less than 17 border disputes since 1949, in 15 of which, Beijing made significant concessions over land claims in the larger interest of securing her borders, in order to concentrate on the development of China.
But in India, while the Communist parties and some Muslim journals suggested meaningful negotiations, 'Jan Sangh' and 'Hindu Mahasabha', took the extreme jingoistic line, protesting, "India should not cede an inch of ground". Entire opposition except Communists, recommended war to evict the Chinese out of Aksai Chin, and pressurized Nehru not to have any 'talks' with China. However, Nehru announced in the Parliament that he would 'talk but not negotiate'. Thus he made it clear that he was not keen to settle the issue diplomatically. As a result, the 'April 1960 Indo-China Summit' ended up in a unilateral six-point statement by China, made in Delhi during a press conference, involving common points or points of proximity, the essence of which was that the boundary problem be settled through discussions, pending which, to ensure tranquility, both sides should refrain from patrolling along all sectors of the boundary. China was more than reasonable in its approach; in fact that is the best it could have done. But Nehru did not take China seriously and made fun of the Chinese six-point statement, in the Parliament.
Now, to ensure peace on the borders, both Armies were required to be separated by 20 miles, and no patrolling was supposed to be carried out within two kilometres of the established borders. While China religiously honoured its '1960 Delhi Summit Statement', India blatantly dishonoured it. She continued with her 'Forward Policy'. Bhola Nath Mullik, the all powerful Director of Intelligence Bureau for 16 years continuously (1948-64), propelled Nehru to believe that China would not react, since militarily it was not in a position to do so. As a consequence, in Sep 1960, instructions were issued for forward patrolling as a part of Forward Policy, in the Western Sector, ie across Ladakh. Gen Thimayya was still the Army Chief, and the government was apprised of the risk and the lack of capability of the Indian Army to deal with a large scale Chinese offensive. Government questioned the Army for its sluggishness to implement its policy. It was due to its total ignorance of all matters military.
The Reign of the 'Yes-men' Generals
In Mar 1961, Lt Gen B. M. Kaul, Nehru's yes-man, and his most trusted military advisor, was made the Chief of General Staff (CGS), the most powerful Principal Staff Officer at the Army Headquarters, over the active objections of Gen Thimayya, since he possessed none of the qualifications for the key appointment. However, since Gen Ayub Khan had seized power in Pakistan in 1958, and Nehru, who had been fed with the idea that Gen Thimayya was likely to stage a military coup, felt safe with Lt Gen Kaul in the key position. Soon, on the advice of Lt Gen Kaul, Nehru promoted Gen Thapar as the Army Chief, against Gen Thimayya's advice to promote Lt Gen Thorat. Now Lt Gen Kaul being in a pivotal position, got a group of hand-picked officers to work with. The build-up phase and proper coordination for implementation of 'Forward Policy' was neglected, and they interfered more and more with the conduct of operations at unit level.
When Lt Gen S.D. Verma, GOC 15 Corps, responsible for operations in Ladakh, apprised the ground realities to Gen Thapar in writing, he was asked to withdraw the letter. He refused, hence was soon superseded. So he resigned. Even his pension was withheld for a year, till he met Nehru personally. And thus started the process of superseding all professionally competent and morally upright General Officers, to be replaced by 'yes-men' Generals. By mid 1961 the 'yes-men' officers took over at the Army Headquarters, so the Indian government was now free to hurry on to disaster, insulated from the professionally prudent warnings and protests. Hence a directive was now issued for implementing the 'Forward Policy'. While the government believed that the Chinese would not react to Forward Policy, Army's 'Intelligence Appreciation' clearly spelt out that the Chinese would react vigorously. And beyond that were the fundamental principles of war, and the basic common sense, that military plans cannot be founded on the assumption that the enemy will not react.
But now, it was Lt Gen Kaul who ran the Army, Gen Thapar being a nominal Chief, as he was indebted to Kaul for his appointment. Lt Gen Kaul had effectively manipulated to become the next Army Chief after Gen Thapar, totally out of turn, superseding many of his seniors. He was an average officer as compared to his contemporaries, neither trained to be the CGS, nor to command a Corps.
The civil set up was of the view that political factors would prevent a strong Chinese reaction. Though Gen Thapar differed, and pointed out the dangers with prophetic precision, yet his warnings were merely registered and never pressed, and Lt Gen Kaul was the man who counted. As a result, in mid-1961 the straight contest between the civilians and the soldiers ended in favour of 'Forward Policy', which commenced during the winter of 1961-62. Lt Gen Daulat Singh, Army Commander Western Command, protested against the establishment of post at Samzunling, in Galwan Valley, but he was overruled by Lt Gen Kaul. In Chip Chap Valley, across Ladakh, the Indians occupied posts both to the front and rear of the Chinese and started provoking them. By the end of August 1962, India had established 43 posts across Ladakh, beyond the established boundaries, with the aim of occupying Aksai Chin and cutting off supply routes to the Chinese posts. In NEFA, some 24 new posts were set up along the McMahon Line, in violation of the spirit of '1960 Delhi Summit Statement'.
The Trigger for War
Though the major piece of territory aimed at, was Aksai Chin, yet during May-Jun (on 04 Jun 1962) India established an Assam Rifles Post across the McMahon Line in NEFA, at a place called Che Dong, and named it Dhola Post. It was on the southern bank of Namka Chu River, at the base of Hathungla Ridge, but well within the Chinese territory. Lt Gen Umrao Singh, GOC 33 Corps objected to it, and suggested its withdrawal, this being a tactical liability, but he was overruled. Eventually, it was this post that acted as the trigger for the 1962 war.
The Chinese, who had refrained from border patrolling, came to know about it only in Sep 1962, hence they moved up to Thagla Ridge, overlooking Dhola Post. This was the Ridge, five kilometres across the McMahon Line, which Nehru had unilaterally included on the maps in Indian territory in 1954. Hence the Indian public, the press and the opposition clamoured for eviction of the Chinese from Thagla Ridge. On 08 Sep 1962 the Chinese troops came down from Thagla Ridge, encircled Dhola Post, and asked them to vacate the Chinese territory. They even requested for talks with the local civil administration but were not given a chance. China then tried to talk to Delhi but the government refused, since Nehru had locked the doors to negotiations.
India's unilateral and unannounced changes in the mode of McMahon Line in her favour, and thereafter establishment of of military posts across this Line, beginning with Khanzemane, Longju and Tamaden in 1959, and now the Dhola Post, demonstrated total disregard for the basic principle that the boundary changes had to be done with mutual agreement. As a consequence, on 03 Oct 1962, China proclaimed, "The McMahon Line was null and void and has never been recognized by any Chinese government." It implied that the annexation of NEFA by India in Feb 1951 was illegal. And this is precisely the reason why China exerts its claim on NEFA since then, to counter India's claim on Aksai Chin and Thagla Ridge.
At the same time, a divided cabinet, an irresponsible opposition, an uninformed press, a restive Parliament, and misinformed public, all fed on wrong history, clamoured for eviction of the Chinese from Thagla Ridge (NEFA). The opposition's demand and the public pressure gained momentum and the newspapers hammered the point editorially. Nehru was in a fix. At this stage, he couldn't have admitted that Thagla Ridge was actually in the Chinese territory, since he himself had unilaterally altered the boundary lines in 1954, and thus got drawn into a whirlpool of anti-Chinese agitation. Now he was left with no choice, but to order the Indian Army to evict the Chinese from Thagla Ridge (16,000 ft), to pacify the public opinion. It carried the Forward Policy one explosive stage further. In fact, it was a strategic blunder of first magnitude.
Lt Gen Kaul Appointed the Task Force Commander
When Lt Gen Umrao Singh, GOC 33 Corps, responsible for the defence of NEFA, expressed his inability to capture Thagla Ridge, the government wanted to sack him. However, since that would have created a major controversy in the Parliament, the government came up with a compromise formula. One Division (4 Infantry Division), which had only one infantry brigade (7 Infantry Brigade) in Tawang Sector (NEFA), another one 500 kilometres away with headquarters at North Lakhimpur (Assam), and the third one deployed in Nagaland in counter-insurgency grid, was detached from Lt Gen Umrao's Corps. This truncated infantry division was named 4 Corps, and Lt Gen Kaul, personally chosen by Pandit Nehru, was promoted as its Corps Commander, with the specific task of evicting the Chinese from Thagla Ridge in NEFA. It was a political gimmick.
Brig John Dalvi, Commander 7 Infantry Brigade, who fought the battle of Namka Chu in NEFA, wrote in his book 'Himalayan Blunder', "Nehru made many unfortunate choices and took many questionable decisions, but none more disastrous than the championship of Kaul, and his appointment as the Commander of the Task Force to evict Chinese from NEFA in 1962."
When Lt Gen Kaul took over the non-existent Corps on 04 October 1962, there was no accommodation for his headquarters. So he asked Headquarters 4 Infantry Division located in Tezpur (Assam) to move up, to Tawang (10,000 ft) in NEFA, and thus occupied their office complex. Headquarters 7 Infantry Brigade, located in Tawang, was in turn asked to move further ahead to Lumpu, towards Thagla Ridge, and thus the Division Headquarters occupied their office complex. So now in NEFA, three officers had only one formation to command, at the scene of conflict, that was 7 Infantry Brigade. They were : the Brigade Commander, the Division Commander, and Lt Gen Kaul, the so-called Corps Commander; that is three bayonets in one scabbard. No military unit or a formation can have two commanders, but now 7 Infantry Brigade had three, though the Division Commander, as mentioned by Brig John Dalvi, had become a post office.
Right the next day, i.e. on 05 Oct 1962, Lt Gen Kaul flew to Lumpu and personally ordered the 7 Infantry Brigade, through the Brigade Major, a staff officer, while the Brigade Commander was away from the Brigade Headquarters with his 'O' (Order) Group comprising all the Battalion Commanders, to move further ahead, and deployed them at the forward base of Hathungla Ridge, along the Namka Chu River, on both sides of Dhola Post. This area was clearly across the McMahon Line, well inside the Chinese territory, just below the Thagla Ridge. Moreover, he had deployed the Brigade non-tactically, without even consulting the Brigade Commander or the Division Commander. Brig John Dalvi, Commander 7 Infantry Brigade later wrote, "He ignored the laid-down time-honoured custom to follow the proper chain of command. It was to prove, the point of no return. In fact, from 05 October 1962 onwards, Lt Gen Kaul became the prime force that ordained all activity in NEFA, and now he had assumed the personal command of the 7 Infantry Brigade."
Lt Gen Kaul flaunted his access to Nehru on his Kashmiri net. Professionally he was not fit to command troops in war. He was an Army Service Corps (ASC) officer, and had not even commanded an infantry battalion. An intimate knowledge of an infantry battalion is a pre-requisite for commanding an infantry brigade. And now the so-called 4 Corps was his first battle command. As Brig John Dalvi put it, "Kaul was in a hurry to take on the world's largest land Army with the bayonet strength of two under strength battalions, moving on hard scales. The vague assurances of moving forward of war-like stores were dishonoured. It was a military blunder."
And then came the fateful day of 09 October 1962. Brig John Dalvi later wrote, "Kaul then threw the bombshell with which he had come from Delhi. In spite of the stark facts, he had no option but to make some move on Oct 10, as this was the last date acceptable to the Cabinet (due to impending snowfall thereafter), whatever the cost. He stated that the country was prepared to lose 20,000 lives if necessary, for achievement of this aim. It was going to be 'The Charge of the Seventh Brigade.' The Indian Army's mission was the defence of a political, instead of a tactical position."
The Indian troops had no Extreme Cold Clothing (ECC) or snow boots for high altitude warfare, and were equipped with .303 Lee Enfield Bolt Action Rifles, whereas the Chinese lnfantry had automatic Rifles. India had World War ll weapons, whereas China had modern weapons. Our troops were on hard scale rations, with pouch ammunition (50 rounds per head). They had walked 200 kilometres all the way up, from the plains of Misamari rail-head (Assam) to Namka Chu River (NEFA) flowing at the base of Thagla Ridge (16,000 feet), in torn canvas shoes. Their rubber soles and toe-caps had perished. They were moved up without being acclimatized to high altitude area, hence some of them even vomitted blood at Sela Pass (13,500 ft), and a few died at Tsangdhar (14,500 ft) on Hathungla Ridge, enroute to Namka Chu. Brig John Dalvi put it so aptly, "There are no limits to self-delusion. Men with power, but no knowledge, ignore these uncomfortable facts of life."
Lt Gen Kaul, who had assumed personal command of the 7 Infantry Brigade, ordered 2 RAJPUTS to capture the area and sit behind the Chinese on Thagla Ridge, at Yumtsola (16,000 ft) the next day. To facilitate the same, an advance patrol of 9 PUNJAB was sent to the slopes of Thagla Ridge, on the night of October 09/10, to secure a Firm Base for the 'October 10 Operation'. The aim was : "To capture Thagla Ridge". But this patrol was attacked by the Chinese at 05.00 am on October 10. As per Brig John Dalvi, India had six dead and 11 wounded, and the Chinese admitted to 100 casualties (33 killed and rest wounded). Lt Gen Kaul then turned to Brig John Dalvi and said, "This is your battle. This is a Brigade battle." Brig John Dalvi later wrote, "In the moment of crisis he failed to accept responsibility for obligatory decisions. He was bound to extricate the Brigade from the position, in which it had been placed."
Immediately thereafter, Lt Gen Kaul left for Delhi to consult Nehru. Brig John Dalvi observed, "Here was the most powerful General of the Indian Army who now wanted to consult Nehru for tactical decisions. The Chinese buried the Indian dead with full military honours, in plain view of their Indian comrades. It was a moving site, and that was the last attempt on the part of China to avoid a war." And thus ended the momentous day of October 10, 1962.
Brig John Dalvi wrote, "After October 10, Lt Gen Kaul was not to be seen in the battlefield, in spite of having set the Namka Chu Valley as a Chinese butchery. He believed in bullying his subordinates and never explained the reasoning behind his unreasonable and unsound orders. It was militarily an impossible task. My Brigade had become the sacrificial lamb to expetiate everyone's sins. The precipitous slopes of Thagla massif would have caused our troops to be massacred. 7 Infantry Brigade had to carry out a suicidal assignment with no scope to influence its fate. The Chinese were building in a massive way, and we were a mute witness to our impending destruction. But Indian troops are obedient and disciplined. They would have given their lives if ordered."
But unfortunately for India, Nehru had locked the doors to negotiations. The mood in lndia equated any agreement to negotiate, with surrender. So the Lok Sabha put it formally in a resolution, in which it affirmed "the resolve of the Indian people to drive out the aggressor from the sacred soil of India". Now China was left with no option but to teach India a lesson the harder way. As a consequence, it launched a massive pre-emptive offfensive on 20 Oct 1962, simultaneously, both in Ladakh and NEFA sectors.
The War
As Brig John Dalvi later wrote in his book 'Himalayan Blunder', "At 5 on the morning of 20 October 1962, massed Chinese artillery opened up a heavy concentration on the weak Indian garrison, in the narrow sector of Namka Chu Valley of Kameng Frontier Division, in NEFA. Massive infantry assaults followed, and within three hours the unequal contest was over. This was the moment of truth, Thagla Ridge was no longer, at that moment, a piece of ground. It was a crucible to test, weigh and purify India's foreign and defence policies. The Battle of Namka Chu must surely achieve the black prominence of the Battles of Panipat and Plassey. In three short hours, the flower of two regular battalions had been hacked to pieces without a chance to do anything but to die like men. The troops from all over the country or all four corners of India had nothing to sustain them but their regimental pride and traditions. They had done what they had done because they were soldiers. For no one can give more than his life for his country. By their selfless immolation the defenders of Namka Chu converted this remote valley into a grim reminder to the Indian people, of their duties and responsibilities as a sovereign nation."
The route to the plains of Assam lay wide open. Tawang fell without a fight and they swept aside the so-called impregnable defences at Sela Pass. Bomdila was literally overrun, and they reached the foothills of Brahmputra Valley by November 20. This was the result of going to war with a token Corps. Simultaneously, the Chinese had captured all their claim areas in Ladakh Sector too. With this, militarily the Chinese victory was complete, and the Indian defeat absolute.
China then unilaterally announced ceasefire with effect from November 22, and the commencement of their withdrawal to pre-war positions with effect from December 01,1962. Having completed their withdrawal, they invited India for resolving the border issue through talks. The Indian govt learnt that China had been engaged not on an invasion on India, but on a giant punitive military expedition for trying to unilaterally alter the boundaries, through use of force.
Operational Review of the Reverses
After the war, the Army was instructed to conduct an Operational Review of the reverses during the 1962 War. The Inquiry Commission comprised Lt Gen Henderson Brooks and Brig Prem Bhagat, VC. As per Neville Maxwell, "The Henderson Brooks Report traced the roots of disaster to 'Higher Direction of War', and the failure of the senior officers after mid-1961, to resist policies that they knew, or should have known, to be militarily impractical. The Report followed the NEFA fighting in detail, and the responsibility of Lt Gen Kaul, GOC 4 Corps; Lt Gen LP Sen, Army Commander Eastern Command, and Gen PN Thapar, the Army Chief, was made clear."
Since the Indian Army was still using the original British era maps, crossing the established borders for implementation of 'Forward Policy', establishment of 43 Army posts across Ladakh in the Chinese territory, establishment of Dhola Post (NEFA) across the McMahon Line, and the issue of evicting the Chinese from Thagla Ridge, five kms inside their own territory, had to be explained, for which the Ministry of Defence emerged squarely responsible, as orders for the same had been received in writing. These hard military and political facts could not have been ignored or suppressed. India was guilty of trangressing, with the aim of occupying Chinese territory (Aksai Chin and Thagla Ridge), over which she had no legal claim. Apart from many other reasons, this was the primary reason because of which the Henderson Brooks Report was classified as 'Top Secret' and not even tabled in the Parliament.
Nor can it ever be made public by any government. Or else, it will expose to the world, that it was India, who was responsible for provoking the Chinese aggression in 1962, which would cast an indelible slur on her image. Declassification of 'Henderson Brooks Report' would put the nation in an untenable position of being on a moral high-ground. It is a hard political compulsion for India. But unfortunately, we have made China our bitter enemy for no justified reason, when China could, and should have been our greatest friend. That's the political tragedy, for which the nation has been suffering since 1962, and shall continue to do so till the border issue is resolved in a justifiable manner.
Brig John Dalvi had very rightly observed, "Had Nehru and Krishna Menon given sober thought to the politico-military consequences of their rashness in demanding the eviction of Chinese, they could have saved the humiliating defeat of the Indian Army and India's reputation. Nehru's short-sightedness and negligence with regard to China is remarkable when judged against his far-sightedness in world affairs." And of course, Krishna Menon, as Defence Minister, had appeared like a malignant shadow over the military horizon.
The Way Ahead
While the Henderson Brooks Report is best kept under wraps, it is in India's long term strategic interest now, to settle the boundary dispute with China in a political framework. It is futile to fight, on and off, leading to avoidable loss of precious human lives for minor tactical gains, resulting in meaningless short-term jingoistc jubilations. How long will the youth of India keep bleeding like this, without a permanent solution ? The far-sighted political wisdom demands that the blunder committed in 1962, be corrected now. For this, India needs to give up her claim on Aksai Chin and Thagla Ridge, and China will automatically reciprocate by giving up its claim on the erstwhile NEFA (which it had offered to India in 1956, 1959 and 1960), but has been using it as a lever to counter India's claim over Aksai Chin and Thagla Ridge since 1962. It requires a visionary statesmanship.
The author is from 2nd Battalion Brigade of the Guards (1Grenadiers).
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