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Lt Gen Satish Nambiar

Regional Security and Bangladesh, Including Terrorism and Migration, And India’s Role as a Regional Power

Updated: Aug 28

Editor's Note

Lt Gen Satish Nambiar, well known Padma Bhushan recipient , wrote this piece in 2006 for a talk that he delivered at a conference at the Sikkim Manipal University in April 2006 ,i.e. nearly two decades ago !

Although a bit long, the entire original piece is relevant in today’s context, both regionally and globally.

MVI is privileged to publish this original version without any changes being made.

I am certain that readers will gain immensely from it due to its rare ,all encompassing ,deep insight of the subject matter and intricately linked issues .


The article may please be circulated amongst keen and interested readers.


Photos are for symbolic representation only

With Regards & Best Wishes,

Col Vinay B Dalvi,

Editor ,MVI


(Text of a presentation made by Lt Gen Satish Nambiar at a conference held at the Sikkim Manipal University in April 2006)


General

Till very recently, notwithstanding its size, population, military capability, and technological manpower resources, India had relegated to itself only a marginal role in regional and global power politics. Even the sharp rhetorical posturing from time to time as a leader of the so-called non-aligned community and the developing world, could not really conceal the marginal role it played at the international level. The high moral position the country took on many vital issues had little or no relevance in the conduct of international relations. The leadership (presumed or real) of NAM was a charade played out to some effect for a while, and was subsumed by real-politik in due course. If anything, India was looked upon as a non-performer by many in the developed as well as the developing world.

This perception may have changed somewhat with the outstanding military victory in 1971 that included standing up to threats from the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China, and also to some extent by the 1974 nuclear test, both of which made the world sit up and take notice of India. However a real change in the perception of India as a likely regional and possibly global player seems to have emerged with the institution of economic reforms in the early 1990s and consequent economic growth, the phenomenal capability displayed in harnessing the potential of information technology, its overt nuclear status after the tests in May 1998, and most recently, the outstanding capacity displayed in dealing with the Tsunami disaster, both within the affected areas of the country, as also in providing assistance to neighbouring countries affected.


An analysis of the regional security situation with particular focus on Bangladesh, including the aspects of terrorism and migration, and the possible role that may be imposed on India by virtue of its size, geo-strategic location, economic potential and military capability, need to seen within the larger perspective of developments at the global plane in the last couple of decades.

 



The Global Perspective

The dismantling of the Berlin Wall, the disintegration of the USSR, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the consequent end of the Cold War, were perceived by the Western world as heralding the emergence of a new world order. A perception that democratic forces and capitalism had triumphed over communism and that the West would now be able to set the rules by which the international system would be ordered. This euphoria was quickly shattered by the conflicts that raged soon thereafter in parts of the former Soviet Union, the Balkans, West Asia and many parts of Africa. As the Western world was trying to come to terms with these developments, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington took place, followed immediately thereafter by the US led operations in Afghanistan, and the US led invasion of Iraq three years ago.


These events have dramatically transformed the contours of the international system that we were familiar with in the latter half of the 20th Century. The most important element of this transformation is the dominant status of the USA as a global player. It is today a super power in every sense of the term, except maybe in displaying visionary statesmanship and providing credible leadership. Its political, economic, military and technological power is supreme. No other nation or grouping is anywhere close. Not only is the USA a significant player in the Americas and Europe, it is also an Asian power in that it has vital interests in West and Central Asia, and on the Pacific seaboard in Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines. It will without doubt continue to be the dominant economic and military force for much of the 21st Century, unless it degenerates under the contradictions of over-reaching itself by trying to run the world on its own.


Unified Europe will continue to be a significant political and economic player in the international arena. Most Europeans would very much like to see Europe provide some balance to the overpowering dominance of the USA; but that is unlikely for some time yet. Europe’s military clout will be contingent on the continuance of US forces in the support structure of NATO. Even so, it would seem there is some loosening of the trans-Atlantic relationship that seems to be driving Europe towards developing credible security architecture of its own. In fact Europe is possibly trying to reconfigure its relationship with the USA. In some ways it may well be trying to determine where it lies between the USA and a resurgent Asia.

Under the shadow of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation is seen by some as taking on the contours of the Germany that surfaced from the Versailles Treaty following World War 1. A mood of seething anger and economic discontent: a feeling of deprivation, of loss of prestige, and injured ethnic pride. Added to all that is the obsession the political and military establishment in Russia has about the eastward expansion of NATO. Given Russia's tremendous material resources, and the pride and resilience of its people, it is more than likely that the nation will re-­emerge strong and powerful once again. The speculation can only be how long this will take and whether this process will generate sparks that may ignite conflict on a large scale. The Russian role in the international arena therefore is still significant, but real credibility will largely depend on the speed with which the country is able to resurrect itself. The moves being initiated for coordination with China on various international and regional issues, and attempts to draw India also into these, are indications of the Russia’s desire to re-establish itself as a significant global power.



Japan is becoming increasingly assertive and displaying a willingness to play a greater role in international affairs. Its defence budget may be only 0.5 per cent of the GDP but that translates into a significant amount given its sizeable economy. It has ships and missiles of established capability. Whereas Japan has not gone nuclear, its latent capability is significant. Given the history of what was perceived as brutal Japanese rule in the region, the current developments within Japan are being looked upon with some concern by neighbours like China and the Koreas. The Japanese justification for what it is doing has to be seen in context of a perception that in the medium or long term, US commitment to Japan’s security may not necessarily be absolute.


China's role will be significant. It is already a power of considerable international stature; developing at a fast pace­ economically, and modernising its military. Given the requirement of oil for economic growth, China is already aggressively bidding for and securing rights for development of oilfields in various parts of the world. It is not inconceivable that it will spare no effort to secure for itself the oil­ rich basin of the South China Sea. Equally, China’s western flank borders on the known oil­ reserves of Central


Asia, which it will strive to exploit to advantage. An objective assessment suggests that China’s immediate focus is economic growth. It is therefore unlikely to provoke any confrontation beyond posturing and rhetoric. Even with Japan, political moves are driven by expediency as anti-Japanese attitudes help in sustaining Chinese nationalism that is useful in pursuit of domestic policies.


The only exception to such a benign policy may be in relation to the Taiwan issue on which the Chinese position tends to be rather paranoid. However this is unlikely to boil over as even the USA recognizes Chinese sensitivities on the issue and to that end exerts pressure on the Taiwanese authorities to exercise restraint.


In recent years the United Nations has been increasingly marginalised. In my view this process of marginalisation gained momentum with NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 without UN Security Council endorsement, and peaked with the unilateral US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Ironically, on the one hand, the UN is seen by the USA as a hindrance to the global policies it wishes to pursue. On the other hand, the organisation is perceived by the developing world as dominated by the USA and its Western allies, who are together more than prepared to use the world body as a front for pursuit of goals laid down by the developed world through political, military and economic pressures and sanctions. The latter position indeed has a great deal of merit because of the immense clout the developed world has both in military and economic terms. Recent attempts at organisational reform including that of the UN Security Council have foundered at the altar of political expediency, and there appears to be little hope of any significant change in the manner in which the world body operates for quite some time yet. Its authority and relevance, questionable at the best of times, seem to be in terminal decay. It will require a display of statesmanship of a very high order indeed to resurrect the United Nations.

The Asian Perspective

Most analysts seem to believe that in the 21st Century the power balance will shift from Europe to Asia for a number of reasons. The emergence of growing dynamic economies, energy dependencies of some of the larger players like China and India, large militaries, a number of established nuclear capable powers, missile capabilities, and so on. Even so the situation remains fluid in many parts of Asia.

West Asia continues to be volatile; with the ongoing developments in Iraq, the efforts of the new regime in Iran to pursue policies on nuclear capability that are perceived to be in violation of the provisions of the NPT, the ongoing conflict in the West Bank and Gaza, and the moves towards democratisation of societies in the midst of the emergence of radical Islam.


Central Asia has become another arena for power play with the USA, Russia and China trying to assert in one way or another. An interesting development is that of Russia and China trying to get together to elbow out the USA. The Central Asian Region has significance not only in terms of sources of energy supplies, but equally importantly as a stabilising influence against Islamic radicalism.


South East Asia is an area of vital interest to India. Not only because of the security of the sea-lanes of communication but also the economic agenda. This is a sub-region that is perceived as generally tranquil but no doubt dominated by China. It is therefore more than likely that the USA, as also some of the SE Asian countries themselves, wish to see India play a more assertive role as a balance to China.


Dimensions of Future Conflict

The end of the Cold War signaled the demise of ideology as the prime source of conflict; by proxy or otherwise. Capitalism triumphed over socialism, though both were different manifestations of the industrial era, primarily because the former identifies itself with the self-centred motivations of the human race. Since then, the focus in the West particularly,has shifted to identifying a "clash of civilisations" as the source of conflict in the future.


Obviously there is some merit in such a focus given the basic parameter on which the thesis is based; that the 'fault lines' between civilisations will be the battle lines of the future. There is no doubt that the strains of the different civilisations, namely the Western (Christian), Islamic (which runs from Turkey, or maybe now Bosnia-Herzegovina, through West Asia and North Africa, Central and South Asia, to South East Asia taking in Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia), Sinic, and Indic, carry within them the seeds of confrontation. However, except for the Sinic, and the Indic civilisations, the other two, which are the more prone to conflict, are not monolithic enough to sustain the theory of conflict on a civilisational basis.


The inescapable truth of an impending clash between "the Western World and the Rest", as Samuel Huntington puts it, lies both in the past and the present. The "West" as the "Rest" sees it, has attained a degree of affluence, and high standards of living for its people, by the exploitation of the mineral and human resources of colonies over the last few centuries, by the material wealth generated by the industrial era, and by the unfettered exploitation, of the natural resources of the planet. And having reached these­ exalted levels, led by the USA, the West, seeks to impose on "the Rest" (mainly the developing world), its perceptions of moral values including human rights, environmental restrictions, technology denial regimes, and so on. The scenario for conflict therefore, needs no civilisational connotation; it is generated by the “revolt of the oppressed”. Notwithstanding the imbalance of such an arrangement, it is not by itself likely to spark conflict in the 21st Century; the real sparks will be generated by some of the 'spill­ over effects' as it were, of the "West" versus the "Rest" syndrome.


Demographic movements propelled by deprivation together with ethnic, tribal and religious strife initiated by the explosion in populations in the developing countries, will be difficult to control. Where this movement takes place towards the developed countries of the Western world it will severely strain the already slender veneer of tolerance and assimilation in those societies and efforts will be directed at introducing international intervention in local conflicts, which may either extend the conflict, or give further impetus to fissiparous movements. Africa and parts of Asia, including South Asia, would appear to be the fertile arena for this type of situation. Where such movement takes place into developing countries like India, the perceived adverse impact on economic growth and social stresses could provoke conflict. Some of the effects of the influx of large migrant populations from Bangladesh and Nepal into India, notwithstanding all the protestations to the contrary by the two governments, have been a matter of concern for some years now.


Terrorism coupled with drug trafficking has been a major threat to peace and security in many parts of the globe. Whether state sponsored to correct perceived imbalances, or to respond to perceived impositions, or undertaken by fanatical groups, or by paid mercenaries, terrorism will continue to be a major factor in international security concerns for quite some time yet. As recent events have proved, any part of the world could be affected by this menace. The international community needs to shed empty rhetoric and posturing on this issue and get serious about instituting appropriate mechanisms to deal with it effectively. The drug trafficking menace that provides much of the funds for sustaining terrorist activity will need to be particularly addressed in South America, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and parts of South East Asia like Thailand.


The tussle for control, exploitation, and protection, of the existing resources of oil and the known oil reserves, will be another major factor in spawning tensions that could have the potential for conflict. The West Asian region has already demonstrated its vital importance to the international community, to extent of drawing in sizable military forces, particularly of the USA and other Western powers, to wage war on a massive scale for the security of its oil resources. The Central Asian region has also demonstrated its equally vital importance to the major players at the global and regional levels; the USA, Russia, China, Turkey, and Iran, are all exerting their utmost to have a dominant role in the exploitation and control of the large oil reserves of the region. Ironically, these major oil regions, the traditional West Asian oil belt, and the emerging Central Asian oilfields, are home to significant Muslim populations. Tensions and conflict, notwithstanding the scale, could therefore take on the dimensions of an Islamic versus the Christian West. In the other major area that has large oil reserves, the South China Sea, attempts by China to assert control and exploit the oil resources, would no doubt induce tensions and the scope for conflict, with her East Asian neighbours, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Since these countries have close political and security links and affiliations with the Western world, it is not inconceivable that the USA, and at least some of its Western allies, and countries like Australia, would try to limit the extent to which China dominates the region. Such a move could well develop, into a Sinic versus the Christian world, civilisational conflict dimension. This is of course a very remote possibility.


Another dimension that seems to have received little or no attention till very recently in terms of its impact on international peace and security is that of the environment. The struggle for water resources in this context could well develop into a serious issue, possibly even more debilitating than that for oil, unless taken note of immediately. Equally serious is the aspect of environmental degradation leading to floods and other such disasters. Not only as a source of conflict, but also as a cause of demographic movements.


The Regional Perspective

General

In looking at the security perspective of the south asian region, the following factors that are a unique feature of the geography of the region, merit particular attention. The most dominant factor is india's sheer size in terms of land mass, population and resources. The second is that, of the seven states that constitute the immediate region, india has common land borders with all except the maldives, allowing for the fact that the geographical proximity of sri lanka with mainland india makes for almost a land border. None of the other states have common land borders with each other. The third is that, other than between nepal and bhutan to some extent, only india has shared ethnic affinities with sections of the population of its neighbours. An appreciation of this unique feature is vital for an understanding of the complex inter-state political and security dynamics of the region in as much as, in almost every context, there is a bilateral dimension between each of the countries and india, but little with each other. That is the price india has to pay for its geography and cultural history. Because of this unique aspect of regional security it is imperative to briefly focus on some overall regional dynamics before addressing the bangladesh dimension.

 

Maldives the maldives, though not particularly stricken by any evident internal conflict, has a section that is inimical to the present government, which has in the past, caused some problems. Over a decade ago, at the request of the government in male, india had intervened militarily to deal with some raiders who had landed on the island in an attempt to overthrow the government. There could be a similar development in the future, which may call for a response either from the saarc as an organisation, or by the indian government, should the government of the maldives so request. The legitimacy of the request, and the type of threat, would of course, dictate the response.

Bhutan

Bhutan's internal problem has to do with the ethnic divide between the indigenous Drukpas (Bhotias and Lepchas) and the local Nepalese, who number anything between 30 to 50 per cent of the population of Bhutan. There are also divisions within the royal family and the dominant Dorji and Wanchuk clans; dormant perhaps, but to be taken into account nevertheless in such an analysis. In addition, the King's efforts to insulate the traditional culture and ethos of the Bhutanese from the invasion of modem ideas, technology, media exposure, and so on, are in contrast with the increasing opening up of the Kingdom to foreign tourists, to generate sources of income for the local populace and the Government. None of this however, is perceived to get out of control in the foreseeable future. The latest moves initiated by His Majesty for increased democratisation are indeed laudable.

Nepal

One of the problems pertaining to Nepal relates to the Terai area bordering India, where there is a big divide between the Hindi speaking people of the Terai, and the Nepali speaking hill people who have migrated to the Terai over the years for economic reasons. But the more serious problem today is the tussle between the monarchy together with the RNA on the one hand, and the disparate political parties and the Maoists on the other. The situation has taken a turn for the worse in recent days with the political parties and other activists having taken to the streets and the blockades imposed by the Maoists. Given the fact that one of the major contenders for power in Nepal and the main player is the Maoist Peoples War Group (with the dangerous connotation of affiliation with similar groups in India), the Indian establishment appears to have been caught in a cleft-stick. The fact remains that Nepal is in a crisis situation. No matter what the outcome, there will be serious implications for India and Indian society, particularly in the areas contiguous to the states that share borders with Nepal, not only in terms of refugee influx, but also due to the links that the Maoists have established with similar groups in India.

Sri Lanka

The political history of Sri Lanka since its independence, is deeply tainted by the Sinhala- Tamil divide. The regional connotation of this ethnic conflict is the impact it has on the Southern Indian states, particularly Tamil Nadu, and the scope it affords for the entry of influences from outside the region; on the pretext of assisting the state machinery in dealing with the insurgent problem. The cease fire agreement put in place between the then Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in February 2002 generally held for about three years without any serious outbreak of fighting. However in the last one year, with the internecine fighting between the LTTE and the break-away group led by Karuna, and more particularly in the last couple of months, the situation has become extremely fragile. Renewed outbreak of fighting will inevitably trigger a refugee exodus into India with all the attendant problems of security, relief and rehabilitation.

Pakistan

Pakistan also seems to be in a state of turmoil. Elements of the Al Qaeeda and the Taliban continue to operate in the border regions with Afghanistan keeping considerable sections of the Pakistan Army committed to operations on its own, as also on occasions in cooperation with the US led forces in Afghanistan. Pakistani society is periodically subjected to terrorist attacks by Al Qaeeda and associated groups, as also by sectarian fundamentalist groups. In addition, an insurgency situation has developed in Baluchistan that has drawn in the Pakistan Army. This explosive internal situation notwithstanding, Pakistan has not, in any way moderated its uncompromising stand of placing all its woes at India's door, and suggesting to the point of desperation, that if the Kashmir issue is resolved in its favour, all would be well with Pakistan, the Region, and the World. This paranoia, coupled with Pakistan's presumptious perception that it is the guardian of the welfare of, and the spokesperson for, the Muslims in India (who incidentally, outnumber the Muslims in Pakistan), is at the root of its reluctance or inability, to come to terms with the reality on the sub-continent, and the Region. This obsession appears to motivate Pakistan to use institutions like the ISI to encourage terrorists in their actions against the Indian establishment and to foment unrest within India. Which includes recruiting, arming and training cadres within Bangladesh.

India’s Internal Prblems

India's internal problems related to insurgency, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir, notwithstanding the external dimension in the form of induction of well-armed and trained mercenaries from Pakistan, are being dealt with and contained by the security forces of the state. These problems, together with those of casteism, class struggles, communal strife at times, ethnic pressures, and so on, while not too surprising in a country as large and diverse as India, are primarily the result of expediency in politics by many of the parties. The greatest problems today appear to be that of corruption and degradation of values in public life; which fortunately, are being increasingly recognised and, to some extent, being countered by judicial activism. Despite all this; and many more, the integrity and stability of the country are not at serious risk. The inherent strength of the democratic base, fully endorsed at the last elections, and the formation of a coalition government, as well as the economic strength and potential of the country, being given further impetus by the process of economic reforms, give reason for confidence.

The Extended Region

A brief look at the region immediately beyond the SAARC boundaries is also essential if the security dimensions are to be placed in perspective. Myanmar remains, and will probably continue to remain for some time, an enigma. Even so, the increasing Chinese influence in that country is a matter that needs to be taken note of and factored into any security assessment. In the Asian Region, the most significant development in the early 21st century would be the consolidation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a major power of great military and economic strength. That she will play an important role in the security perceptions of other countries in the Region is unquestionable. She is modernising her Armed Forces and has a nuclear stockpile of about 300 to 400 warheads. With Hongkong coming under her fold, the economic strength of the PRC will increase by 15 to 20 per cent; the island would also provide greater flexibility to China's security strategy in the South China seas. In the South Asian region therefore, China's role will be of great significance. This is evident in the enduring relationship that has been built up with Pakistan and the increased political and economic investment China is making in Bangladesh, and more recently in Nepal.

Developments in Afghanistan need to be watched with great care, because whatever happens there will have a serious bearing on the security of the Region. Whereas the Karzai regime backed by the US led coalition forces and the UN is making every effort to consolidate the democratic process that has been initiated, it is no doubt too early to completely dismiss the capability of the Taliban and Al Qaeeda. Whatever the outcome of the present struggle, the effects on the Region will be significant; and more so for India, whether it be in terms of the scope for increased problems in dealing with the insurgency situation in Jammu and Kashmir, or in terms of restricting her own scope for increased inter-action with the Central Asian Republics. The power play now going on in the Central Asian Republics, with the Russian Federation, in coordination with China, making strong attempts to retain its old influence and links, in the face of attempts by the USA, Turkey and Iran, to impose their presence and influence in that region, needs to be carefully analysed and assessed by India, to work out strategies to counter any ill effects such developments could have on the SAARC Region in general, and India in particular.

This brief review of the security situation indicates without any doubt that there is considerable turmoil within the region. All of which, besides being of concern to the countries affected, has serious security connotations for India. And with that we may now look at Bangladesh.

Bangladesh Preamble

 



As someone who as a young major, had the honour and privilege of entering Dacca (as it was then called) with the leading troops of the Indian Army and our colleagues from the Mukti Bahini, on the afternoon of 16 December 1971, after a fortnight’s gruelling but greatly rewarding campaign, one is struck by the irony of the state of relations between India and Bangladesh today. But as a witness to events as they then unfolded and as a strategic analyst in later years, one must admit at not being too surprised. There was much that could have been done then and in later years to consolidate on the joint efforts in 1971. Both sides share the blame for what we at least in India see as an opportunity lost. On our part, we failed to exploit the goodwill and gratitude of the locals by what can only be termed acute lack of appreciation of their sensitivities as a people who had suffered under Pakistani (Punjabi) domination and oppression. Some of our actions immediately after the termination of the war were no doubt perceived by the more sensitive sections of the local population as patronising and condescending; and with good reason, one may add.

Even so, the more important reason for the slide in relations seems to have been the resurgence soon after the war, of those sections of the people of Bangladesh who did not actively participate in the war of liberation, including some who actually worked with the Pakistani establishment. Whatever the reasons for their resurrection, there can be little doubt that as they surfaced to take positions of authority in various organs of the establishment, they had a point to prove; which they did most effectively by playing down the role of the Indian Armed Forces and even to a large extent, that of the freedom fighters, in the war of liberation. The political turmoil following the assassination of Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman and the periods of autocratic military rule that followed, contributed no doubt to the dilution of the sacrifices of the struggle in 1971. In due course, India became the favourite “whipping boy” of most political leaders for all the ills prevalent in Bangladesh society. And as the years passed, the anti-India rhetoric was further fuelled by Pakistani machinations including the use of ISI agents. This process was given impetus by the fact that by its actions and in many cases lack of action, the impression of India as a non-performer that was unwilling or unable to assert itself, gained ground. From that point on, the slide in relations between the two countries was downhill almost all the way.

Internationally, Bangladesh was seen as a poverty stricken country with shaky democratic roots. Even so, Bangladesh took fairly spectacular strides in its economic performance and social development in the 1990s. It ranked among the top performers in improvement in the UNDP Human Development Index. However by 2004, institutional weaknesses, poor governance, and the destructive politics of inter-party confrontation were causing extremely serious economic disruption. The overall picture both in regard to the internal situation as well as Indo- Bangladesh relations was far from reassuring. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism, deteriorating security, and the Bangladesh Government’s apparent inability or unwillingness to act firmly to correct the drift, seem to be attracting widespread international concern. Sreeradha Datta in “Bangladesh: A Fragile Democracy” sums up the problem of the country as follows: four parties (Awami League, BNP, Jatiya Party and Jama’at), three personalities (Sheikh Hasina, Begum Khalida Zia, General Ershad), two families (Rehman and Zia) and one central agenda (personal animosity). As a consequence the problems the country faces are: inroads by fundamentalist outfits; networking of the ISI with various Islamic groups; a highly negative economic situation; orchestrated attempts to create anti-Indian sentiments; sanctuaries in Bangladesh for anti-Indian militant organizations; absence of cooperation on issues like transport of natural gas, management of water resources or removing trade irritants. From India’s point of view all the dimensions of future conflict referred to earlier in the paper find place in the matrix of India-Bangladesh relations: namely, terrorism, demography (migration), energy and environment (water resources).

Terrorism

It is no secret that as the US led coalition forces and the troops of the Northern Alliance closed in on the Taliban and Al Qaeeda in the wake of the operations launched in Afghanistan in retaliation for the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington, many of the cadres and sections of the top leadership, managed to escape the dragnet (no doubt because of some collusion with interested elements in Pakistan’s ISI) and find their way to Bangladesh. These hard-core terrorists were not only provided ready sanctuary in Bangladesh but found support and sustenance from a set of extreme fundamentalist groups that were already committed to the ideology of making Bangladesh an Islamic state governed under Sharia law. This motley grouping also found ready assistance from the Pakistani ISI that had re-established its roots in Dhaka during Khaleda Zia’s earlier stint in power from 1991 to 1996. With the huge amounts of foreign aid pouring into the country, as also funds provided by charities in the United Kingdom, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other parts of the Gulf, money laundering was relatively easy. Large chunks of such money were used to fund ‘madrassas’ that spawned willing recruits to the jehadi cause. Bangladesh has therefore largely replaced Pakistan as the epicentre for the recruitment, motivation, arming and training of cadres for international terrorism. Recent events indicate that much of the planning and organisation for the conduct of attacks, particularly in India, emanate from cells in Bangladesh. 


Terrorism attacks the values that lie at the heart of the Charter of the United Nations: namely, respect for human rights; the rule of law; rules of war that protect civilians; tolerance among peoples and nations; and the peaceful resolution of conflict. It is generally understood that terrorism flourishes in environments of despair, humiliation, poverty, political oppression, extremism and human rights abuse; and that it profits from weak State capacity to maintain law and order. To that extent, Bangladesh provides many of the conditions under which terrorist organisations can flourish.  Several United Nations anti-terrorist conventions have laid important normative foundations. However, far too many States remain outside the conventions and not all countries ratifying the conventions proceed to adopt internal enforcement measures. Bangladesh is governed by a four party coalition led by the Bangladesh National Party with three religious parties which are staunch supporters of Islamic fundamentalism. Also, attempts to address the problem of terrorist financing have been inadequate. While many States have insufficient money-laundering laws and technical capacity, the evasion techniques of terrorists are highly developed and a number of terrorist funds have a legal origin and are hard to regulate. 


In so far as India is concerned it is important to emphasise that notwithstanding all the initiatives under discussion and implementation at present at the international plane and the recommendations made, our fight against terrorism on the sub-continent will for some time yet have to be undertaken by us alone. Without doubt we may be able to count on the active support of countries like Russia who are similarly affected, and the sympathy of some of the other countries favourably disposed towards us. However, it is difficult to foresee any sections of the international community assisting us materially in the process. Not that we should be looking for any direct assistance in this regard. Hence we need to continue dealing with the menace as best as we can by mobilising and organising our capacities accordingly. Simultaneously, we should work towards endorsing the efforts of the UN Secretary General to garner the support of the international community. All the recommendations made by him can be exploited to our advantage should we feel inclined to do so. Ensuring that pressure is brought to bear on those countries in our neighbourhood that are either promoting terrorist activity or providing shelter to terrorist groups, and compelling them to adhere to the UN Security Council resolutions and other directives in this regard. Sharing of intelligence and information about such groups and cooperation so as to pre-empt them or interdict them to the extent possible. Imposing sanctions and freezing of financial resources to which such groups have access.


It is possibly important to highlight at this stage a related dimension of security that India has to deal with. Of countering armed insurgency in some of the states of North East India. This task is made considerably more difficult because not only do many of the leaders of the insurgent groups and some of their cadres find sanctuary in Bangladesh, but are able to secure weapons and equipment and operate training camps. No doubt with some assistance from the Pakistani ISI as also terrorist groups undertaking activity against the Indian establishment and its people.

Migration

Migration or demographic movements are not a new phenomenon. Movements of people across regions and even continents have taken place through the history of mankind. Some movements have taken place because of natural calamities; others due to oppression of minorities and ethnic strife; and still others due to economic deprivation, pressure on arable land, or search for a better quality of life. However, in so far as India is concerned, illegal migration from Bangladesh has assumed gigantic proportions. Figures of such illegal Bangladeshi migrants vary from ten to twenty million and more. While most of these migrants are in the North Eastern states of India, particularly Assam, there are significant numbers in other parts of India, including the National Capital Region. The point that merits mention is that only a small proportion of this community are Hindus fleeing threats and discrimination from the majority Muslim population of Bangladesh. The larger numbers are Muslims looking to resettle or seeking a better quality of life. For quite some time after India achieved Independence, illegal migration from what was then East Pakistan was subsumed by political expediency that exploited vote banks.


The security dimension of such migration for India is serious. The presence of such large numbers of ‘foreigners’ imposes severe strains on a society already trying to cope with inadequate infrastructure, shelter, basic necessities, and restricted avenues for employment; this could lead to conflict. The ‘foreigners’ stake in the well-being of the state and its people will always be questionable. Equally the flow of such migrants could well be exploited by terrorist groups to induct their cadres for execution of planned missions to provoke communal violence, create chaos and thus retard economic growth. The concern within sections of the establishment, the intelligentsia and the strategic community is not totally misplaced when one looks back into history and into the writings of some political leaders in relatively recent times. Communal politics in India started with the birth of the Muslim League in Dhaka in 1905. In the case of Assam, with the policies of the British and the Muslim League in power in Bengal, there was organised settlement in the early part of the Twentieth Century. Large numbers of peasant workers from East Bengal, particularly Mymensingh, were moved into Assam to work the virgin land and to provide labour for the tea gardens. The 1931 census report apparently showed that between 1911 and 1931, the Muslim population in Assam had increased from 5 per cent to 30 per cent. In his book Myth of Independence, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto wrote, “It would be wrong to think that Kashmir is the only dispute that divides India and Pakistan….One at least is nearly as important as the Kashmir dispute, that of Assam and some districts of India adjacent to East Pakistan. To these, Pakistan has very good claims.” Before the emergence of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman wrote in his book Eastern Pakistan: Its Population and Economics, “Because Eastern Pakistan must have sufficient land for its expansion and because Assam has abundant forests and mineral resources, coal, petroleum, etc Eastern Pakistan must include Assam to be financially and economically strong.”


Considering the projection that, in the next fifty years, India is likely to be the world's most populated country, it would be stating the obvious that any additions to these numbers by migrations from adjacent countries without adequate safeguard mechanisms, will cause serious social tensions, economic upheaval, and environmental disaster. The challenge will therefore be to put in place appropriate structures to ensure that any migratory movements that may take place are part of mechanisms that are designed to absorb any adverse impact. The only frame-work that would appear to lend itself to successful management of this challenge, is the institution of a South Asian Union on the lines of the European Union, with open borders and free market trade, economic cohesion including a common currency, and a cooperative political arrangement that is also answerable to the people of the region as a whole. (Sounds very utopian at the moment). The feasibility of such an option lies in the common strains of ethnicity, culture, tradition, and aspirations of the peoples of the region. Needless to say, for such an arrangement to come into being, a very high order of statesmanship, determination, sagacity, and compromise, are required. India, with its size, geographic location, manpower and material resources, large industrial base, technical expertise, and well-established democratic traditions, will need to be the driving force. The developed world, led by the USA and West European countries like the UK, France and Germany, and possibly Japan, could act as catalysts in this remarkable venture to make it happen. The assistance required is not in the form of doles (with the inevitable strings attached), but an infusion of investment particularly in the infrastructure sector of the South Asian countries, ready access to advanced technology in industry and agriculture, and more particularly in the exploitation of renewable energy resources like solar energy, biotechnology, and the ocean bed. A tall order on all counts, but not impossible. Should such an arrangement come about, it would also provide a credible and effective apparatus for the security of the region from external conflict influences, with considerably reduced demands on the countries of the region for allocations for individual defence needs.


India’s Strategic Options

The Canvas

In the five decades plus after Independence, for all its protestations, India has largely been insular and isolationist. Totally subsumed with the situation in Jammu and Kashmir and the insurgencies in the North East, the Indian establishment allowed China and Pakistan to call the shots most of the time. China did so by supporting the insurgencies in the North East in the early years, and using Pakistan as a proxy to keep India totally pre-occupied. Pakistan on its part deftly exploited the situation within Jammu and Kashmir as also in other parts of the country to wage a low intensity proxy war that includes support to terrorist groups. The success the two countries achieved in this context is underscored by what had become a paranoid obsession about Pakistan; a paranoia that took India down to the same level as Pakistan. In the process, an otherwise untenable Pakistani claim of parity with India gained credibility in the international arena.


Notwithstanding the challenges India faces internally, we need to be clear that within the international setting at the commencement of the 21st Century, given our size, geo-strategic location straddling the Indian Ocean, the population of over a billion people, our undeniable democratic credentials, the significant capability in information technology, space research, a large reservoir of scientific talent, management expertise and so on, proven military capability, and the large market for consumer goods and services, the country has a role to play both regionally and globally. Having stated that however, it may prudent to remind ourselves that whereas there is much euphoria about India’s economic growth potential and its capacity to be a player on the global arena, actual performance will be contingent on getting our act together in terms of absolutely critical issues such as development of infrastructure (airports, seaports, electricity, roads, railways, water supply, etc), pursuit of policies that promote growth, increased attention to vital aspects like primary and secondary education and provision of basic health services particularly to the less privileged sections of society, and eradication of abject poverty.

There is a view that India is experiencing a couple of silent revolutions. New elites are emerging from the most laudable phenomenon of democratic politics over the years and the more recent one of economic growth. They have new aspirations and energies; not in itself a bad thing. However, there is also the simultaneous phenomenon of the hitherto depressed classes seeking their rightful ‘place in the sun’. Provided both these phenomena are managed effectively without social upheaval and violence, India’s movement forward on the world stage would be unstoppable.

The Stake in the Region

There is no gainsaying the fact that India has an inescapable and vital stake in the happenings in the immediate neighbourhood; imposed on us by the fact that whereas we share boundaries and ethnic affiliations with all our neighbours, they do not share these with each other. Instability and social upheaval in these countries will have inevitable adverse ‘spill-over’ effects that will cause us security problems and generate stress within our society. Internationally, the situation today is that most countries, including major players like the USA, European Union, Russia, Japan, etc, would no doubt like to see India play a more pro-active role in promoting democratic values and contributing to stability in the region; as much because of the perception that India has such a capability, as because they would not wish to be physically involved. The only limiting element in this context is perhaps our inability to build a national consensus in this regard and a lack of political will. Whereas there is little doubt that we need to factor the aspect of the sensitivities of our neighbours into our proposed actions, there must be a preparedness to use our economic and military clout in pursuance of security in the region. This capacity and intent must be made clear and demonstrated to the extent required.


The fact that India straddles the Indian Ocean imposes on us the responsibility to ensure the security of the sea-lanes of communication from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Straits. In recent years this has been acknowledged by a number of major international players like the USA, the European Union, Russia, Japan, Australia, and so on. Our spontaneous and most effective response to the Tsunami disaster has reinforced this position. Our maritime capability must therefore be geared to meet this challenge. The diplomatic challenge is to initiate coordination with other littoral Indian Ocean countries.


Assuming the Role

On the economic front, India’s growth rate, increasing inflow of foreign investment, its own growing investment in the developing world, exploitation of its resources of renewable and non-renewable energy resources, and so on, will be the determinants of policy. Many of the restrictive policies of the past have already been dismantled and further moves are afoot to encourage both domestic entrepreneurs and foreign players to invest in the Indian dream. Domestic opposition to some of these measures on grounds of being against the interests of the Indian work force, etc, must obviously be appropriately addressed. Even so, the manner in which things are moving, it would appear that the Indian economy will continue to grow at an impressive rate and to the advantage of the country, notwithstanding the hurdles and obstacles imposed by some of our politicians and elements in the bureaucracy. The process will, without doubt, be propelled by Indian entrepreneurs and the Indian people to the advantage of the country.


It would not only be prudent but most appropriate, that in this process of dynamic economic growth, we draw in our immediate neighbours. Not only by removing trade barriers but also by encouraging and assisting Indian business houses to invest in these countries, to boost their own economic growth. This will need some imagination, innovation and finesse. Whereas in the case of the rest of the region and indeed the world, economic moves are largely driven by market forces, the immediate region is influenced by a number of local issues that need to be factored into our calculations. As an incentive for positive economic inter-action at the regional level, India may well have to make a number of concessions in the initial stages.


If we are to play any significant role in regional affairs and be taken seriously at the global level, Indian diplomacy will need to move into high gear, taking into account the fact that in pursuing international relations there is no place for righteousness and moral posturing; it is guided solely by sovereign national interests. In the immediate region, it may be useful to get off the high pedestal we have placed ourselves on, shed the patronising approach we seem to have mastered over the years, and evolve working relationships with our neighbours.


This will need to be set up on two basic planks: one, an appreciation of their needs and sensitivities; and two, a clear enunciation of our security sensitivities and their non-negotiable status. Whereas we should be prepared to bend over backwards to meet their requirements, and genuinely do so, it should be made clear that where our security interests are concerned no compromises will be made. That we will go the distance to ensure this, even to the extent of application of economic and military power. This process will obviously take some effort. Primarily because we have to first undo the present lack of credibility in regard to our determination in pursuit of national security interests; not too many countries take us seriously, because we have indulged in rhetoric rather than action all too often. Simultaneously, we shall need to condition international opinion to the fact that we are serious about developments in the region and that we propose to do something about dealing with those that impact on India’s security. To that end we may well have to regularly inter-act with other members of the international community including the more powerful ones, and coordinate our moves in consultation with them.


The demographic dimension has to be addressed at two levels. The first relates to the large migrant population, which if not managed properly could impose serious stress on economic and social activity within India. Obviously, if there are effective moves towards an arrangement like a South Asian Union similar to the one that exists in the Europe, the aspect will need to be handled within the parameters worked out under that arrangement. But till that comes about, there would be a need to clearly delineate and implement the framework for controls on illegal movement across borders. The second level relates to the effective management and application of India’s emerging youthful working population. It is more than likely that much of this segment of our population particularly in the professional category like scientists, IT qualified personnel, doctors, etc, will be lured by the Western world as also other countries that would be grappling with the problem of aging populations. While fully facilitating and even encouraging such movement of our young people, we will need to invest early in equipping our youth with better education at all levels - primary, secondary, university and post graduate professional, technical and scientific; in order that we have enough such capacity to meet our own requirements and some to spare. This is a task that our political leadership will need to devote their immediate attention to shedding rhetoric and symbolism.

Our security policy needs to be based on three elements: facilitation of continued economic growth; maintaining adequate defence capability making optimum use of available resources and technology; and, development of strategic and technological partnerships. Enabling our people and the institutions they create to promote their sustenance and well being, to work in an atmosphere free from fear and disruption is the primary security responsibility of the state. Hence the security apparatus and arrangements must provide protection to the population from internal and external threats. In the current scenario the main focus will be that of dealing with terrorism and proxy war. The phenomenon of terrorism is likely to remain with us and indeed the international community, for some time yet. In this context, pending appropriate action at the international level, it may be useful for India to initiate moves for evolving a comprehensive convention on combating terrorism within the SAARC framework in the first instance. Equally, to promote continued economic growth, there is need to ensure that economic institutions, the infrastructure that supports them, resources required from within and without, etc are secured against disruption or attack. This means providing security within the country, at our borders, and also well beyond our borders, on land, sea and space.


To deter and dissuade potential adversaries from undertaking any adventures against the country, to be able to deal with internal and external security threats should they emerge, to provide a degree of reassurance to our friends and neighbours who look to us for assistance, and to meet international responsibilities that require the deployment and use of military forces, India needs to maintain effective conventional defence forces and a credible deterrent strategic capability. This requirement should not impose unbearable strain on the Nation, and to that end should be met by making optimum use of our trained manpower provided with equipment that is indigenous or manufactured under joint venture projects or by transfer of technology. Having stated that however, it is imperative that we ensure that our defence forces continue to be apolitical, highly professional, and well trained.


As things stand today, no country, not even the sole super power, the USA, can manage conflict scenarios that have international dimensions, on its own. There is an imperative need to engage other nations in the shape of strategic arrangements and coalitions of forces. This is an inescapable development that we must factor into our security strategy. To be able to deal with the regional and international security environment as it emerges, and more importantly, to play the security role in the region that many members of the international community expect us to, it is essential that India develop and strengthen partnerships and arrangements at the strategic and technological level with as many international players as possible; the USA, European Union, Russia, and Japan, as also other littorals in the Indian Ocean. The connotation of such arrangements is that of consultation on developments at the regional or global level, and coordination of efforts at conflict resolution or conflict management where required. This obviously means possible application of elements of the Indian Armed Forces for maintenance of peace and security when it is in our national interests to do so, or in international situations that do not directly affect our security interests but our commitment based on expertise and capability, is sought by the international community represented by the United Nations. It would be useful for us to try and work out such strategic security partnerships with other regional organisations like ASEAN, SCO, AU, GCC, etc. This will no doubt fructify when the organisations and the countries that form part of them, begin to realise that India is serious about playing a role in international affairs. That therefore is the challenge of our political leadership in coming years.

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