Operation Pawan (1987-90): An Infantry Officer’s Perspective by Lt Col MK Gupta Ray

Introduction

While a lot has been written about Op Pawan yet the information provided to the reader remains incomplete.

So far I have not read a complete study giving out the detailed reasons that attributed to such a glaring loss to the well trained and professional Indian army caused by highly underestimated LTTE .

Main Reasons For IPKF Losses

I would attribute the following

main reasons for this sad loss :

1. Lack of coordination between the government and Army and between the three forces. When defence forces is to be launched it must be a cohesive force with its full might. In fact even the army units and formations were not in full strength and its complement.

2. Lack of political experience in employment of army both in conventional war as well as political war across the sea where political application of mind has to be astute with its force to be suitably grouped and employed with fixed aim with alternative plan depending on development.

3. 1986-87 had seen turbulence. Army was busy with operation Brasstacks from Nov 1986 to July 1987 when our battalion came back to Lucknow after 6 months operational deployment. Same was the situation with complete Western command and army reserve forces. It's also pertinent to mention that the battalion came to Lucknow only in July 1986 from 3 years tenure in the mountains in Kashmir where the battalion busted many militant operations including capturing arms, ammunition and 10 KG worth of gold that was being smuggled in by the militants.

4. Lack of time for proper preparation for operating in absolutely different terrain, enemy and different scenario requiring a completely different approach.

5. Directional command at Brigadier and above couldn't or didn't apply their professional mind as was applicable on the ground. One followed the other blindly.

6. No coordinated intelligence gathering. IB, RAW and MI were not well coordinated. RAW, IB and High commissioner Dixit were playing one upmanship to please political boss and individual game in that army command was in the weakest wicket which was required to bring result.

7. When we were launched within 24 hours being flown from Lucknow with 24 hours notice with 1/4th of troops we had nothing in our hands: not even proper maps.

8. PM Rajiv Gandhi had soft ears on Dixit.

9. Army Chief took the war for granted promising PM to capture Jaffna within 7 days when accord failed.

10. During negotiation between PM Rajiv Gandhi and PM Jayewardene, Prabhakaran was not allowed to participate. He was kept confined in a Hotel room from where he developed distrust which manifested later.

11. Indian Govt buckled under Srilankan pressure and handed over 11 middle ranking LTTE cadre causing their suicide and breaking the accord. Next day LTTE burnt Sinhalese villages and both LTTE and Sinhalese Govt accusing India of being unable to keep peace.

12. Maj Gen Harkirat Singh, the Commander on the ground was pleading not to hand them over to Srilankan Army as per the accord, but Indian Govt relented. What I want to project is when a book/paper/editorial is written a complete analysis needs to be done to bring out the correct perspective.

Conclusion:

I'm fully convinced with my experience . If the same operation was launched with proper planning, preparation and training Indian Army would have come out with flying colours.

There were unfortunate flaws in our political and military leadership.

Planning and preparations as were displayed in 1971war should be our hallmark in all our future conflicts. It displayed amazing patience, preparation,planning and execution. Despite tremendous external and internal pressure political and military leadership displayed amazing calmness and fortitude. Indian Govt and Army had no need to be in such a tremendous hurry. It could have allowed self attrition amongst Sinhalese and LTTE to make our job easy.

We, in the meantime time could have been fully prepared before being launched.

It was indeed a lost opportunity.

1971 war displayed correct combination of political and military leadership.