Introduction
An article titled 'The Art of Leading from the Front' by Lt Gen Bhopinder Singh was published by The Pioneer on 22 Sep 23 .This piece highlights the recent encounter in the Kashmir Valley that spotlights the unique institutional facet of ‘leading from the front’ that differentiates our Indian Armed Forces and their operational outcomes, as compared to other forces, internally and externally. Hard empirical data from 1965, 1971, Kargil-1999 to other ops-commitments validates the deliverables of battleground leadership, kinetic-abilities and doing the impossible, routinely. The junior-middle leadership of the forces have retained and internalised the culture of ‘leading from the front’ despite several other challenges from the front and concerns.
This piece was circulated amongst veterans and resulted in a spontaneous article from Neil John with divergent views on the ' Art of Leadership' and published by Mission Victory India ( MVI ) on 23 Sep 23 . Two highlights of this piece indicate the concept and thought process of the author Neil John - : "The kind of leadership that rides into the battle cavalier style is of course the worst form of leadership. What I disagree with is as a leader getting into an operation and drawing fatalities. And if the fatalities are due to bad planning, operational ignorance and lack of tactical knowledge then, it’s poor leadership" "The time of leading from the front charging on to the enemy is over. Leading from the front doesn’t mean dhawa of an enemy position. It means accomplishing a mission, through planning, mission type orders, catering for contingencies, deriving usable intelligence and manifesting own strengths on enemies vulnerabilities, aimed at achievement of the planned end state. To do this we don’t need to lose lives. We need to follow the principles of contact battles. Dekho, samjho, pahechano, plan banao, phir bhido.
With the transparency in battle fields, it is but imminent that the leader is going to get hit first." These two articles with divergent views has ample food for thought to trigger a debate amongst both serving officers and veterans on the this 'Art of Leadership' especially at unit and sub unit level in present times especially during CI / CT operations in J& K and the difference in this ' Art of leadership ' during conflict / war including all types of military challenges that unit and sub unit commanders could face. The critical role of higher leadership of formations and commands that impacts unit and sub unit leadership could also be discussed in the debate. PDFs of both the articles are attached for reference.
Trigger For Debate -
" When I asked cadets from NDA, AFA, Sudent officers at DSSC, participants at CDM as to what leadership is, the first response from all of them had been "Leading from the Front".
If one is trained to fight a war, he will always be eager to take part in operations regardless of personal safety. Now that the Army has been successfully transformed by Pakistan to change focus from war to CI, people jump to kill a terrorist if he smells one nearby. It has its reward system but is the risk/reward equation in favour of the leader? Is that what a leader is supposed to do?
A leader is one who has great situational grasp, ideate on effective solutions, use the members of his team to transform the situation in favour of the team and in military terms victory! If a leader gives one victory, he is a leader for life for the members of the team. He becomes a leader with personal power, which every one is supposed to become, rather than get promotions (positional power) through devious means. We need to choose the harder Right than the easier Wrong. Leading from the front and getting killed is not the solution ! The Nation needs the well trained leader for the next operation." --Gp Capt Johnson Chacko
Responses From Veterans
Maj Gen Raj Mehta:- As the application is referenced to the recent deaths at Kokarnag and how we've chosen to interpret them my response is in this context. As Cdr I Sector RR whose operational area began where the densely forested Kokarnag cliffs ended, it was mandatory for me to understand my terrain imperatives before conducting operations in such areas.
The area lies on the thickly forested northern slopes of the Pir Panjals in Banihal ,forming a fissured narrow sub valley in which the Jehlum River arises to descend rapidly to Khanabal where it meets the Lidder rising in the Kolahoi Glacier/Sheshnag area. I Sect is at Khanabal. This is where I was based.
Before the leading-men-into-battle philosophy any which way get examined or microscoped lets accept that the Kokarnag issue was about operations in poor visibility , poor negotiability areas where the operational advantage has always been in favour of an attacker ,the renegade/s invariably looking down at whoever wishes to climb up to force the renegade/terrorist/s attacker/s out of his/their well selected hideout/s.
Such holed up renegades need logistics support which is provided to them by sympathetic over ground workers OGWs, besides giving the renegades updated information on military movements.
It is thus the issue of intelligence that was the heart of the matter and the method of application of that intelligence far more than the issue was about the manner - cavalier or otherwise - of the four deaths.
I have operated in the area having done no great feat as it was mandatory to get familiar with the operating environment before obtaining and filtering and then applying intelligence.
This is not the forum for one to analyse the deaths that occured or why the operation stretched for so long.
What can be suggested for acceptance or censure is the fact that complex and interlinked factors play a part in such operations of which most media reports are unaware or ill informed about.
I have witnessed several CO level and below casualties up front and close and have no hesitation in avoiding speculation about what I wish I knew better about.
I may add that if there are lessons learnt I'd be careful about the forum where I would share the little I know .
Col Pradeep Dalvi: - "Leading from the front" is the most misleading term and used very brazenly especially in the valley and LC area. Never ever AWC has taught offrs to be pts men , Recce cdrs to lead company/ sqn in war or CI ops. As coy cdr behind leading platoon and as sqn cdr behind leading tp. I totally agree with Gen Raj Mehta OPS depends upon various factors like trn, hostile population, intelligence , lack of intelligence , verification of intelligence, etc. Having commanded my Bn in 2 sector located near Kulgam I am quite aware of the terrain, population, importance of Pirpanjal ranges and rivers and tributaries flowing from it like Jhelum, Lidder , Vashisth and villages located on the banks. These days the forces have advantage of high tech technology, equipment, c4 I systems. Way back in 1999-2000 everything was manual , we kept intelligence / info cards of all villages. In our 18 months tenure we knocked 20 militants without losing a single soldier. Some basic things need to be avoided are - bravado, rushing into ops without due diligence, inadequate tps in cordon & search ops. Use of wpns like RL, MMG effectively including intelligence gathering equipment. Lastly, gallantry awards for operations carried out in CI grid should be stopped. Sometimes they become counterproductive.
Maj Gen Raj Mehta:- Col Pradeep Dalvi has correctly expanded on the subject of leading, where much more than treating death as automatic martyrdom is the reality. My stint of 1996-1997 in Doda and end 1997-1999 in I Sector was in close badly needed coordination with his 2 Sector stint, so in many ways Kokernag, Kapran and Anantnag, Khanabal areas had linked operations.
What happened has nothing to do with what was reported. I leave it there.
Brig Pradeep Sharma:- " Leading from the front "- It has merely been a term used to euologise the death of a commanding officer. A CO is not to lead 'Small Team ' for house clearing operations and we have lost many good men doing just that!
In counter terror ops, 'Charging in' is not the way. 'Pinning down' and Starving them of Ammunition, Food and Water, then Smoking them out is by far a better bet. Cdr up the chain must not breathe down the necks of COs to get results or kills.
Brig RE Williams:-‘Leading from the front’ has to be understood in a broader sense. Front is ‘The battle front’ and not being the first amongst equals right at the point of contact.
Having gone through various battle / conflict situations and at different leadership levels, my sole driver has been to connect with the ‘Led’, and as close to the troops as possible.
As a young 2/Lt during the 1971 ops in Shakargarh sector, my learning was that the platoon Cdr moving along with the tps carrying all that load expected for a three day self contained battle ready was a real motivator, instead of the ‘Sahayak’ being burdened with that load. That in a sense was leading from the front. Now after the war and even during it, while just the initial conversation with the PWs taken as we advanced toward Bien R just before Shakargarh, they loudly came up with the fact that their leadership was no where to be seen at the front and their morale was low.
Even at Siachen, just being positioned at the right places of conflict, the troops morale was very high. This was aptly reflected when we captured Quaid post at 22000 feet, Late Rajiv Pandey, VrC, Late Virender Singh, VrC of our Bn. 8 JAK LI, and others were with the troops in battle. ‘Upfront’. Similar reflection was experienced three months after the capture of Quaid post, when Pak tps under Late then Brig Musharraf, attacked on us on 23 September 1987. While we were close to the area of conflict, the intercepts of the Pak soldiers, when they were very close to success, were totally demoralised as none of their leadership were even close to the conflict area. They were actually abusing Pak leadership for not providing them the promised equipment at the point assured. This again reflects upon the leadership and positioning of the leaders.
Kargil ops demonstrated very clearly on fighting and being present right in front.
As Cdr Drass bde, soon after Kargil, we captured Pt 5070 and were almost atop Pt 5353, when directions came to cease operations because of the assurance given by the Top leadership to Pak that ops will cease immediately. Again a link to appropriate positioning upfront.
We can carry on sharing similar thoughts but the bottom line remains - ‘Correct positioning and always Leading from the front’, have to be assured and tps morale kept always high.
Col PK Royal Mehrishi:- Leading from the front ( by CO's ) is now the norm because of :
Very junior in - experienced company cdrs (in the CO's view)
Credits (for operations)
Poor bonding (especially in RR , diff units intake etc)
Over confidence in one's abilities.
Poor track record of informers, (not vetted & unreliable)
Neil John:- I have been in the thick of battle and a gallantry award winner. I did stupid things when I was young. Today in retrospection I am living because the good lord thought I wasn’t welcome as yet in heaven.
Adrenalin will flow, youngsters will sometimes do crazy things. We can easily castrate them and call him useless or even term him as a misguided missile. But that’s the process of learning. Unless of course he is shamelessly repetitive about his follies. We all have worn those shoes, some of us buckled under pressure, some of us arose from the ashes to become heroes.
We have all learnt the hard way. Being in the thick of operations in the north east now, I have learnt such valuable lessons that I didn’t even learn while operating in the valley or in my 32 years of service. There is no my way, or the right way, or the wrong way. The unpredictability of a group of people, who basically are a misinformed mob, playing to someone’s sinister aim, is something which is in the realms of ambiguity. Sitting in a plush office I will never know, what the reality of that young officer facing the mob is. You have to experience it to believe it. Our young leadership does a fabulous job. Sometimes it doesn’t go text book style, but that’s why it’s internal security. That’s why we have senior leadership supposedly there in the back ground to do something called hand holding. Here the enemy is not the people but the narrative being played.
Our leadership has to be living the reality. Use of brute force might work in some places and might not in some. A small thing like a medical camp changes perceptions and gains acknowledgements of effort. The leader has to decide how he is going to operationalise to deliver, in the context of the situation and the effort available. Can you ask a barber to cook a dining out event meal? No you can’t. Capabilities are realised only by men who command troops on ground. The commander knows who will fit in where. Take Galwan, to accost the Chinese the boys that were sent were a motley mix of all kinds and trades. Soldiers, barbers, cooks, safaiwalas, etc. We know what happened then. Senior leadership needs to ensure adequate intelligence, training, preparedness, technology and a stress free operating environment. That’s all, don’t reach the venue and be the cause of misadventures.
It’s never a dull moment in operations. But leadership needs to be based on the four T’s … Trust, Training, Thought and Thoroughness of intent and planning. To top it with empathy and common sense.
Col NN Bhatia:- Two highest examples of leadership :
26 Sep is celebrated and observed by 13 Kumaon as 'Zalurah Day' with gratitude, remembrance and pride to Sub Sujjan Singh , AC and 9 Ahirs . Sub Sujjan Singh joined 13 Kumaon in 1971.Over 23 years he took part in various operations . On this fateful day in 1994 the unit got news of a large group of terrorists holed up in a location in Kupwara. Various teams were formed up for the 'search and eliminate mission.' Sub Sujjan with his team moved first under the cover of darkness at 0200 hrs and noticed 2 hideouts . In the meanwhile another team of the ahirs of same unit led by an officer was also approaching the terrorist hideout location but unaware of their presence and lurking danger . Comprehending this imminent threat to the other team Sub Sujjan approached the terrorist hideout immediately, unmindful of his personal safety .He was hit by a terrorist bullet in his abdomin yet continued his attack and sustained grevious injuries but killed 5 terrorists and sacrificed his life also 9 ahirs of his unit for the nation. Sub Sujjan Singh was awarded the nation's highest peace time military award,The Ashok Chakra (Posthumous )
Maj Shaitan Singh, PVC, Rezangla Battle.Out of 120 soldiers 114 were martyred. What could be a better example of unit level leadership !
Col PK Royal Meherishi:- Any audit and longitudinal study during last 30 years carried out of gains from 'OP Sadbhavna' in the valley by an unbiased study team ? I have done six tenures in J & K with 4 in frontal ops. We managed to fight hard with orders like no use of RL, 2" Mor even grenades for clearing underground basements inside huts in villages around Baramulla.
I once ordered the fire of 81 mm illumination ammunition to identify suspected terrorists in Gurej area , there was hell to pay the next day ! There is no independence, only controlled operations with GOC laying down rules of fire and engagement . Totally individual personality oriented !
Lt Col M K Gupta Ray:-'Leading from the front' means leader of a command, from section to army, shall be so positioned, that his presence is felt by the troops in physical contact of the enemy and the leader concerned can influence the battle with whatever resources is under him or he can call for. More difficult and less fluid the battle,the more the soldiers need the presence of the leader to be felt for moral , physical support and position of the leader needs to be nearer to the front line. One must understand that break in battle is the toughest one.
I would like to narrate a small example from my own experience.
Operating in Op Pawan was the most difficult thing as it was a disorganised and unorthodox battle. In 1987 our battalion landed at Palali to capture Jaffna. Battalion strength was only 220 as opposed to 850, troops needed orientation, adequate weapons and equipments, rest and refit ,etc. But we were launched over night practically without even a proper map!
We were moving through the dense Jaffna forest hardly knowing the right direction. It was difficult to have proper idea of the location of the subunits. Rifle Company strength was 40. Seeing the condition, despite bullets flying all over I decided to take the most conspicuous position so that I was seen from as much distance away as possible so that we moved as a team. Seeing this one of my company commanders commented "Sir, you seem to be walking on a Mall road !" I replied "Yes, so that you all can see me and feel my presence". So, how forward a leader should be depends on the battle situation. Rommel as a corp commander used to be in the front line and used to dig in with front line troops to observe the enemy.
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