By Brig BL Poonia, VSM (Retd)
Editor's Note
This article is based on the personal experience of Brig BL Poonia, during his command of an Assam Rifles Battalion in Nagaland and Tripura during the peak of insurgency from 1994 to 1997.
"Command of troops, sometimes throws up such trying and challenging situations, that a Commading Officer is left with no other option than to literally lead the troops from front, even against the conventional teachings", opines Brig Poonia.
In counter-insurgency operations (CI ops), is it correct for a Commading Officer (CO) to lead company level operations? Well, my answer is: "Yes, why not?" I say so, because the command of troops is an art, a free creative activity, based on character, ability and power of intellect. While the risk involved is much higher, the results achieved may be out of proportion to the effort put in.
Rommel, even as a subaltern, used to unconventionally infiltrate through the enemy lines with a few men. The climax of his career during WW I was reached with the capture of Monte Marajur using such unconventional tactics, for which he was awarded Pour le Mèrit, an award corresponding to Victoria Cross.
Leadership in war is among the highest forms of human activity. It requires superlative skills, a person to whom other men would unhesitatingly confide their lives in battle. A leader must have something more than normal. He must have a sixth sense, an intuition, which is developed through experience, sharp judgment, an ability to take quick decisions and calculated risks. Rommel had it in him and he led from the front, even as an Army Commander, during the African campaign. When the British raided his HQ, 400 kms behind, Rommel was riding a tank in the vanguard squadron of the advancing column. Even Field Marshal William Slim used to often reach the frontline troops during the crucial battles, even as a Corps Commander. The ultimate aim of adopting such unconventional methods is to minimize human losses by ensuring economy of effort, and to raise the morale of troops. Moreover, what is the use of studying military history campaigns and character studies of various military commanders if we are not prepared to learn the lessons and implement the same ?
In any case, different situations demand different solutions. When you command an infantry battalion or any other Army unit, which is well trained to carry out counter insurgency operations, there is no problem whatsoever, but when you are asked to command an Assam Rifles Battalion, the things are not the same, and your challenge increases manifold. While the Assam Rifles troops are fantastic, the problem lies with leadership. I will narrate my own experience.
An Assam Rifles battalion has six rifle companies, as against four in an infantry battalion of the Army. In my case, the two companies were deployed in Tripura, with the Main Battalion HQ at Agartala. Both companies were occupying the posts vacated by a battalion each, which had moved out to other states like Assam, Nagaland or Manipur. They were spread out far and wide, since the Tripura insurgency was relatively low in intensity. The remaining four companies with Tactical Battalion HQ were deployed in Nagaland, in a high-pitch insurgency environment. Those days, the NSCN (IM) was the most powerful faction which was brought to the negotiating table just at the fag end of my command, ie wef 01 Aug 1997, in which my battalion had a played a crucial role by rounding up the major portion of their top leadership.
My Second in Command was a 1962 batch Emergency Commissioned officer, and the four senior most Company Commanders had already been overlooked for promotion. Imagine my plight ! The remaining lot of officers comprised either Assam Rifles cadre officers or officers from All Arms, with no experience of counter-insurgency operations whatsoever. Fortunately, I had commanded a Rifle Company in Nagaland, where I was awarded Chief of Army Staff Commendation, and had served in Kashmir Valley during the peak insurgency, from 1992 to 1994.
Moreover, instead of normal three Reporting Officers in the chain of command in the Army, I had six of them in the chain of Operational plus Administrative Command. All my Reporting Officers were Army officers: DIG Tripura Range, DIG Kohima Range (Nagaland), the operational Brigade Commander in Nagaland, IGAR (North) - equivalent to a GOC Division, the Corps Commander, and finally the Director GeneralAssam Rifles (DGAR).
One of the sister Battalions under the operational command of the Brigade was a Parachute Battalion. To begin with, the Brigade Commander had full faith in them, but nil faith in us purely because ours was an Assam Rifles Battalion, till we proved otherwise through our years of hard work and toil, where I personally led all company level operations. I commanded the Battalion for three years, during which we received 70 awards, including a Shaurya Chakra. A copy of the Special BRO is still available with me to support my claim. I was awarded a Chief of Army Staff Commendation for the second time, as well as a VSM, and the Battalion was awarded a Unit Citation.
Just to give an idea of the handicap Isuffered from, I must narrate some interesting incidents, which of course were not at all interesting then. The Brigade Commander asked me for a photocopy of our Unit Citation, for displaying in the Brigade Motivation Hall. I handed over the Unit Citation Parchment personally to one of my officers to get it photostated from the market. He in turn handed it over to another officer through an NCO. Finally, they managed to do the unimaginable, ie to lose this historical document for ever, within a month of it being awarded. Yes, that is exactly what they did. The resultant effect is that even today the battalion, in spite of having been awarded a Unit Citation, doesn't have the parchment in its possession. Well, how they managed to lose it, and ultimately to have it destroyed, is a long story, but such wasthe lot with whom I had to deal with and depend for carrying out counterinsurgency operations. Then, one of the officers had put up a false claim for transportation of his car to Agartala, which I refused to sign. Thereafter, he was always busy writing pseudoanonymous letters against me to all my higher commanders in the chain.
Though he was ultimately caught and punished, yet imagine my plight throughout my tenure ! Then there was a minor change in the area of responsibility for the Road Opening Parties (ROPs) between us and the Parachute Battalion. Though the Officiating Adjutant, while handing over the duties to the permanent Adjutant on his return from leave, had intimated thisto him in writing, yet he failed to brief him verbally. Thisled to the Adjutant passing orders for deploying the ROPs as per the boundaries prior to his proceeding on leave, which led to a gap of about 500 metres. The militants exploited this gap by following the security forces convoy on the road in a light vehicle, and escaped through this gap after killing four jawans travelling in a gypsy.
So I had no option, but to lead every company level operation myself. It was neither aimed at getting awards nor at getting good Annual Confidential Reports, but only to save the precious lives of the men I was responsible for, and to uphold the 'izzat' of my Battalion, and to preserve my self respect. The Tactical HQ of my Battalion was located next to the Corps HQ, and I used to occasionally get summoned by the Corps Commander for certain blunders committed by my officers. I had a tough time facing him.
While the Platoon level operations were led by the respective company commanders, the Company level operations were personally led by me, and I had to keep awake at night till the troops led by these officers returned to their barracks. Throughout my three-year tenure as a CO, I did not sleep for more than four hours a night, and this is not an exaggeration.
Those who have been fortunate enough to command Army units may not be able to appreciate the handicap, officers Iike me were placed under. While in a conventional war, there is no option, in CI ops, when one has an option to utilize the experience of the CO, to ensure avoidable loss of human lives, there is nothing wrong in a CO leading company level operations.
To reach Agartala (Tripura) from Dimapur (Nagaland), by a combination of rail cum road, it took me 24 hours. Then visiting the posts required another 3 to 4 days. Since I was fully committed in the high-pitch insurgency in Nagaland, I hardly found any time to visit Tripura, but the DIG Tripura used to complain to the DGAR against me that I was not interested in the Tripura portion of my command. Hence I liaised with the Army Aviation Squadron to take me from Dimapur to Agartala, whenever there was a helicopter training flight to that location. He helped me by occassionally planning his training flights accordingly, so that I could return to my Tactical HQ the same evening after holding a Sainik Sammelan, and resolving various issues at the Main HQ, Agartala (Tripura), but the DIG Tripura Range compared such visits to that of a Corps Commander, and insisted that I visit each post in Tripura periodically. So I had to go to Tripura by road-cum-rail every six months and visit the posts, in addition to my helicopter visits. One day a jawan committed suicide at one of the Tripura posts. The Court of Inquiry'sfirst question was, "When did the CO visit the post last ?" Fortunately, I had visited the post two months ago and had held a Sainik Sammelan there, during which that particular jawan was also present, but he did not reveal any problem. The suicide was due to some domestic problem, otherwise the DIG Tripura Range was gunning for me.
In addition to leading company-level operations, I had led two Battalion level operations also to raid two different NSCN (IM) camps, in which I had placed myself just behind the two leading scouts of the entire raiding column, with the Platoon Commander of the leading platoon just ahead of me, alongwith the leading Section Commander. However, the Company Commander, with his Company HQ, remained at his conventional location behind the first platoon. What was my justification for adopting this unconventional approach ? Simple; to save the precious lives of the men I was responsible for, though at a great risk.
How much risk a commander is prepared to take, is purely a matter of his prerogative. A commander, no matter what his rank, should go to the 'hotspot', ie to the place where judgement counts, where a true feel of the actual situation can be gained that just simply cannot be transmitted by telephone or radio set, in fact it can be transmitted in no other way than through the six senses of the man who isthere. How far forward, will depend on his rank and upon the situation at that time. There can be no set rules, the only rule being, when in doubt, err towards the front and not towards the rear.
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