“KARGIL-99”— POLITICAL , MILITARY, AND AN INTELLIGENCE BLUNDER ! By Col Rajinder Kushwaha

Editor's Note

This second piece is by Col Rajinder Kushwaha who was posted in Keren Sector 268 Inf Bde ,adjoining Kargil .His book ' Kashmir - A Different Perspective' has elaborately covered the Kargil War and more.

“—No wonder Kao ( RN Kao — founding father of RAW ) is believed to have said —General Malik (General VP Malik former COAS of Indian Army during Kargil-99) went into a happy deep sleep into the winters. He is now blaming the intelligence agencies for not preventing him from sleep—“

—Vikram Sood , Ex RAW Chief , on Page 222 of his book “The Unending Game“

Vikram Sood has quoted RN Kao in context of General VP Malik’s observation in his book “

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KARGIL : SURPRISE TO VICTORY”. General VP Malik had observed that intelligence agencies had failed to detect Kargil intrusion by Pakistan . General Malik had pointed towards the deficiencies in collecting , collating , interpreting and assessing capabilities of Indian Intelligence agencies. This had been contested by Vikram Sood .

According to him , this was a clumsy attempt to pass on the blame, for Generals acts of omission and commission. I was there in Keran Sector, 268 Infantry Brigade, adjoining Kargil and I know the truth because I saw the confusion all around. Some of these facts I have stated in my book on “ Kashmir - A Different Perspective”. Intelligence was coming but Military had different priorities .

Intelligence agencies had been passing on the intelligence about build up in POK to all concerned . In fact an article in News week after the Kargil fiasco had stated that Pakistan Army’s drive to purchase High altitude and extreme cold weather clothing was on the radar of Indian intelligence agencies since June 1998. Even then Prime Minister , Sh Atal Bihari Vajpayee, after Kargil -99, when asked, had stated that there was no Intelligence failure. Therefore this negates General Malik’s allegations.

In fact , Vikram Sood contends that it was military intelligence and Generals who had refused to accept warning from civil intelligence agencies. He brings out a real reason for the Kargil intrusion. It is a known fact that prior to 1982, forward posts in the Kargil - Dras region were occupied by BSF. Even during extreme winters at heights above 4200 meters , BSF never withdrew its troops.

However, once army took over the responsibility in 1982 , it introduced the practice of withdrawing in the winter. This fact was very well known to Pakistan army. There is a lot of truth in this, as I would narrate from personal experience in the Keran sector of Kashmir. Vikram Sood further states that the policy of withdrawing troops in winters continued even when in April 1998 there was a report of some 350 odd “irregulars’ having infiltrated from Pakistan side of the Kargil.

This practice of withdrawing troops in the winters had become a routine with the Indian Army and a practice with Pakistan Army to quietly occupy some of these tactically important posts. But our Generals and army maintained stone silence on such losses and nation never came to know.

In the Keran Sector of Kupwara of North Kashmir, there is a Pakistani post called “Guthur Forward” by India but “Ramzan” in Pakistani lexicon. This post was once Indian outpost on the LC . But it was lost to Pakistan in the winters of 1990. Same is true of “Lunda Forward” in “ Gurej- Dawar” Sector. Pakistan has been quietly nibbling at some of the Indian posts on the LC in the winters but the Generals had suppressed this information.

Anyway, the point I am making is that we are very good in committing tactical blunders . When the going is good our senior officers, would hog the credit. If things go wrong, they shamelessly blame subordinates . This is what happened post Kargil-99 when Kargil Brigade Commander was made the “only Villain”.

Take the case of construction of UNVR (Upper Neelam Valley Road) by Pakistan in the mid 90s of the last century. Till date no one has questioned as to how Pakistan was allowed to construct this life line of its troops in Kargil Sector. Today, UNVR is a life-line for Pakistani troops deployed opposite Kargil. But in early 1990s , it was not so. It is a 22 KMs shunt , taking off from Chak (Athmuqam) in the Neelam Valley to village of Dakhan kot , where it rejoins the LNVR (Lower Neelam Valley Road).

This shunt was constructed when Indian artillery guns suddenly and mysteriously fell silent . What is shocking is the fact that interdiction was stopped during the hey days of militancy . Why did it happen? Answer lay with Generals of the time, who commanded 15 Corps, Northern Command HQ and also Army HQ.

The UNVR was constructed by Pakistan, some 4-5 KMs away, westwards from LNVR, to avoid the Indian small arms fire from localities on the LC, interfering with LNVR. It must be acknowledged that before UNVR was constructed , Pakistan largely depended on LNVR for logistic support to troops in Gulari-Kotli area. LNVR takes off from Muzaffarabad in POK and runs along the Neelam River ( called Kishan Ganga on the Indian side). It was easily choked and blocked by small arms fire.

Indian army not only allowed the road construction but also high embankment on the road. It was a tactical blunder by sleeping Generals to allow this. In magnitude, this was equal of dismantling of TSD (Technical Support Division) at Army HQ in 2012-13 , which had made a big success in CI/CT operations in Kashmir Valley . Suffice to say, that it was falsely accused of eves- dropping on politicians and so dismantled.

Indian Army was sleeping, while Pakistan was fully entrenched in Kargil in April - May 1999. The snow had melted in April 1999. There was no hurry to occupy the posts - but shepherds of Kargil started moving around , who gave the first news of Pakistan’s intrusion. But Indian Army in 15 Corps was busy in other extra curricular activities. Army HQ was no less.

When in the first week of May 1999, General VP Malik was planning to visit Poland , the news of Kargil infiltration had started pouring in. A journalist had questioned General Malik on this visit, while Kargil was flaring up. He had retorted, “ I am the Chief of the Army. It is a formation level event . For such small things you mean, I cannot even go to the ⁸ bathroom” or words to that effect . As later events turned out , he had grossly misjudged the situation.

What about commanders at the HQ Northern Command? It was perhaps in a deeper slumber. Surprisingly, Lt General Padmanabhan was shifted from Northern Command to Southern Command at a crucial time, when snow had begun to melt in April 1999. His successor Lt General HM Khanna had no time to grasp the situation when militants-intrusion- issue had caught the eye of the nation. As his sleeping staff had briefed him , he boasted of throwing out the intruders in next 48 hours . But when he realised the gravity by end of May 1999, he rushed to Pune to consult General Padmanabhan.

It seems after “Lahore bus” of Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, on 20 February 1999, not only the Generals but also the entire Indian army officer corps was in a holiday mood , as if India had found a “Mantra” for a lasting peace . It was more evident in Srinagar, Kargil, Leh and Kupwara.

At Leh and Srinagar, Garden and Flower competitions were being organised in May 1999. Besides, “May Queen”, beauty pageants were held in the officer messes of Kargil and Leh. At Kupwara, as late as 26 June 1999, Husband’s Night function was held . At the same time, at Srinagar, Badami Bag Cantonment, there was a Golf tournament going on, while body bags were arriving from Kargil and Dras. George Fernandez, then Defence Minister, saw this and had fumed with anger.

Over and above all this, Indian security forces in the Kashmir valley were involved in winning the hearts and minds of the people through Operations “ Sangam”, “Sadbhavna” and “ Maitreyi”. There was everything else other than professional job by the army. Therefore it was silly to think as to why did Kargil happen?

The question should be : Why should not have Pakistan done this , when it found everybody in Indian Army was in a “holiday mood” and sleeping along the LC? It is a different matter that Pakistan goofed it up.

What did army do post Kargil fiasco? First thing it did was to liberally give gallantry awards, so as to hide incompetence of the Generals . Some 265 awards were given , which included 4 PVC and 9 MVC and 53 VrC - which was a record for “Half -a - War”. No previous war had fished out so many gallantry awards .The dead can not speak and and award winners had silence written all over their face.

The whole blame for Kargil was shifted to Kargil Brigade Commander and he was sacked . None of the higher up was touched . The GOC (General officer Commanding) the Infantry Division was asked to simply go home . The Corps Commander at Srinagar got a coveted appointment of QMG (Quarter Master General) at Army HQ. He went home honourably. Kargil Inquiry, both at national level and in-house by Army , cleared everyone else. Climax was as happy as the ending frame of a Bollywood movie.

Then, strangely, Army HQ issued a STRATEGY PAPER called , “Important issues and case of Brigadier Surinder Singh “. The gist of it was published in The Tribune of 15 September 1999 and Kashmir Times on 16 September 1999.

The two main points of the Strategy Paper were:

-First, that Media was trying to make Brigadier Surinder Singh a hero and painting General VP Malik as a villain.

—The second point directly blamed PMO ( Prime Minister Office) for not properly assessing RAW reports .

What was the point ? It was a sure admission that intelligence was there with the army but it failed to properly interpret it. Sickening part was that a General was blaming his subordinate, Brigadier Surinder Singh, who was four rungs down the ladder. What a shame?

Hereafter the story becomes more interesting . I will deal with it in a later article . we have had not only been sleeping giants but also pliable and scheming grandmasters on our rolls . It was minnows (upto the rank of Colonel) who saved the Army . And India was largely helped by General, Nay, President Bill Clinton of USA who arm twisted Nawaz Sharif , then PM of Pakistan, to pull out his troops.

It may be noted that Pakistan had infiltrated with FOUR INFANTRY BATTALIONS of NLI (Northern Light Infantry), over a frontage of some 150 Kms to a depth of 8-10 KMs . And Indian Intelligence agencies, military included , thought they were militants. Statements of Indian Army Chief and Northern Army Commander testify this . It is also alleged that probably, Nawaz Sharief had cautioned Vajpayee in his “one on one” meeting on 20 February 1999. He wanted India to cut Pak Army’s wings, so as to allow him to sort out his army. Perhaps, he was not given full information, though he had visited Gultari region , opposite Kargil in January 1999. So, he knew what was going to happen, may be only half- cocked information was fed to him . Though later he denied knowing it , which was questioned by General Mushareff.

No wonder , Vajpayee had, later claimed that there was NO intelligence failure . This is why, then, R& AW chief, Arvind Dave , was made Governor of Arunachal Pradesh on 02 August 1999. Perhaps, the alleged information of small scale infiltration by Pak Army was kept confined to top brass of the Indian army and intelligence agencies. It never trickled down to commanders, who were to sort out the Pakistan army.

May be the information was only of militants being infiltrated, which had led Indian Army into complacency. It seems, General Pervez Mushareff , Chief of Pakistan Army, had outsmarted not only AB Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharief but also Indian Generals and intel agencies . No doubts, Kargil-99 was a political , military and intelligence debacle, at the lower scale of 1962 debacle , but brave “ Minnows” of Indian Army saved the day for it . Special thanks to General (Nay POTUS) Bill Clinton. !