Editor's Note
Although the 1962 Indo China War is 62 years old, yet some articles on the same keep appearing in various newspapers and magazines from time to time. While there is nothing wrong in that, dealing with such a sensitive subject without authenticating the historical facts in entirety, results in misleading the readers, creating a wrong impression about the Indian Army, and casting aspersions on the calibre, competence and character of some of the outstanding military commanders, who displayed courage of conviction expected of them, but were simply the victims of circumstances.
This MVI article by Brig BL Poonia is a strong counter to the narrative painted by Brig Karan Rathore on the 1962 War, and published by Swarajya Magazine. Let the readers be educated and enlightened by it, and form correct impressions, perceptions and views on this sensitive subject, that continues to draw the interest and attention of the students of military history, authors, readers and publishers in particular, and the nation in general.
Editors Note - All photos and maps are for symbolic representation only
Editor ,MVI
Background
Recently I came across an article titled 'Failure of Indian Military Leadership in 1962 Sino Indian Conflict : A Relook', by Brig Karan Rathore (Retd), published by 'Swarajya' on Nov 24, 2024.
The author has mentioned that the reason for defeat during the 1962 war was complete failure of the military leadership at all levels, ie strategic, operational and tactical. Well that is not a correct statement. While it was a combination of political and military blunders, not every military commander was at fault either. Hence to place Brig John Dalvi, Commander 7 Infantry Brigade, on a par with some of his over-ambitious seniors in the chain of command, amounts to a blasphemy of military ethics. While who all were responsible for the debacle, I shall cover later with due justification, yet he was definitely not the one.
While the views may differ from person to person, basing the same on incorrect historical facts is totally unacceptable. Moreover, let us not forget that the freedom of expression does not include the freedom to make wild allegations, amounting to character assassination of upright soldiers and commanders par excellence like Brig John Dalvi, who deserved to be decorated with an award. He didn't receive one, only because Lt Gen Kaul, his Corps Commander, wanted to shift the blame of his own failure to his subordinate formation commanders.
While the Indian Army suffered a humiliating defeat, the biggest victim among the military commanders of 1962 War was Brig John Dalvi, and his Brigade, which had to bear the brunt of political shenanigans of Pandit Nehru and Krishna Menon, and military blunders committed by Lt Gen BM Kaul, Lt Gen LP Sen and Gen PN Thapar. Unfortunately, he suffered for no fault of his, resulting in the brutal destruction of his Brigade right at the commencement of the war. Hence the nation needs to know the truth and defend the honour of a brave soldier and an excellent commander like Brig John Dalvi.
Every author is morally bound to take pains to dig out the truth before blaming any one, since morality is more important than the publicity gained by writing an article. If an article is based on incorrect historical facts, the deductions and the assessment are bound to be misplaced. The author has also raised a question, that while Lt Gen Kaul was personally issuing unreasonable orders, directly to 7 Infantry Brigade, bypassing the laid down chain of command, why did Brig John Dalvi accept it and not resign? And he further says that by not doing so, he failed to give his command a fighting chance, and that was his professional and moral failure. Well these are absolutely irresponsible and wild accusations. However, to understand the strength of counter-arguments to this question in its correct perspective, we need to go through the history and sequence of events, that led to the 1962 war.
A Claim Cannot be Based on Assumptions
The author's assumptions are based on the premise that Aksai Chin and Thag La Ridge belonged to India, and China was and is, in illegal possession the same. To begin with, let us get our historical facts correct. Both Aksai Chin and Thagla Ridge never belonged to India/British India. Nor does McMahon Line have any legal sanctity, since it was never ratified by China. Before making a claim on Aksai Chin, we should ask ourselves, as to during which war/battle did India or British India capture Aksai Chin, or vide which treaty was it ever given to India? A unilateral claim on a piece of territory by a nation, cannot be the basis of its justification. The same goes for Thag La Ridge.
History of Aksai Chin
WH Johnson, a British officer of Survey of India, who visited Khotan (China) in 1865 via Aksai Chin, drew a boundary line showing Aksai Chin in Kashmir territory. It was named 'Johnson Line' (also known as Johnson-Ardagh Line), and the same was published in an atlas in 1868. It had no legal sanctity, since it was a unilaterally drawn line, that was sought to be proposed, but the British never even communicated this as a boundary proposal to China. Interestingly, this is the line from which India derives its claim on Aksai Chin. However, the British had never laid any claim on Aksai Chin; it was done for the first time by Pandit Nehru only, in 1958.
In 1899, the British proposed to divide Aksai Chin through 'McCartney - MacDonald Proposal', a boundary line suggesting a portion of Aksai Chin to be included in the British territory. But the Chinese never replied. After 1899, there was no further attempt by the British to get China to agree to a boundary alignment across Ladakh.
So the only ratified boundary in Ladakh sector, that had legal sanctity, was the one which existed as per the '1842 Treaty' between Maharaja Gulab Singh and the Tibetans. This boundary was marked on the maps as 'British Boundary Commission 1846-47', later extended by 'Foreign Office Line - 1873' towards the north, as per which, the entire Aksai Chin remained a part of China. Howevever, the 'Johnson Line', continued to be marked on the British maps showing its legal status as 'Boundary Undefined', thereby implying it to be one of the boundaries 'to be proposed'. But for China, the strategic importance of Aksai Chin increased manifold, after the construction of 'Aksai Chin Highway' in 1957, which linked the vast regions of Sinkiang Province with Western Tibet.
History of McMahon Line
Now let us move on to NEFA and examine the history of McMahon Line. The sudden collapse of Chinese power in Tibet in 1911-12, tempted Lord Hardinge to capture the area that later came to be known as NEFA. However, a direct attack on Tibet would have resulted in a war with China. Hence Britain convoked a 'tripartite conference' in Simla, comprising Britain, China and Tibet in Oct 1913, since China excercised 'suzenerity' over Tibet, i.e. it still controlled Tibet's foreign policy, since Tibet did not enjoy independent treaty making powers. But the Simla Conference did not result into any treaty to which China was a party. Hence the British played a trick, and secretly signed a 'bilateral agreement' with Tibet, by assuring it all the help, in getting independence from China. But even the '1913 Simla Convention' showed Aksai Chin as part of Tibet.
However, this bilateral agreement was kept a closely guarded secret, since it was in violation of 'Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906', as well as 'Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907', under which Britain was prohibited to enter into negotiations directly with Tibet except through an intermediary of Chinese government.
Four months later, the British invited Tibet to Delhi for further discussions on Assam-Tibet border in Feb-Mar 1914, but China was neither invited, nor informed, and a secret bilateral treaty was signed on 24 March 1914. The alignment agreed upon was McMahon Line, which resulted in drawing of a new boundary line between Assam and Tibet, extending from Bhutan into Burma. This treaty being legally untenable, was kept secret for the next 23 years, till the British marked the McMahon Line on its maps in 1937, showing its legal status as 'Boundary Undemarcated'.
Annexation of NEFA
The Indian flag was hoisted in Tawang by Maj Bob Khating of Assam Rifles on 09 Feb 1951, 37 years after signing of the secret 'McMahon Line Treaty of 1914', when China was busy with Korean War (1950 -1953). The British had never laid any claim on NEFA, and legally NEFA was still a part of China, but India's claim on it, since annexation, is based on the right of possession, and not on the basis of any legal international treaty, the way Pakistan's claim is based on POK.
Thus, by annexing NEFA, India added 65,000 square kilometres of Chinese territory, but China did not protest. This puzzling silence of China can be construed as her acceptance of the McMahon Line, since China wanted to maintain good and friendly relations with India to resolve its remaining border issues. But Nehru misconstrued China's silence for its military weakness, which encouraged him further to make similar moves to acquire more of the Chinese territory. In spite of this, China signed the famous 'Panchsheel Treaty' on 29 April 1954, which was based on the 'Five Principles of Co-existence', that formed the basis of India's foreign policy with China, and the slogan 'Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai' became very popular since then, till early 1960.
Unilateral Change of Boundaries
Nehru strongly believed that nine-tenth of the claim on a piece of territory gets justified through the right of possession. Hence on 01 Jul 1954, just two months after signing of 'Panchsheel Treaty' Nehru unilaterally converted the 'Johnson Line' into a permanent boundary line on India's official maps, by removing its legal status of 'Boundary Undefined', and thus manufactured the Indian claim on Aksai Chin. In fact, it was a 'Top Secret' excercise, which was given a physical expression on the Indian maps under the personal guidance of Pandit Nehru.
Mr A.G. Noorani, an expert on legal and constitutional matters, known for the study of Indo-China boundary issues, has mentioned this incident in his book 'India-China Boundary Problem - 1846-1947 : History and Diplomacy', stating that India revised the maps unilaterally, where the legend 'Boundary Undefined', defining the legal status of Johnson Line, was dropped on the official maps, and a firm clear international boundary line was shown instead.
He writes, "It was a fateful decision. Old maps were burnt. One former Foreign Secretary told this writer how, as a junior official, he himself was obliged to participate in this fatuous excercise." It was speculated that the official was Ram Sathe, India's last Counsel General in Xinjiang and later an Ambassador to China. The new maps were printed showing 'Johnson Line' and 'McMahon Line' as permanent international boundaries without making any reference to their legal status, i.e. Johnson Line (Boundary Undefined), and McMahon Line (Boundary Undemarcated).
The History of Thag La Ridge
Another significant change made by Nehru during the execution of this 'Top Secret' excercise, was to alter the alignment of McMahon Line in the Kameng Frontier Division of NEFA, shifting it further north from Hathung La Ridge to Thag La Ridge, involving a unilateral shift of five kilometres, thereby including about 100 square kilometres of Chinese territory in India. The importance of Thag La Ridge lay in the fact, that it provided an unhindered view of the Chinese movements and military build-up, deep inside its territory.
How the Nation Was Fed With a Wrong History?
A.G. Noorani's book mentions that Nehru also wanted these maps to be sent to embassies abroad and to be introduced to the public in general to be used in schools and colleges. Accordingly, new maps were printed and the Indian atlases and maps started showing Aksai Chin and Thagla Ridge in Indian territory. The Indian youth which grew up seeing these maps and atlases printed in 1954, in schools and colleges since their childhood, had no reasons to doubt or disbelieve, and these boundary lines got imprinted and carved out on their unsuspecting minds. Anything contrary to this became unbelievable, and anyone challenging this obviously appeared unpatriotic.
As per Noorani, even the 1950 edition of Indian maps showed 'Johnson Line' as 'Boundary Undefined'. He writes, "A century old problem was neglected by a conscious decision in 1954, which in turn acquired the dimensions of boundary dispute in 1959. Unresolved in 1960 when the prospects of a fair settlement were bright, the dispute was sought to be resolved by confrontation."
He further wrote, "The conclusion is hard to resist that there was a total disconnect between the facts of history and India's policy on boundary problem, and later boundary dispute, and worst of all, an impermissible recourse to unilateral change of frontiers." It also flouted the 'October 1842 Treaty', and even the USA's secret 'CIA Papers', confirm these facts. And thus did Nehru shut the doors to boundary negotiations on 01 Jul 1954, which became the self-created root cause of the boundary problem.
Construction of Aksai Chin Highway
During 1956-57 China constructed the Aksai Chin Highway. This activity did not arouse the Indian government for the simple reason that it knew nothing about it. Indian Army had never been to Aksai Chin. India learnt about it only through the Chinese press reports, and it was not until 1958 that India made a formal claim to Aksai Chin. Having unilaterally altered the boundaries on maps, and emboldened by the annexation of NEFA without any Chinese objections or resistance, Nehru got encouraged to implement his plan of occupying Aksai Chin and Thagla Ridge, armed with the self-created logic that these were the maps handed over to India by the British in 1947.
Border Skirmishes
In 1959, the Indian Army was asked to establish two posts in the Chinese territory, across the McMahon Line in NEFA, ie Longju Post in Subansiri Frontier Division, and Khinzemane Post in Kameng Frontier Division, on the slopes of Thagla Ridge. Both these posts were pushed back by the Chinese in August 1959. However, when the Chinese returned, Indian Army re-occupied Khanzemane Post. In Ladakh Sector, the Indian troops reached Kongka La Pass in Cheng Chenmoh Valley, but were pushed back by the Chinese on 20 Oct 1959.
Due to these incidents, political opinion was aroused in India by the end of 1959. So the controls were locked, but in the positions in which Nehru had set them. As per A.G.Noorani, "In Aug-Sep 1959, Nehru had publicly admitted that Aksai was a disputed territory. However, his advisors were grossly culpable. They fed him with palatable history."
Chinese Efforts to Ratify Boundaries
The Chinese delegation reached New Delhi on 19 Apr 1960. This was Chou En-lai's fourth visit to India. He wanted a fair and reasonable approach to boundary settlement through friendly negotiations. The negotiations took place for six days at Nehru's residence in Teen Murti Bhavan. China's stand was that India accept Aksai Chin and China accept McMahon Line; no withdrawals were involved. Chou En-lai even said, "You keep what you hold, you take too anything in dispute and occupied by neither, and we keep what we hold." But the Indian side was adamant. The Chinese delegation had come via Burma, where they had accepted the McMahon Line. India once again missed a golden chance and a historic opportunity. Even the USA's secret CIA report read, "Fundamentally, China was right to assert that the boundary was undefined and called for negotiations without pre-conditions. Its terms in 1960 were reasonable."
When Nehru refused to compromise, Chou En-lai met Dr S Radhakrishanan, GB Pant and Morarji Desai, in a gesture of reconciliation. Their arrogance was matched by their ignorance, and in a desire to cut Nehru to size, Morarji was even rude to Chou-En-Lai. The diplomatic process was debased and Nehru compounded diplomatic arrogance with military folly.
However, before its departure from Delhi, the Chinese delegation made a six-point statement (Delhi Summit Declaration) stating that the boundary issues should be resolved in a peaceful manner, and to ensure the same, both the armies should not be deployed within 20 miles, and no patrolling should be carried out within two kilometres of the established frontiers.
Forward Policy
While China honoured the 'Delhi Summit Declaration' religiously, India disregarded it blatantly. Nehru's plan involved nibbling away the newly claimed boundaries by pushing forward the Indian Army in a gradual manner, which came to be known as 'Forward Policy'. Nehru felt that China could only create tension but was not in a position to provoke a war with lndia, as she had her own problems. That was the faulty premise and the fundamental flaw in the 'Forward Policy'.
But unfortunately, the altered boundaries in 1954 had been printed only on a limited number of official maps, and the Indian Army, the biggest user of the border maps, was still in possession of the original British era/pre-1950 edition maps. Hence whenever they were asked to cross the established frontiers across Ladakh or McMahon Line across NEFA, as printed on their maps, for implementation of Forward Policy, the Army officers questioned the wisdom and legality of such actions, since these had serious military repercussions. However, they were asked by the Ministry of Defence to disregard the same.
Gen Thimayya, who was still the Army Chief, apprised the government of Army's inability to deal with a large scale Chinese offensive, but the government blamed the Army for its sluggishness to implement its policy. It was due to the ignorance of all matters military. Lt Gen Kaul was appointed the Chief of General Staff (CGS), the most powerful staff officer at the Army Headquarters, against the advice of Gen Thimayya, he being the most trusted officer of Pandit Nehru. He was appointed primarily to keep a check on Gen Thimayya, who Nehru was made to believe might take over the country. Accordingly, Lt Gen PN Thapar was appointed the Army Chief to succeed Gen Thimayya, against his recommendation to appoint Lt Gen SPP Thorat, based on the recommendations of Lt Gen Kaul.
By mid-1961 the 'yes-men' officers took over at the Army Headquarters, and the Indian government was free to hurry on to disaster, insulated from the professionally prudent warnings and protests. The civil set up was of the view that political factors would prevent a strong Chinese reaction. Though even Gen Thapar, who took over as the Army Chief in May 1961 differed, and pointed out the dangers with prophetic precision, yet his warnings were merely registered and never pressed, and Lt Gen Kaul was the man who counted. Gen Thapar was indebted to Kaul for being appointed the Army Chief, and Kaul blindly towed Nehru's line. As a result, in mid-1961, the straight contest between the civilians and the soldiers ended in favour of 'Forward Policy', which commenced during the winter of 1961-62.
The Trigger For War
Lt Gen Daulat Singh, Army Commander Western Command, protested against the establishment of post at Samzunling, in Galwan Valley, but he was overruled by Lt Gen Kaul. In Chip Chap Valley, across Ladakh, the Indian Army occupied posts both to the front and rear of the Chinese and started provoking them. By the end of August 1962, India had established 43 posts across Ladakh, beyond the established frontiers, with the aim of occupying Aksai Chin and cutting off supply routes to the Chinese posts. In NEFA, some 24 new posts were set up along the McMahon Line, in violation of the spirit of 'Delhi Summit Declaration' of 1960.
On 04 June 1962, Assam Rifles established another post (named Dhola Post) in Chinese territory, ahead of McMahon Line, across Kameng Frontier Division. It was objected to by Lt Gen Umrao Singh, GOC 33 Corps, it being a tactical liability, but he too was overruled by Lt Gen Kaul. The Chinese, who had refrained from border patrolling, came to know about it only in September 1962, hence they moved up to Thagla Ridge, overlooking Dhola Post. This was the Ridge in the Chinese territory, five kilometres across the McMahon Line, which Nehru had unilaterally included on the maps in Indian territory in 1954. Hence the Indian public, the press and the opposition clamoured for eviction of the Chinese from Thagla Ridge. On 08 September 1962 the Chinese troops came down from Thagla Ridge, encircled Dhola Post, and asked them to vacate the Chinese territory. They even requested for talks with the local civil administration but were not given a chance. China then tried to talk to Delhi but the government refused, since Nehru had locked the doors to negotiations.
India's unilateral and unannounced changes in the mode of McMahon Line in her favour, and thereafter establishment of of military posts across this Line, beginning with Khanzemane, Longju and Tamaden in 1959, and now the Dhola Post, demonstrated total disregard for the basic principle that the boundary changes had to be done with mutual agreement. As a consequence, on October 03, 1962, 17 days prior to the war, China proclaimed, "The McMahon Line was null and void and has never been recognized by any Chinese government." It implied that the annexation of NEFA by India in February 1951 was illegal. And this is precisely the reason why China exerts its claim on NEFA since then, to counter India's claim on Aksai Chin and Thag La Ridge.
Prelude to The War
At the same time, a divided cabinet, an irresponsible opposition, an uninformed press, a restive Parliament, and misinformed public, all fed on wrong history, clamoured for eviction of the Chinese from Thagla Ridge (NEFA). The opposition's demand and the public pressure gained momentum and the newspapers hammered the point editorially. Nehru was in a fix. At this stage, he couldn't have admitted that Thag La Ridge was actually in the Chinese territory, since he himself had unilaterally altered the boundary lines in mid-1954, and thus got drawn into a whirlpool of anti-Chinese agitation. Now he was left with no choice, but to order the Indian Army to evict the Chinese from Thagla Ridge (16,000 ft), to pacify the public opinion. It carried the Forward Policy one explosive stage further. In fact, it was a strategic blunder of first magnitude.
Lt Gen Umrao Singh, GOC 33 Corps, responsible for the defence of NEFA refused to capture Thagla Ridge in the absence of adequate logistic support. To avoid the issue being raised in the Parliament, one infantry division, i.e. 4 Infantry Division ex his Corps was detached and renamed 4 Corps, and Lt Gen Kaul was promoted as the Corps Commander of this non-existent Corps. It was a political gimmick. This Division had only one brigade near the scene of action, i.e. 7 Infantry Brigade deployed in Tawang Sector of NEFA, commanded by Brig John Dalvi. The second brigade was deployed in Nagaland in counter-insurgency grid, and the third brigade deployed 500 kms away with Headquarters at North Lakhimpur. Lt Gen Kaul was made the Task Force Commander for eviction of Chinese from Thagla Ridge.
Thus 7 Infantry Brigade ended up having three commanders, ie Brig John Dalvi, the Brigade Commander, Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad, the Division Commander, and Lt Gen Kaul, the so-called Corps Commander. Now there were three bayonets in one scabbard, though no unit or formation of the Army can ever have more than one commander. Kaul took over the so-called 4 Corps on October 4, 1962, and reached Headquarters 7 Infantry Brigade at Lumpu (Tawang Sector) on October 5. He immediately assumed personal command of 7 Infantry Brigade and ordered the Brigade, through the Brigade Major, a staff officer, to move up further in the Chinese territory, and deployed it along the Namka Chu River, at the base of Thag La Ridge.
And then came the fateful day of October 09, 1962. Brig John Dalvi later wrote, "Kaul then threw the bombshell with which he had come from Delhi. In spite of the stark facts, he had no option but to make some move on October 10, as this was the last date acceptable to the Cabinet, due to impending snowfall thereafter, whatever the cost. He stated that the country was prepared to lose 20,000 lives if necessary, for achievement of this aim. It was going to be 'The Charge of the Seventh Brigade.' The Indian Army's mission was the defence of a political, instead of a tactical position." The government's decision was a plain act of political opportunism in the face of ignorant clamour of the Opposition and uninformed public.
The Indian troops had no Extreme Cold Clothing (ECC) or snow boots for high altitude warfare, and were equipped with .303 Lee Enfield Bolt Action Rifles, whereas the Chinese lnfantry had automatic Rifles. India had World War ll weapons, whereas China had modern weapons. Our troops were on hard scale rations, with pouch ammunition (50 rounds per head). They had walked 200 kilometres all the way up, from the plains of Misamari rail-head (Assam) to Namka Chu River (NEFA) flowing at the base of Thag La Ridge (16,000 feet), in torn canvas shoes. Their rubber soles and toe-caps had perished. They were moved up without being acclimatized to high altitude area, hence some of them even vomitted blood at Sela Pass (13,500 ft), and a few died at Tsangdhar, on the forward slope of Hathung La Ridge (16,000 ft) enroute to Namka Chu. Brig John Dalvi put it so aptly, "There are no limits to self-delusion. Men with power, but no knowledge, ignore these uncomfortable facts of life."
It was India Who Initiated the War
Lt Gen Kaul, who had deployed the Brigade along the Namka Chu River in a non-tactical manner, personally ordered 2 RAJPUTS on October 09, to capture the area and sit behind the Chinese on Thagla Ridge, at Yumtsola (16,000 ft) the next day. To facilitate the operation, an advance patrol of 9 PUNJAB was sent to the slopes of Thagla Ridge, on the night of October 09/10, to secure a Firm Base for the 'October 10 Operation'. The aim was : "To capture Thagla Ridge". But this patrol was attacked by the Chinese at 05.00 am on October 10. As per Brig John Dalvi, India had six dead and 11 wounded, and the Chinese admitted to 100 casualties (33 killed and rest wounded). Lt Gen Kaul then turned to Brig John Dalvi and said, "This is your battle. This is a Brigade battle." Brig John Dalvi later wrote, "In the moment of crisis he failed to accept responsibility for obligatory decisions. He was bound to extricate the Brigade from the position, in which it had been placed."
Immediately thereafter, Lt Gen Kaul left for Delhi to consult Nehru. Brig John Dalvi observed, "Here was the most powerful General of the Indian Army who now wanted to consult Nehru for tactical decisions. The Chinese buried the Indian dead with full military honours, in plain view of their Indian comrades. It was a moving site, and that was the last attempt on the part of China to avoid a war." And thus ended the momentous day of October 10, 1962.
Why Did Brig John Dalvi Not Resign?
Brig John Dalvi wrote, "After October 10, Lt Gen Kaul was not to be seen in the battlefield, in spite of having set the Namka Chu Valley as a Chinese butchery. He believed in bullying his subordinates and never explained the reasoning behind his unreasonable and unsound orders. It was militarily an impossible task. My Brigade had become the sacrificial lamb to expetiate everyone's sins. The precipitous slopes of Thagla massif would have caused our troops to be massacred. 7 Infantry Brigade had to carry out a suicidal assignment with no scope to influence its fate. The Chinese were building in a massive way, and we were a mute witness to our impending destruction. But Indian troops are obedient and disciplined. They would have given their lives if ordered."
Caught in the whirlpool of political shenanigans and military blunders, Brig John Dalvi offered to resign his commission. He asked Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad, his Division Commander, for a helicopter the next day to evacuate him from the battlefield. This was on October 19, on the eve of Chinese offensive. But the Division Commander took no action, nor did Brig John Dalvi press the issue further.
However he explained his predicament in his book 'Himalayan Blunder' under the heading 'Ethics of Resigning A Field Command', where he says, "If I left on tactical grounds, and the Chinese did not attack, I could have been branded a physical coward. I did not have the moral courage to accept this stigma. It takes more courage to appear a coward than risk being killed. On balance I decided to stay with my Brigade and share their fate. If I had to make this decision again I would still opt to do what I did."
He further wrote, "Field Marshal Von Manstein was responsible for conducting the efforts to relieve the trapped German Sixth Army at Stalingrad in 1942. He repeatedly clashed with Hitler who refused to allow any withdrawal, creating in Manstein, the crisis of conscience which is the lot of every soldier in history, who had to face political interference or unsympathetic commander - to resign or not to resign? Field Marshal Manstein has expressed his sentiments and contradictions of all commanders, in his memoirs : 'Lost Victories' as follows : The soldier in the field is not in the pleasant position of a politician, when things go wrong. I refer to the feeling of responsibility which a senior commander must have towards the soldiers. To throw up my task at this moment, however justifiable the human motives might be, stuck me as a betrayal of those brave troops who were locked in life and death struggle."
The War
Brig John Dalvi wrote in his book 'Himalayan Blunder' that the vague assurances of moving forward the war-like stores were dishonoured by Lt Gen Kaul; it was a military blunder. And then came the grand finale, when China, having exhausted its patience, finally decided to launch a pre-emptive counter-offensive simultaneously, both in Ladakh and NEFA sectors on October 20, 1962.
In NEFA Sector, 7 Infantry Brigade faced the initial attack, which Brig John Dalvi described as follows, "At 5 on the morning of 20 October 1962, massed Chinese artillery opened up a heavy concentration on the weak Indian garrison, in the narrow sector of Namka Chu Valley of Kameng Frontier Division, in NEFA. Massive infantry assaults followed, and within three hours the unequal contest was over. This was the moment of truth, Thagla Ridge was no longer, at that moment, a piece of ground. It was a crucible to test, weigh and purify India's foreign and defence policies. The Battle of Namka Chu must surely achieve the black prominence of the Battles of Panipat and Plassey. In three short hours, the flower of two regular battalions had been hacked to pieces without a chance to do anything but to die like men. The troops from all over the country or all four corners of India had nothing to sustain them but their regimental pride and traditions. They had done what they had done because they were soldiers. For no one can give more than his life for his country. By their selfless immolation the defenders of Namka Chu converted this remote valley into a grim reminder to the Indian people, of their duties and responsibilities as a sovereign nation."
The route to the plains of Assam lay wide open. Tawang fell without a fight and they swept aside the so-called impregnable defences at Sela Pass. Bomdila was literally overrun, and they reached the foothills of Brahmputra Valley by November 20. This was the result of going to war with a token Corps. Simultaneously, the Chinese had captured all their claim areas in Ladakh Sector too. With this, militarily the Chinese victory was complete, and the Indian defeat absolute.
Operational Review of the Reverses
After the war, the Army was instructed to conduct an Operational Review of the reverses during the 1962 War. The Inquiry Commission comprised Lt Gen Henderson Brooks and Brig Prem Bhagat, VC. As per Neville Maxwell, "The Henderson Brooks Report traced the roots of disaster to 'Higher Direction of War', and the failure of the senior officers after mid-1961, to resist policies that they knew, or should have known, to be militarily impractical. The Report followed the NEFA fighting in detail, and the responsibility of Lt Gen Kaul, GOC 4 Corps; Lt Gen LP Sen, Army Commander Eastern Command, and Gen PN Thapar, the Army Chief, was made clear."
Since the Indian Army was still using the original British era maps, crossing the established borders for implementation of 'Forward Policy', establishment of 43 Army posts across Ladakh in the Chinese territory, establishment of Dhola Post across the McMahon Line (NEFA), and the issue of evicting the Chinese from Thagla Ridge, five kms inside their own territory, had to be explained, for which the Ministry of Defence emerged squarely responsible, as orders for the same had been received in writing. These hard military facts could not have been suppressed.
India was guilty of trangressing, with the aim of occupying Chinese territory (Aksai Chin and Thagla Ridge), over which she had no legal claim. Apart from a few other reasons, this was the primary reason because of which the 'Henderson Brooks Report' was classified as 'Top Secret' and could not even be tabled in the Parliament.
Those Responsible for the Himalayan Blunder
The following were squarely responsible for the debacle :
● Pandit Nehru. He was the main architect of the 1962 debacle. His belief that nine-tenth of the claim gets justified through the right of possession, led to the implementation of 'Forward Policy'. He mistook China to be militarily a weak country. Though the IB Chief misguided him, yet in war there are no joint decisions. A plan devised by million brains is still signed by one man, and that man has to assume the responsibility.
● Krishna Menon. He was the Defence Minister, who was in line of succession to Nehru, and his yes-man to the hilt. After his thumping electoral victory in 1962, he became more ambitious, ruthless and insufferable. Moreover, he acted as a field commander at Tezpur, dictating the Army Generals, the tactical deployment of troops. Ministry of Defence had all the authority but no responsibility. No amount of white-washing can absolve Menon of his direct contribution to the failure of 1962. If the military advisors failed him, the blame is still his, as he selected them himself.
● Bhola Nath Mullik. The all powerful Director of Intelligence Bureau for 16 years continuously (1948-64), propelled Nehru to believe that China would not react, since militarily it was not in a position to do so. As a consequence, instructions were issued for implementation of 'Forward Policy'. While it was a case of intelligence failure, should a responsible nation attempt to occupy its neighbour's territory, just because the intelligence reports indicate it being militarily a weak nation?
● General PN Thapar. By mid-1961, the fangs of the Army brass had been skillfully removed, and he had been selected as an Army Chief, to conform and not argue. When he received the letter signed by Joint Secretary Defence to evict the Chinese from Thag La Ridge, he did not have the boldness to throw away that scrap of paper into the waste-paper basket. As an Army Chief, he failed to resist the political orders beyond the capability of the Indian Army, and thus became a post office between the politicians and the Indian Army.
● Lt Gen LP Sen. As an Army Commander Eastern Command, he was aspiring to be the next Army Chief, hence he failed to resist the political orders received through the Army Chief, fully knowing the impracticablity of the task assigned to him. To fulfill his ambition, he replaced Lt Gen Kaul with Lt Gen Umrao Singh, removing him from the responsibility of the defence of NEFA, during midst of a military crisis, being fully aware, that he was an upright soldier and a professionally competent General Officer, with high integrity and exemplary moral courage. Removing a commander in the midst of a warlike situation is the worst form of humiliation he can be subjected to. Lt Gen Umrao was sidelined only because he was insisting upon military prudence. Lt Gen Sen failed to display moral courage expected of a soldier.
● Lt Gen BM Kaul. He was appointed the Corps Commander of a non-existent Corps by Pandit Nehru, to act as the Task Force Commander to throw out the Chinese from Thag La Ridge (their own territory). His sole aim was to please Pandit Nehru at all costs, since he had been appointed purely due to political considerations, and had the burning ambition to be the next Army Chief, totally out of turn. Professionally he was not fit to command troops in war, especially when he had not even commanded an infantry battalion. He was an ASC officer. Brig John Dalvi wrote, "In his memoirs, Lt Gen Kaul reveals a pathological impulse for self-justification. He rarely admits major errors of Generalship, though he has freely criticized others." He appeared to be a malignant shadow over the military horizon.
In the bargain, the future of upright and upcoming officers like Lt Gen Umrao Singh and Brig John Dalvi, got trampled under the personal ambitions of the above mentioned people. Brig John Dalvi, who was a bright and brilliant officer, had the potential of becoming an Army Chief in his own turn. Moreover, he had volunteered to command 7 Infantry Brigade in a high altitude area. However, his book 'Himalayan Blunder' is a master-piece of military history that exposed the cunning schemes of the above mentioned people, who had placed their personal interests above the interest of the nation. For the Army officers, it amounted violation of the credo inscribed in Chetwode Hall of the Indian Military Academy Dehradun, which says : "The safety, honour and welfare of your nation comes first, always and every time........"
Conclusion
It is morally incumbent on the part of every soldier and citizen of the nation to understand the truth, and for those in responsible positions, to explain the same to the nation, without putting any blame on a patriotic commander like Brig John Dalvi, who displayed high moral courage, and took every possible action, upholding his professional integrity, and risked his life to defend the nation, in spite of getting trapped in a situation beyond his control, and being betrayed by some of his senior commanders with unbounded ambition and little vision.
Brig John Dalvi was an officer with iron integrity, and the nation owes him a debt of gratitude, as also to all ranks of 7 Infantry Brigade, to include his staff officers, the battalion commanders, the Company Commanders, the Platoon Commanders, the Section Commanders, and every soldier of his Brigade, who made the supreme sacrifice or risked his life in an effort to defend the nation to the best of his ability, for no soldier can do anything more than this.
(The author is ex 2nd Battalion Brigade of the Guards (1 Grenadiers)
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