By Gp Capt TP Srivastava
Background
During my association with Indian Military spanning over nearly six decades, the most common refrain (read complaint) that I have heard and continue to hear from my military colleagues of all ranks, all services is that Government (read Politicians and Bureaucrats) do not listen to Military. After evaluating various cases/issues that emerged during past five decades, I am of the opinion that in few cases Military view might have been rejected in a wanton manner but in equally large number of cases Military leadership (read Service Chiefs) has been found wanting for not projecting the issue with sustained pressure. Few such cases are listed below with facts.
I treat Service Chiefs as 'institutions not „individuals', hence I rarely mention anything 'against' what they said/did while in chair or for that matter even after their retirement. However in succeeding paras I will have to use what few Chiefs said/did. In addition I will offer my professional views without any bias/disrespect towards any Service or Chief.
Case I : Kargil Fiasco
Kargil fiasco (not war) was a self inflicted injury entirely due to lack of surveillance during peace time. Who all were responsible has been lucidly stated in Subrahmanyam committee report. But what is most significant is the statement by the then Chief of Army Staff. He said 'WE WILL FIGHT WITH WHAT WE HAVE'. It is quite evident that the brilliant soldier made this statement in sheer anguish because he knew that we did not have adequate resources/technology to fight the battle in icy heights. As a soldier my take is simple “what were we doing during peace time?” I express my absolute and total resentment/disagreement with such belief. Although I am quite conscious that the CoAS made this statement out of sheer disgust for our weapons procurement process. But 'institutions' should not be governed by emotions. We, the officers are obliged and duty bound to provide state of art weapons to our soldiers. For instance we could not even provide an assault rifle to our soldiers to match AK-47 carried by every terrorists/jihadi. Why did we accept the INSAS Rifle, which did not work? The question arises; Was Government responsible for Kargil fiasco or Military leadership failed? Cost of such failure was over 500 young lives snuffed prematurely and over 1500 injured, few of them maimed forlife.
Brighter side of Kargil war was government‟s instant approval to acquire Litening Targetting Pod for use by Mirage-2000 while shooting match was on. Mirage pilots scoring direct hits on Tiger Hill bunkers with pin point accuracy stunned the world Air Forces.
Case II : Half Baked Theatre Command Concept
Product of unwarranted and undesirable process of supersession resulted in „luck‟ smiling on Lt Gen Bipin Rawat (third in order of seniority in the panel for Chief) becoming Chief of Army Staff. Destiny smiled on him yet again and after completing his tenure as CoAS; he was appointed as the first Chief of Defence Staff. Overnight he realized that all his predecessors (Service Chiefs) from all three Services (numbering nearly 70) did not have the foresight, he was blessed with. While he did not utter a word about Theatre Commands as CoAS but within a month of taking over as CDS, he advocated, rather bulldozed his way, courtesy „heaviershoulders‟ that existing organizational military structure of decentralized regional commands to be torn to shreds and highly centralized Theatre Command structure to be introduced. He supported his utterly flawed logic by stating that new structure will result in better „Jointmanship‟. He had obviously never heard of Chanakyan precept of „Mutual Inter Dependence‟. Instead of cementing greater integration among Services, he started the process of disintigeration. He, like many other supporters of flawed Theatre Command Concept (TCC), never answered an elementary question; “when, if at all, Indian Military faced adversity under hot war conditions due to lack of integration among Services?” His professional ignorance is exemplified by few of his decisions/directions listed below;
He directed that Air Defence Command was to be in place by 30th june,2020.
On national TV he said that IAF was a support service.
Now the core issue; No politician or bureaucrat asked him to tear the org fabric of military. It is he as CDS, who went to government with the proposal. Government and bureaucrats okayed it believing it to be a sane proposal coming from first CDS. Hence we cannot blame the government. Let us be candid; Not many politicians or bureaucrats understand how military operates. They are not required to because a stable structure has been and still in place and no government till date including Atal Ji‟s government ever tampered with organizational structure of Military in spite of Subrahmanyam Committee report. But if we from the military put up such half baked proposals to them, they are „obliged‟ to give the green light. That Late Gen Bipin Rawat had no clue about what will be required to bring such unwarranted structural change, is proved by the fact that it is more than 42 months (as on 20.09.23) and no one including the current CDS (A Retired Three Star Officer) has any clue as to how to execute it. Surely we cannot blame politicians and bureaucrats for the mess we are in. Acceptance of his proposal is not as significant as is the acceptance of proposal of a retired Group Captain for not creating an AD Command. Government listens to contrarion view as well and acts. Details below.
Case III : Air Defence Command
As a retired soldier I contested the professionally insane proposal of creating Theatre Commands with specific reference to creation of single Air Defence Command. It took me more than three years of continuous „tirade‟ (as called by a friend) of challenging the professionally unviable proposal of creation of single AD Command but the powers that be relented and AD Command proposal has been shelved. On this subject I wrote to PM downwards giving reasons and rational. I quote this not for self aggrandizement; I quote this to prove that „Government and Bureaucracy listens‟. It will not be out of place to mention that there was little or no action on part of Centre for Air Power Studies on the issue or for that matter numerous brilliant air warriors. Of course I am not privy to any confidential correspondence on the issue.
Case IV : Chastising DRDO/HAL/Ordnance Factories
I have been writing for over a decade and highlighting the proven incompetence of DRDO/Ordnance Factories/HAL for having failed to deliver operational platforms of international standards viz Tanks, Artillery Guns, ECM/ECCM Systems, PGMs, All types of aircraft etc. I supported my argument by stating facts. Result is that DRDO and Ordnance Factories performance is under scrutiny and committee has been formed to assess their performance. HAL has been told by PM to increase production and quality. Yet again not many of our Pseudo Military Strategists, who are adept at writing about happenings in Pacific Ocean, have had the moral courage to call spade a spade. DRDO/HAL and Ordnance Factories have individually and collectively failed the nation. A look at the list of indigeneous weapon systems each service operates will prove the point. Government ordered audit of all three is yet another substantive proof that government listens provided one has tenacity, patience and professional capability and most importantly to pursue the case repeatedly in a logical manner.
Case V : Role of Our Think Tanks
Role of our Think Tanks leaves a lot to be desired. In fact institutions viz IDSA, USI, ORF, CAPS etc avoid discussion on issues of such critical importance towards national security. I will quote few instances;
When COVID struck the globe, most believed that it emanated from Wuhan, China. Few foreign strategists viewed it as a Biological Warfare. I wrote to DG, IDSA to hold a seminar on our Bio-Weapon capability. After six months of continuous correspondence, a reply on behalf of DG, IDSA was received (signed by a Gp Capt) that since we are a signatory to CBW treaty, we cannot hold a seminar. I had not proposed production and use of CBW agents. My suggestion was aimed at conveying to world powers about our capability „if the need arose‟. COVID has come and gone (hopefully) but we are yet to hold a seminar on the issue. DG, IDSA obviously has no clue about „Capability-Intent Continuum‟.
Immediately after CDS proposed TCC, I wrote to Director USI to hold a seminar on the issue to discuss pros and cons of the proposal. The Director neither acknowledged nor held the seminar/discussion.
More than three years after the TCC proposal ORF decided to hold a seminar on the issue by inviting conformal thinking speakers supporting TCC. I specifically requested for a invite to project a contrarion view. I was not invited. Discussion lasting 71 minutes was an outstanding case of professional waffle sans substance. In fact former Chief of Naval Staff attending the seminar supported creation of Theatre Commands by giving various reasons. As an example he said that „it takes 10 hours to get air support from IAF because one is required to fill forms, whereas Carrier borne aircraft can get airborne in 15 minutes‟. I was aghast to hear such views from an aviator CNS. Carrier operations are under Navy‟s control. Why blame IAF? In any case all inter service procedures are jointly agreed to.
Even role of CAPS was not professionally pro-active. Premier Air Power institution is duty bound to question such professionally insane proposals. But it did not because no seminar was held on the issue. If CDS can announce on national TV about setting up of a single AD Command, why can‟t CAPS hold a seminar on the issue. It is not a personal matter; it has implications for nationalsecurity.
In case of all above stated issues surely Raksha Mantri is not required to intervene and/or give clearance. It is well within their respective domain to discuss such current issues in the larger interest of national security. But they avoid discussing any so called „controversial‟ issue. Forget about holding a seminar these institutions do not even publish contrarion views in their respective magazines.
Case VI : Inter Service Rivalry
CDS Gen Bipin Rawat‟s proposal of TCC had an ulterior motive, although unstated. As CoAS he never conceived the idea of TCC but on becoming CDS his visionary personality emerged from the dark. I have served in inter-service appointments/organizations for over 11 years out of 32 plus years of service as IAF officer. To best of my knowledge Late Gen Bipin Rawat had never served in an inter-service establishment. I state with total and absolute professional conviction that Army and Navy indoctrinates their younger officers by repeatedly telling them that „IAF FIGHTS ITS OWN BATTLE‟. Nothing could be farther from truth. Proof of what I have stated is there to see when one interacts with young Army and Naval officers during professional courses viz Joint Air Warfare Course (JAWC) and Defence Services Staff College course. Youngsters from Army and Navy come to attend these courses with pre conceived notions about employment of Air Power. In IAF we do not teach our youngsters that firstly, IAF fights its own battle and Secondly that Army and Navy fight their own battles. But the fact is that IAF promotes integration with other services and mutual inter dependence. It is the Army and Navy, which has a problem with IAF operational philosophy. IAF has no issues with operational philosophy of Army and Navy. IAF does not interfere or suggest how strike corps or submarine operations be conducted. But Army and Navy insists on telling how air operations should be conducted. As CDS Gen Bipin Rawat thought that he could and would bulldoze his way through by splitting IAF elements in penny packets and bring them under control of Theatre Commander, who would be from Army. Initiative to promote inter service integration rests squarely with Army and Navy by stopping false indoctrination of their youngsters. I have taught at DSSC and War Colleges of all three services for over seven years and interacted with officers of Capt/Lt to Colonel/Capt (IN) rank. Bipin Rawat was my student at College of Combat (now Army War College).
Has any General ever commented about deficiencies in Strike Corps operations? Has any Admiral ever commented on submarine operation limitation or capability (or lack of it) of our aircraft carriers? But dozens of Generals and Admirals have commented in public domain about IAF operational philosophy.
Should we not stick to our expertise?
Do we expect government to act as referee?
Fundamental tenet of IAF operations is based on „Mutual Trust and Inter- Dependence‟. Two examples will prove the point. IAF follows „Confidential Reporting‟ system for performance appraisal. It is indicative of „Trust‟ both ways. IAF published its „Doctrine‟ over two decades ago clearly enunciating how Air Power will be used in an integrated manner to achieve National Aim and Military Objectives.
Case VII : Weapons Procurement Process
One of the most flawed process we continue to live with is Weapons Procurement Process. Former CoAS‟s anguish expressed in few words said it all; „WE WILL FIGHT WITH WHATEVER WE HAVE‟. But we cannot carry on like this or should we?
Yet again military leadership is to be blamed/held responsible squarely for such state of affairs. How many Service Chiefs/Three Star officers have questioned the utterly flawed process of weapons procurement, particularly from foreign vendors? Has any Chief questioned the government on the issue? None; at least in public domain. For that matter our pseudo strategists and Think Tanks too have failed to question. As on date Defence Procurement Board (DPB) is headed by Defence Secretary. Why shouldn‟t the DPB be headed by respective Service Chief? But for that to happen noise has to be made at appropriate level. To illustrate the point; India continues to apply balm to scars received in 1962. Ordinary citizen and media invariably comments “Hindustan ki Fauj China se Haar Gayee”. They do not say that the then RM Sri Krishna Menon or the then Defence Secretary lost the war. Isn‟t this reasoning good enough to change the structure of DPB?
We now have a CDS in place. Instead of wasting time talking about integration, CDS ought to convince the government that weapons procurement must come under Military control, including finances. But will it happen? Will the present CDS and Service Chiefs confront the government on the issue? Will these Think Tanks stop behaving as government „mouth piece‟ and question such flawed policy?
Case VIII : Reform of Higher Defence Organisation
As on date one individual, the Defence Secretary is responsible for evaluating, vetting and approving all weapons procurement for all three Services. Even if he/she worked 24 hours a day, it is not feasible to do justice to task at hand. Why does the military leadership not ask the government to appoint a dedicated Secretary for each Service, who will report to respective Service Chief?
There is, therefore, no need to change/alter regional command structure of Indian Military, which has stood test of time. The need to change is Higher Defence Structure. Will any General, Admiral step forward and take it up with government? Will the CDS have the conviction and moral courage to take it up? There is still time to retrace oursteps.
Case IX : OROP
Unsoldier like agitation promoted by senior military officers, mostly from Army, has been one of the most despicable act of leadership. We soldiers behaved like trade unionists by deciding to sit on Dharna. If the OROP committee accounts are examined and names of contributors checked, it will prove my point that unwanted agitation was encouraged mostly by Army Officers. There was no need for the agitation, which merely resulted in no worthwhile gain. But it sullied the image of a soldier in the eyes of countrymen. OROP leaders even politicized the issue by attending press conference with a „no name‟ Congress leader. No Service Chief, past/present thought it fit to discourage such act of public nuisance by the soldiers. While large number of officers/men still keep cribbing about how government has been unfair to military but the moot point is how many of us have actually read the text of Koshiyari Committeereport?
Peace Time Operating Environment
There is a fundamental difference among how IAF operates vis-à-vis how Army and Navy operates during peacetime. IAF operations during peace and war differ in only one domain. During peace time IAF pilots fire actual weapons on firing ranges not actual targets, lift thousands of tons of load and deliver it to inhospitable terrain, fly helicopters well beyond the limits mentioned in pilots notes. Nothing simulated about all IAF operations. IAF actually launches (may be) 20 aircraft simulated strike over a designated target. 20 aircraft actually get airborne. But in case of Army and Navy most of their time is spent in Sand Model and Chart rooms. There is very little actual firing/movement. Symbolism is practised in their war games viz a platoon represents a brigade (as an example only) Strike Corps do not move; Carrier Battle Group merely simulates the threat and acts; Submarines do not fire torpedos on genuine targets as a matter of routine. It will not be out of place to mention that the IAF lifts more load annually to Leh than the entire load lifted during Berlin Airlift. Army and Navy does nothing like this during peacetime. However Air Power compliments of Army and Navy do exactly the same as IAFdoes.
All Air Forces are different from their sister services all over the world and operate independently but in an integrated manner and in close coordination with other services to achieve national objective.
There is no intention to discredit sister services. We in the IAF believe that our colleagues in Whites and OGs are the finest soldiers. We in the IAF have no intention of commanding a Strike Corps or Carrier Battle Group. We in the IAF expect reciprocation of same sentiment.
Air Power elements will deliver the punch within four hours of the „go ahead‟. Army and Navy cannot do that. Government also understands that.
Conclusion
Well I may not have succeeded to the extent I would have liked to but I have succeeded;
My continuous 'tirade' (as a friend called) against creating AD Command worked. Not one strategist had the guts to contest my logic. What is significant is the fact that a retired Gp Capt‟s logic was accepted and sitting CDS‟s recommendation negated. I have no doubts that serving IAF fraternity too must have expressed their dissent to this unviable proposal. It is ironic that our Think Tanks failed, CAPS in particular to challenge the professionally insane proposal mooted by an ignoramus CDS.
DRDO, HAL and ORDNANCE FACTORIES are den of inefficiency and incompetence. My 'tirade' against each one has resulted in DRDO being placed under audit. Ordnance Factories are being restructured again. No less than PM has asked HAL to deliver.
Theatre Command creation has been held in abeyance due to my consistent stand against organisational change. I may not have prevented it but I have delayed it by over THREE YEARS. Let me share something; government (politician and bureaucracy) is having a rethink. They do read the 'crap' I write.
Much to the annoyance of my colleagues in 'WHITES', I will advocate no further Aircraft Carriers unless we operationalise the existing carriers. Our existing Aircraft Carriers have limited offensive capability against Pakistan, which has a formidable Air Force. By the way my suggestion that Indian Military acquire Submarines in large numbers has been noted and appreciated by the powers that be.
C-295 has become a reality. Many opposed it, including my colleagues in „Blue‟. I insisted for procuring medium lift tpt aircraft of around 10 ton category.
To my extremely competent colleagues in „Whites‟ and „OGs‟, may I submit that they take care of their operations. IAF has and will continue to ensure that conflict termination situation, always and every time, will be favourable to India. IAF does not fight a „PRIVATE WAR‟. Army and Navy would do well if it discarded their innate desire to control Air Power assets of the IAF. No IAF personnel would ever want to control tanks or submarines.
And Finally,
My take is 'Govt Does Listen' provided someone has the guts, tenacity, knowledge and professional determination to follow it up instead of saying 'We will Fight with Whatever We have'. It is a direct disrespect to our brilliant soldiers. We the leaders are obliged to provide our valiant men the weapons they need and must have, and stop blaming the government (politicians and bureaucrats). If that is not doable; QUIT.
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