Ref Gp Capt Srivastava's article published by MVI on 17 Feb 25. Link....
The author has summed up the so-called 'offer' of the
F 35 for the IAF very succinctly in one word;
"A disaster"-- if India considers to procure them.
Like a child being shown a new toy, the excitement to 'own' it clouds all other facets of rationality, need, numbers, existing platforms, compatibility, and the balancing of military purchases.
The cost and operational efficiency of any new system, like the F-35, must be carefully weighed against the overall needs of the force, especially in the context of India’s strategic priorities, geography, and budgetary constraints.
The Indian Air Force needs to prioritize cost-effective, multi-role aircraft that can perform a variety of tasks in different threat environments.
The F-35 is undoubtedly a highly advanced fighter, but its operational costs are very high—both in terms of procurement and maintenance.
If India invests too much in this one platform, it could take away resources from other areas, like replenishing its current fleets, improving the readiness of existing assets, or acquiring more affordable, yet capable fighters for routine operations.
The threat from both China and Pakistan necessitates a mix of advanced capabilities and numbers.
For example, while high-tech stealth fighters can provide an edge in certain operations, a robust force does require diverse aircraft types for different roles—such as interceptors, ground support and multirole fighters—each offering their own strengths in various scenarios.
Too much emphasis on any single type, even an advanced one like the F-35, might limit flexibility and increase vulnerability in a prolonged conflict.
Moreover, it's essential to have the ability to sustain these aircraft in combat, especially in a resource-intensive war. Given the logistical challenges of maintaining a fleet of high-end aircraft and the potential need to replace losses quickly, investing heavily in a small number of expensive fighters could undermine the IAF's overall capability.
It is unfortunate, but the problem often lies in the technical jargon and hype surrounding fifth-generation fighter capabilities. While advanced stealth and sensors are important, the IAF's effectiveness will depend on how well these aircraft integrate with the rest of the force and how they can be sustained and replenished in a real-world conflict, especially when facing adversaries with differing capabilities.
In the end, it's about finding a balance—investing in technology that provides an edge without neglecting the more immediate and practical needs of the force.
Rational analysis of the actual employment of these systems in the Indian context, rather than getting caught up in theoretical debates which many well-known 'know- all’s prefer to go into is therefore crucial to making the right decision.
My personal view is that, even if bought in small numbers, it will give us additional insights into the preparedness of our potential foes in battle. Besides it my open doors for technology or at the least for some reverse engineering which will help our DRDO and HAL scientists. I do not have the technical expertise to know if procurement will give us more insights than what is there in the public domain. But a differential cost must be valued as opportunity cost as regards this advantage. Be that as it may, given the past, relying on USA weaponry and looking to the US for spares produces vulnerabilities. The company could be obliging but being subservient to government, we know…