The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) Report, authored by Mr. K. Subrahmanyam, Chairman of KRC, made a critical observation: "The Kargil intrusion was due to failures at all levels—political, diplomatic, intelligence, and armed forces. There is no trust between the Army and the intelligence bodies. This needs to be tackled at the earliest. Further, domestic intelligence must be strengthened." Consequently, the KRC made unequivocal recommendations, suggesting a "thorough review of the national security system in its entirety," conducted by a credible body of experts. The creation and appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) on December 24, 2019, is a direct outcome of the KRC's endorsement.
As we celebrate the 25th anniversary of the victory of our Armed Forces in Operation Vijay—the codename for the military operation to push back Pakistani infiltrators in the Kargil War—it is both vital and fundamental for the Indian Army to review and re examine the role of its senior leadership and Generalship (two, three, and four-star flag officers). In the jubilations that followed the victory, these leaders have remained unscarred, unblemished, and not held accountable for their serious dereliction of duty and propensity to misrepresent the truth. They have not been named and shamed for their incompetence, misrepresentation of facts, and penchant for lying and covering up the truth. Their transgressions led to the loss of 527 lives and 1,363 wounded, and it is therefore that they have blood on their hands.
While the commanding officers, young officers, and soldiers were pushed beyond the limits of their physical robustness and resilience to fight, suffer extreme deprivation and privation, get shot at, killed, wounded, and have their limbs dismembered fighting in the treacherous, cold, and clammy heights of Dras, Kargil, Batalik, and Hanifuddin Sectors; the Army’s Generalship has gone scot-free for having directly or constructively engendered it. As it happens in most instances of failures in command, the axe oftentimes falls on the subordinate leadership, which is implicated for the reverses suffered and losses incurred by the military.
The example of the 1962 debacle, in which the political and senior military leadership failed the country and the Army in particular, is still fresh in the memory of veterans who fought the PLA in the erstwhile NEFA (Arunachal) and Aksai Chin regions. It must be said honestly and forthrightly that the Prime Minister, Defense Minister, Director of Intelligence Bureau, Chief of Army Staff, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Central Command, Chief of General Staff, IV Corps Commander, General Officer Commanding 4 Infantry Division, and others who were the toadies of Lt. Gen. B.M. Kaul were substantially responsible for the disgraceful defeat suffered by the Indian Army. And, even then, the commanding officers, young officers, and soldiers fought as bravely as they could but were betrayed by those expected to lead with courage, operational wisdom and strategic vision.
That this failure in the mountains of NEFA and Aksai Chin, 37 years before the Kargil War, did not help our senior leadership to learn the right lessons from our military history is a sad commentary on the state of our Army, its structured teaching, and the art and science of leadership as taught, learned, practiced, and evaluated for selection and promotion to higher ranks in the organization. Without being cynical about the Army's Generalship, it is my conviction and firm belief that there is something very elementary and basic, which needs to be factored into our all-encompassing leadership training. This is more personal and character-driven than merely positional, flowing from the rank one wears on one's shoulder.
The stories, which one is getting to hear from those who were run roughshod by their senior officers when they reported factually and truthfully to the chain of command in their formations, are extremely disturbing and remorseful. I was personally pained and angered to know what happened to officers like Brigadier Surender Singh, Brigadier Devinder Singh, and Major Manish Bhatnagar, who was court-martialed only because they spoke truth to power and displayed that one sterling quality of an officer and a leader: caring for the lives and safety of their troops under their command.
While soldiers are required and expected to fight and attack enemy defenses to dislodge and evict the enemy, it must always be tempered with the tactical acumen of a reasonable probability of success. From the stories told by Brigadier Devinder Singh, who was commanding 70 Infantry Brigade, he displayed the courage of his convictions by calling off an attack in the Batalik Sector when he was informed that the assessment of the Officiating Commanding Officer of 1/11 Gorkha Rifles indicated a success probability of less than 1%. Yet, he was the first to clear the intrusions into the Line of Control but was sealed from any further promotion.
The case of Major Manish Bhatnagar is heart-rending, and only a stone-hearted and unempathetic person would not commiserate and feel for him for the ignominy of the court-martial he underwent, resulting in his dismissal from service in 2001. Brigadier Surender Singh, too, was "fixed," as we say in Army parlance. In the backdrop of the war stories, which one has heard from those who were given unfair and unjust treatment from the Army's hierarchy in an attempt to cover its backside and escape absolute culpability for their proclivity to be economical with the truth. It is a critical aspect for the Army to reflect upon and correct.
Or else, if we do not learn our lessons from our military history, we are destined to make the same mistakes repeatedly, at the cost of the lives of young officers and soldiers, who are the most non-negotiable assets of our Army. Celebrating the victory of Operation Vijay is essential, but so is having the courage to own up to the blunders that led to the unnecessary loss of precious human lives. 25 yrs is never too late. This is my two-bit advice to those responsible for the fiasco of the Kargil War.
When you pick up one end of the stick, you pick up the other. It is my dispassionate and fervent appeal to all veterans that we must come together collectively to undo the wrong done to those who displayed moral courage in the Kargil War and even now publicly call out those hiding behind the fig leaf of the KRC. Our collective voice will equally vindicate the truth and those who suffered at the hands of the guilty leadership. They are as much Heroes as those who were decorated and honoured.
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